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5Abstract
In “A Poetics of Chaos: Schizoanalysis and Postmodern American Fiction.” I use theories 
from physics and psychoanalysis together to explore narrative structures in recent 
American fiction. Chaos theory, which emerged in mathematical and biological 
discourses in the 1960s, postulates the intrinsic instability and unpredictability of many 
natural and physical phenomena. Theorists like Bertalanffy, Mandelbrot and Lorenz 
produced a vocabulary to account for these pervasive systems. In assessing historical, 
economic and, indeed, literary systems, we may draw terms from chaotic inquiry: 
bifurcation, fractal, moebial, reiteration, complexity, butterfly effect, strange attractors, 
and sensitive dependence upon initial conditions. “Chaotic narratives" may explicitly 
deploy (Barth, Pynchon, Gibson) or inadvertently express (Coover, Ondaatje, Powers) the 
structural features o f chaotic systems. Such writing is characterized by a diffusion of 
linear chronology, as well as ontological and narrative fracture, repetition and variation. 
Literary theorists N. Katherine Hayles, Joseph Conte, Llanjo Berressem and others have 
discussed how chaotic scientific and psycho-social systems are not only invoked in 
contemporary literature, but are themselves the structural and philosophical 
underpinnings of postmodern culture. My thesis builds upon chaotic-literary criticism by 
investigating the psychological implications o f “chaotic narratives.’* Drawing from the 
anti-deterministic “schizoanalysis” of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, I explain how 
writings by Don DeLillo, Paul Auster, David Foster Wallace and Mark Z. Danielewski 
perform and reflect the “orderly disorder” of psychic development. I advance the term 
“psychochaotics” to describe a theoretical approach that uses principles from chaos 
theory to reveal the psychodynamic systems in postmodern fiction.
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7Introduction: Literary Psychochaotics
Isn't the destiny of American literature that of 
crossing limits and frontiers, causing deterritorialized 
flows of desire to circulate, but also making these 
flows transport fascisizing, moralizing, Puritan, and 
familialist territorialities?
- Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.
Anti-Oedipus, 277-8
I open with this quotation because it expresses the central duality— some might say 
paradox— in American literature that I will be exploring in the following pages. The 
remarks occur in Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972) at a moment when 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari extrapolate their political and psychoanalytic concerns 
into the literary domain. Of course, anything sweepingly said about “American 
literature”— or, for that matter, any national product as a whole— is going to make even 
the most dedicated generalist narrow her or his eyes. But the alternate and sometimes 
simultaneous denial and perpetuation of s t r u c tu r a lly  rigid conditions— what Deleuze and 
Guattari call “territorialities”— does appear to be a prevalent impulse throughout the 
American canon, whether this impulse be manifest in the delimited fluidity of the 
Mississippi River navigated by Twain’s heroes, the reiterative, evolving prose of Stein, or 
the skewed quest novels of Kerouac, McCarthy and Pynchon. Inasmuch as American 
fiction reflects the culture’s reigning values of expansion and self-determination, encoded 
in these drives are commensurate pressures to advance new forms of organization, which 
are inevitably anchored in (though, perhaps, strung taut from resistance to) pre­
revolutionary modes of fascism, morality, Puritanism and familialism (to use Deleuze and 
Guattari’s terms). These foundational precepts are a blueprint upon which successive
8cultural patterns, or "flows of desire." are sketched out; markers from which new lines 
diverge; and ideas that yield new imaginings. In such a dialectic, there is neither order nor 
disorder but, rather, perpetual oscillation between the two poles, affirming, finally, the 
fallacy o f distinct polarities altogether.
Produced within this system, literature becomes a means of measuring a cultural 
temperature that is always changing, a means o f assigning coordinates in the knowledge 
that our emplotments are as ephemeral as the system under observation is fluxous. Before 
delving into particular literary works—these "turbulent mirrors"1 that reflect the 
philosophical and ideological variables of the environments from which they emerge— I 
will attempt to make plain the particular theoretical ideas of relevance to my study. 
Because I am working with a cluster of concepts drawn from discrete disciplines,2 it will 
take some unpacking to bring into view all necessary elements. I hope that this technical 
back-story will not eclipse the narrative matters that form the core o f this investigation 
into recent American fiction. My approach is literary throughout, but it is charged by 
concepts drawn from three fields of inquiry: postmodernism, chaos theory and 
schizoanalysis. Over the next few pages, I will elaborate upon each of these subjects,
1 I borrow this phrase from John Briggs and F. David Peat’s Turbulent M irror: An I llu stra ted  G uide to  
C haos T heory a n d  the Science o f  W holeness (1989 ), w hose title refers to the C hinese myth o f  the Y ellow  
Emperor, w ho used m agic to keep the “chaotic” creatures dw elling on the “other sid e” o f  mirrors from 
invading earth; the m agic spell forced the creatures to m echanically repeat the appearance and actions o f  
human beings. B riggs and Peat’s study describes how  “a new  breed o f  scientists has begun constructing a 
new mirror to hold up to nature: a turbulent mirror” (14).
2 Though as one m ight infer from the “ interdisciplinary fever” that is becom ing som ething o f  a pandem ic in 
academ ic circles (evinced , indeed, by this very dissertation), barriers betw een scientific and literary fields—  
what C.P. Snow  referred to in his fam ous lecture o f  1959 “the tw o cultures"— have o f  late been much 
eroded. M ichel Serres’ “dualist hell” o f  disciplinary distinctions (“Dream ” 33) has been to an extent 
remedied by a polym orphous postm odernism , heralded in works like O rder ou t o f  C haos: M a n ’s N ew  
D ialogue w ith  N ature  (1984), in w hich Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers argue for “a convergence o f  
science and the hum anities” (xxix), and D eleuze and Guattari's A  T housand P la teaus  (1980 ), which  
advances a theory o f  “nomad sc ience” to replace the rigid delineations o f  “state sc ien ce” (“Plateau 12”). 
Researchers at institutions like the MIT M edia Lab, the Santa Fe Institute, the Center for the Integration o f  
M edicine and Innovative T echnologies, The A rt-Science Laboratory in N ew  York, and the Research in 
Experimental D esign  group at X ER O X -PA R C  are exploring novel disciplinary com binations, such as 
nonlinear dynam ics and history, technology and m usic, and m edicine and art.
9foregrounding terms that are particularly salient to my thesis, providing historical 
information where warranted, and, at times, alluding ahead to literary applications that 
will be developed in the ensuing chapters. Mining the literary and cultural theories of 
Brian McHale and Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard, in the first instance, I advance a conception of 
postmodernism that is characterized by indeterminacy, multiplicity and ontological 
ambiguity; this conception is not new in itself, but highlights certain elements within the 
vast, polyphonic field o f postmodernist discourse that will be pertinent to the current 
work. I then explain how chaos theory— a branch o f science concerned with systems in 
perpetual oscillation between order and disorder— has become conceptually useful as a 
means of understanding the structural and material properties of postmodern fiction. 
Having gestured toward the sources and features of what I call “chaotic narratives," I 
begin to sketch-out the parameters of my particular interpretation of these texts— namely, 
that their literary chaotics expresses a vision of the psyche that is both radical in its 
resistance to traditional psychoanalytic approaches and revelatory in that its systems are 
structurally analogous to those of the culture they seek to represent and from which they 
emerge. I argue that just as chaos theory has undermined Newtonian convictions of 
causality and determinism in physical and mathematical systems, so too has the anti­
psychiatry o f Deleuze and Guattari— “schizoanalysis"— problematized the Freudian 
model of the psyche. Chaotic narratives, I submit, are sites where these two conceptual 
revolutions are together expressed. As such, these narratives work to enact and incite a 




Nobody likes the term.
- Brian MacHale. Postmodernist Fiction, 3
Postmodern science— by concerning itself with such 
things as undecidables, the limits of precise control, 
conflicts characterized by incomplete information.
‘ fractal catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes— is 
theorizing its own evolution as discontinuous, 
catastrophic, non-rectifiable. and paradoxical. It is 
changing the meaning of the word knowledge, while 
expressing how such a change can take place. It is 
producing not the known but the unknown.
- Jean F ra n c is  Lyotard, The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report 
on Know ledge. 58
Where individual attempts to produce the known, when taken collectively, produce the 
unknown: such is Lyotard's characterization of “the postmodern condition/' But mustn't 
this condition, then, necessarily be a fttw-condition, a pool o f perpetually circulating 
“undecidables.” within which nothing definite can take root? There are. indeed, as many 
definitions of postmodernism as there are ostensible manifestations o f . . . the disease. 
There are Jean Baudrillard's convictions about the waning o f authenticity and 
preeminence o f simulacra [The Precession o f  Simulacra (1981)], Lyotard's “incredulity 
towards metanarrative” (xxiv), Linda Hutcheon’s focus on ironicism and the 
“dedoxification” of cultural mythology (3), Ihab Hassams binary distinctions between 
modernist and postmodernist aesthetic and philosophical concerns1 (91), John Barth's 
incitement to a postmodern “literature of replenishment” [The Friday Book (1984) 206],
1 In The P ostm odern  Turn (1987), Hassan presents a handy chart w here m odernist preoccupations with 
concepts like author, tem poral, p u rp o se , orig inal, c lo sed  fo rm  and h ierarch y  are posed against 
postm odernist em phases upon d iscu rsive  field , spa tia l, p la y , copy, p ro c e s s  and anarchy  (91).
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Fredric Jameson's emphasis upon a multinational consumer capitalism and 
“schizophrenic signifying chains" (25), and a veritable cacophony of others. Each 
approach posits its own ideological valances, aesthetic values, and theoretical 
applications. While, for example, Brian McHale's contention that an “ontological 
dom inant. . .  is the principle of systematicity underlying [the] otherwise heterogeneous 
catalogues [of postmodernism]" (Postmodernist Fiction 10) is a move to establish a 
general paradigm within which cultural objects and processes may be interpreted, Michel 
Foucault's framing of postmodernism is preoccupied with the institutionalization of 
power and its affects on knowledge and identity. Feminist approaches to postmodernism 
may, like those of Helene Cixous and Julia Kristeva, stress “a fluid subjectivity and the 
end of totalizing narratives as freeing women from the constraints of the ‘feminine’ that 
was always already male defined" (Kaplan 250) or, following Donna Harroway, they 
might refer to contemporary sites of ontological hybridity (such as the cyborg) to 
illustrate the social and technological inscriptions specific to female identity. Some 
intellectuals, finally, will utter the word “postmodernism" at gunpoint only, and still 
others consider it to be an outright theoretical hoax.1
Particularly specious to some academics from diverse fields of inquiry are 
postmodernist invocations of models and theories from the so-called hard sciences 
(particularly physics and mathematics) towards the scientification and legitimization2 of 
literary and cultural analysis.3 To these watchdogs and doctrinaires, I would simply say
1 After sending out a Call for Papers through the University o f  Pennsylvania list serve (inviting subm issions 
for a conference panel on psychoanalysis and postmodern fiction), I received a terse corrective from one 
such disgruntled academ ic at UC Irvine: “There is no such thing as P ostm odern ism /’
2 T hese terms I use tentatively, as literary application o f  hard science may also hum anize the scientific or 
delegitim ize scientific objectivity.
3 See, in particular Alan Sokal and Jean Bricm ont’s scathing critique o f  Lacan, Iragary, D eleuze and other 
cultural theorists in In tellectu a l Im posters  (1998), w hich Richard D awkins favourably reviewed  
(“Postm odernism  D isrobed”) in N ature. Sokal and Bricm ont’s book was born from their “success" in
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this: give up— or don't; you have (always already) been assimilated in your very dissent. 
Perfectly self-perpetuating in its premises of absent origins and omni-referentiality, its 
ethos of multiplicity and indeterminacy, and its once-, twice- (or, basically, n-) removed 
points o f apprehension, postmodernism may bend and diffuse to incorporate practically 
every cultural product and procedure— even those that would pose themselves against 
postmodernism. Roland Barthes, for one. casts an approving gaze upon disciplinary 
mingling, which, he proposes in “From Work to Text.'’ would occur “when the solidarity 
of the old disciplines breaks down . . .  in the interests of a new object and a new language, 
neither of which has a place in the field of the sciences that were to be brought peacefully 
together” (155). Contestation and discord, theses and antitheses and, as Lyotard says (in 
lines quoted in the above epigraph), the “discontinuous, catastrophic, non-rectifiable and 
paradoxical'’ are the substance and sustenance of postmodernism. One wonders what 
historico-aesthetic movement might emerge to supplant it.1
Still, a literary study— and mine is no exception—requires a theoretical 
superstructure (not in the Marxist sense) that will assist in avoiding what Jameson calls “a 
view of the present history [and its concomitant fiction] as sheer heterogeneity, random 
difference, a coexistence of a host of distinct forces whose effectivity is undecidable” (4). It 
may seem unhelpfully syllogistic, then, that one of the theoretical lenses through which I 
suggest we examine postmodernism and its products is itself characterized by
having an article filled  with bogus science (“Transgressing the Boundaries: towards a transform ative 
herm eneutics o f  quantum gravity”) published in S ocia l Text. Several instances o f  hum anities applications o f  
science highlighted in Sokal and Bricm ont’s book do, indeed, seem  ridiculous— for exam ple, Lucy 
Iragary's argument that E =M c“ is a “sexed equation” because it “privileges the speed o f  light over other 
speeds that are vitally necessary to us” (110). But attack p ieces alw ays cite the cases o f  extrem e folly , 
extracted from a field that m ight otherw ise contain benign or fruitful inquiry. Bad scholarship, furthermore, 
is hardly just an w /erdisciplinary phenom enon; bad scholarship may be practiced internally, within any  
discip line  — even the hard sciences! Assorted responses to Sokal and B ricm ont’s contentious publication  
are collected  in The Soka l Hoax: The Sham that Shook the A cadem y  (2000).
1 Cybernetics, probably— but this is more a continuation o f  a polym orphous postm odernism  than an 
adverse reaction to it.
13
indeterminacy, heterogeneity and instability— but that, importantly, is not to say (as 
Jameson fears) ‘'random.'’ In order to view as “scientific” a mode of literary appraisal that 
foregrounds the opposite of definitiveness and solubility— one that is “rhizomatic"1 in its 
processes and structures, one that, in fact, searches fo r  instability rather than resolution— it 
behooves us to consider a branch of scientific inquiry that has (largely coincidental to 
postmodernism) elicited a reconsideration of what, precisely, constitutes knowledge. 
Scientific knowledge, Lyotard contends in The Postmodern Condition (1984), is 
erroneously cast as the sole site of knowledge. One strategy towards redefining the 
parameters of empirical knowledge has been to bring together science and humanities 
discourses in order to detect and elucidate the structural, systematic or philosophical 
correspondences.2 Among recent discourse of this kind, Joseph Conte’s Design and 
Debris: A Chaotics o f  Postmodern American Fiction (2002) perhaps most successfully 
connects a particular scientific model with literary strategy, producing a compelling 
argument for the interpenetration of the two fields. While Conte does not argue for 
literature as science, he manages to problematize and, at times, efface the line separating 
scientific and humanistic discourse, finding that in both “the arts and sciences a paradigm 
shift occurs in postmodernism in the conception of the relation between order and disorder” 
(7); it is this shared, roughly contiguous shift in paradigm that motivates a broader 
inspection of the correlatives between postmodern literature and the physical science of
1 In his essay, “Are R hizom es Scale-Free? N etwork Theory and Contemporary American Literature,” John 
Johnston provides a usefu lly  clear description o f  the rhizom e, as it is em ployed by D eleuze and Guattari:
“the rhizom e— literally the root-like stem that sends out shoots in all direction— evokes . . .  a com pletely  
different im age [from the “order and hierarchical organization” o f  the tree, which grow s according to a 
m odel o f  binarism and splitting]— that o f  a burrow, crabgrass, swarm or pack. With m ultiple entrances and 
exits, and m obile, heterogeneous connections, a rhizom e is a network with a unique consistency but no 
unity” (53). I w ill pick up on this term when I com e to d iscuss sch izoanalysis and, further on, with 
reference to various novels.
2 Important “literary” analyses to invoke scientific principles include Gillian Beer's D a rw in ’s P lo ts  (1983), 
Bruno Latour's S cience in A ction  (1987), and Charles B azerm an’s Sh apin g  W ritten K now ledge  (1988).
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chaos. “Postmodern fiction,'’ Conte asserts, “dwells at the interces between order and 
disorder, certainty and uncertainty, verifiability and disruption" (4)— and the shrewd 
analysis of a range of postmodern novels in Design and Debris goes far in supporting this 
assertion. Although Conte distinguishes between two kinds of literary enactments of chaos 
(“proceduralists" and “disruptors"1), he does not, finally, propose a literary mode or type 
that may be considered a sub-genre of postmodernist fiction. Redressing this omission. I 
would suggest a categorical determinant— chaotic narratives— to account for those literary 
works whose architecture has been (either intentionally or unconsciously) informed by the 
structures and philosophical principles of chaos theory— or. as it is variously called, 
nonlinear or complex dynamics. In order to make clear the character and silhouette of such 
literary forms, and to introduce the set of ideas which directed the philosophical energies of 
Deleuze and Guattari, some historical and conceptual discussion of chaos theory is 
required. To the provision of this, the following section will tend. I will then turn my 
attention to schizoanalysis, which provides the conceptual framework for understanding the 
psychological dimension of chaotic narratives.
1 Proceduralist fiction, according to Conte, includes Robert C oover’s U n iversa l B aseba ll A ssocia tion  
(1968), Gilbert Sorrentino’s P ack o f  L ies  (1997), and John H aw ks’ T ravesty  (1 9 7 6 )— “works in w hich an 
undisclosed pattern becom es em ergent in disorder; they are novels that reveal an im m inent design in the 
fractious conditions they describe’" (4 )— w hile disruptors include D eL illo ’s White N oise  (1984), Kathy 
A cker’s E m pire o f  the S en seless  (1988 ) and P ynchon’s G ra v ity ’s R ainbow  (1 9 8 7 )— “works for w hich the 
disorderly confusion o f  the phenom enal world, the disruption o f  staid and resolved structures, becom es the 
requirements for the em ergence o f  a new  and more desirable order."’
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ii. Chaos
The postmodern cross-pollination of disciplines and 
media is evident in its literary artifacts, whose 
complexity and “orderly disorder" are themselves 
reflections and embodiments of chaotic systems.
- N. Katherine Hayles, Chaos Bound: 
Orderly Disorder in Contemporary 
Literature and Science, 10
The theoretical and formal correspondences between postmodernism and chaos theory 
have been enumerated in humanities and scientific discourses alike. Floyd W. Matson, in 
The Broken Image: Man, Science and Society (1964). was the first to make explicit these 
correspondences, referring to chaos theory as “postmodern science," a coinage later 
picked up by Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition. Chaos theory emerged in the early 
twentieth century as part of a scientific movement that undermined classical assumptions 
o f causality and determinacy.1 Developments like Einstein’s Theory of Relativity,
Godel’s Incompleteness Theory, Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, and discoveries in 
quantum mechanics,2 moved scientific thinking away from Newton’s mechanistic physics 
toward an unpredictable, indeterminate and, at times, paradoxical concept of the universe. 
Together, these developments constituted a revolution in scientific thought— or, to extract 
Thomas Kuhn’s phrase from The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions (1970). a paradigm
1 T hese “classical assum ptions'’ are first articulated in Isaac N ew ton 's P rin cip ia  philosophic! na tu ra l is 
m athem atica  (1687).
2 To wit: relativity theory (1905 ) finds that objects m oving extraordinarily fast p ossess different properties 
than objects m oving at everyday speeds; G od el’s Incom pleteness Theorem (19 3 1 ) holds that “there are no 
rules for generating all o f  the truths about the natural numbers’’ because “there are an infinite number o f  
w ays w e  can ch oose a finite set o f  axiom s and rules o f  a formal system  in an attempt to mirror syntactically 
the mathem atical truths o f  the structure” (Casti 371); H eisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle (1 9 2 7 ) im plicates 
the observer as a presence in any system  o f  m easurem ent— a contention that w as furthered by N iels Bohr’s 
Principle o f  C om plem entarity (1927), w hich rejects the logical contradictions o f  light as w ave and photons 
as com plem entary; and quantum theory supposes that extraordinarily sm all objects behave differently from  
everyday m icroscop ic objects.
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shift, where “an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new 
one” (92).
Chaos theory analyzes systems that move between states of order and disorder, 
generation and destruction, unification and dislocation, hybridization and 
homogenization. While the Newtonian paradigm for physical behavior emphasizes 
predictability, chaos theory stresses unpredictability. Rather than deeming systematic 
indeterminacy anomalous and non-conducive to standard, rational methods of 
deciphering, chaotic inquiry attempts to make sense of the particular information 
produced by these indeterminate, irrational systems. In Chaos Theory in the Social 
Sciences: Foundations (1996), Douglas L. Kiel and Euel Elliott explain that “[wjhile a 
Newtonian universe was founded on stability and order, chaos theory teaches that 
instability and disorder are not only widespread in nature, but essential to the evolution of 
complexity in the universe” (2). In Newtonian mechanics and its conceptual parent. 
Euclidean geometry, small causes lead to small effects and geometrical properties are 
scale-invariant; an equilateral triangle, for example, will appear and behave like an 
equilateral triangle, no matter what its size. But in a chaotic system, statements made 
about one scale level do not necessarily apply to another. Systems of interest in chaos 
theory are dynamic (they change over time) and may be mathematically represented in 
differential equations.1 Not all dynamic systems are chaotic, however, and this is where 
the terms linear and nonlinear become important. In a linear dynamic system, a variable 
will change proportionally in response to a stimulus; examples of such are the graphic 
representations of a circle, a parabola or an ellipsis. But chaotic systems differ from other 
dynamic systems because they are nonlinear, which means they depend upon two or more
1 An equation containing derivatives— that is, dynam ic variables that change in response to change in the 
independent variables.
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(often unquantifiable) factors acting independently. In these cases, response and amount 
of stimulus are not necessarily proportionally linked (as they are in Newton's 
conception). Thus, as a chaotic system progresses over time, its behavior (or, if graphed, 
its shape) changes in unpredictable ways.
One of the most famous graphic examples of chaotic behavior is the Lorenz 
Attractor [Appendix /]. While plotting a differential equation corresponding to a weather 
pattern, Edward Lorenz found that each repetition would appear slightly off-kilter from 
the one that preceded it. This successiv e variation, which produced the famous butterfly- 
shaped Lorenz Attractor, resulted from tiny fluctuations in the starting point of the 
system. Lorenz reveals in his seminal paper of 1963, ‘‘Deterministic Non-periodic Flow," 
that a system’s behavior is largely contingent upon its initial conditions. The infinite 
imprecision of a system's initial conditions produced a mathematically random but 
generally discernible image, which became increasingly unpredictable with each 
iteration.1 The term “chaos theory’’ may therefore be something of a misnomer, as it 
connotes sheer randomness rather than the combined patterns of form and formlessness 
that chaotic systems in fact embody.2 Each disorderly element is counterbalanced (either 
alternately or simultaneously) by an orderly one. While the course of a chaotic system 
cannot be predicted (disorder), its trajectory will veer toward a representative point 
(order). In a linear system, this spot or attractor is fixed— for example, consider the 
midpoint of a pendulum's path, where the motion is always toward or aw?ay from a fixed
1 This infinite im precision— or, in chaos theory, a “sensitive dependence upon initial conditions"— is in 
turn com plicated by another dependency, the Liapunov exponent, w hich accounts for the sev e r ity  o f  
sensitive dependence upon initial conditions.
2 At the 1986 m eeting o f  the Royal Society, chaos theory was o ffic ia lly  defined as “the study o f  stochastic  
behavior occurring in a determ inistic system" (Stewart 16-7). “Chaos theory" may also be considered an 
im precise term because, in addition to not representing utter random ness, it is not a th eory : oscillation  
toward and away from periodicity and chaos has been experim entally proven in both nature and pure math.
point at the center of its trajectory, when the pendulum is at a right angle to the earth. In a 
chaotic system, however, the compelling force is impossible to locate precisely and is 
rather aptly called a strange attractor. This kind of attractor appears, for example, in the 
behavior of a double planar pendulum, which is made by attaching a second pendulum to 
the swinging end of the first; the shape of this system cannot be predicted—to know how 
the second pendulum will swing, one must know the starting position of the first 
pendulum with infinite precision, which is impossible. Still, the disorder contains order: 
when mapped into phase space1 (recording the pendulum’s angular position, i.e. each time 
the second pendulum forms a vertical line), the orbits stay within a confined region, 
though they never exactly coincide.
Lorenz discovered that in a nonlinear dynamic system “a nearly imperceptible 
change in a constant will produce a qualitative change in the system's behavior" (69). 
What can begin as a tiny fluctuation in a seemingly orderly system can result in 
catastrophe, or the complete dissolution of pre-existing structures. This is a result of 
recursion, “the continual re-absorption or unfolding of what has come before” (Briggs 
and Peat 66)— an integral property of any dynamic system, but one with potentially 
dramatic consequences in nonlinear dynamic systems. Each time a system reiterates, the 
turbulence grows exponentially because the output of one iteration is fed back into the 
succeeding one. One way of conceptualizing this is to think of a continuous river that is 
suddenly interrupted by a fallen pebble. The water must deviate from its previous course 
in order to move around the pebble. The system bifurcates [Appendix if). And after 
passing by the pebble, the water does not return to its original course of motion, but rather
1 Phase space is a m eans o f  plotting in many dim ensions, represented by positive, negative, real and 
im aginary numbers (imaginary numbers are real number multiplied by -1); each variable o f  an equation 
corresponds to one dim ension.
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fans out into unknowable swirls and vortices which repeat on various scales for an 
unforeseeable number of times. Formally speaking, bifurcation gives rise to perpetual 
mise en abyme, or fractals, where an initial pattern is replicated within and without itself, 
making it impossible to determine the origin or borders of the system. Probably the most 
famous graphic representation of this process is Benoit Mandelbrot's Julia Set, a mapping 
of the recursive equation, z - - >z2 = C [Appendix ///]. Mandelbrot's major contribution 
to chaos theory— fractal geometry— is a technique by which nonlinear systems (the 
irregular or fractional figures produced) can be represented in visual form.
With the 1988 publication of James Gleik’s Chaos: The Making o f  a New Science. 
as well as other non-technical accounts of the subject,1 chaos theory took root in the 
popular consciousness. Supplying a theoretical mode for understanding turbulent 
operations in all composite dynamical systems, chaotic applications would emerge in 
several disciplines outside the realm of the hard sciences. A literary theorist who has 
studied systematic processes in postmodern fiction (in particular, DeLillo's “systems 
novels"2), Tom LeClair affirms that chaos theory enables an investigator to “recognize 
uncertainty and incompleteness’' (Slethaug 13) that are indigenous to social and cultural 
as well as biological, physical and mathematical fields. Chaotic systems are in fact more 
common than orderly systems,3 showing up in contexts as diverse as measles epidemics.
1 Other popular w orks about chaos theory include Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers’ O rder out o f  
C haos: M an's N ew  D ia logu e w ith  N ature (1984 ), W. M itchell W aldrop's C om plexity: The E m erging  
Science a t the E dge o f  O rder a n d  C haos (1994), John L. C asti's C om plexification: E xplain ing the 
P aradox ica l W orld  Through the Science o f  Surprise  (1994); Peter C oveney and Roger High fie ld 's  
F rontiers o f  C om plexity: The Search fo r  O rder in a  C haotic W orld  (1995), and Richard Leaky and Roger 
L ew in’s The Sixth Extinction: B iodiversity  a n d  Its S u rviva l (1996). These works are particularly influential 
in the hum anities because they deal more with the aesthetic and philosophical d im ensions o f  chaos theory, 
playing down its technical and mathematical aspects.
2 This is the subject o f  LeClair's In the Loop: D on D eL illo  a n d  the System s N ovel (1994).
3 This assertion is expanded upon in H ayles’ essay, “C om plex D ynam ics in Literature and Science," in 
C haos an d  O rder: C om plex D ynam ics in L iterature a n d  Science  (1991).
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dripping faucets, and stock market fluctuations.1 Though disruptive to a previously stable 
system, chaotic emergence can prove to be a productive, even necessary, phenomenon. In 
Chaos Theory in the Financial Markets (1994), Dimitris Chorafas states that “[hjealthy 
capital markets and money markets are characterized by turbulence and volatility, rather 
than efficiency and fair price [and like] any dynamic system, a healthy economy does not 
tend to equilibrium but it is, instead, in steady change'’ (16). Sociological discourse has 
likewise connected long-term cultural robustness with complexity and periods of 
upheaval— evinced, for example, by diaspora, which, Paul Gilroy writes, “can be used to 
instantiate a ‘chaotic’ model in which shifting ‘strange attractors’ are the only visible 
points of fragile stability amid social and cultural turbulence” (128).2 As it is with social 
systems, so is it with physiological ones; Lewis Lipsitz discovered, for example, that 
aging is marked by decreased complexity in measures such as heart rate, blood pressure 
and brain wave pattern.3 Too much coherence and inflexibility in organic systems can, in 
fact, impede long-term functioning. And because chaotic recursion incorporates new 
levels of incongruity and fluctuation, a system's ability to accommodate further alteration
1 Explicated, respectively, in W illiam  Schaffer and Mark K ot’s “N early  O ne-D im ensional D ynam ics in an 
E pidem ic” (1985 ), Bernardo Huberm an’s “A M odel for D ysfunctions in Smooth Pursuit Eye M ovem ent” 
(1986), Robert Shaw ’s The D ripp in g  F aucet as a M odel C haotic  System  (1984), and W illiam  B rock's  
“Chaos and C om plexity in E conom ics and Financial S cien ce” (1989).
2 “By em bracing diaspora,” Gilroy states, “theories o f  identity turn instead toward contingency, 
indeterminacy, and conflict. With the idea o f  valuing diaspora m ore h igh ly  than the coercive unanim ity o f  
the nation, the concept becom es explicitly antinational. This shift is connected with transforming the 
familiar unidirectional idea o f  diaspora as a form o f  catastrophic but sim ple dispersal that enjoys an 
identifiable and reversible originary m om ent— the site o f  trauma— into som ething far more com p lex” 
(128).
3 These findings appear in the Jou rn a l o f  the A m erican M ed ica l A ssoc ia tion  (April, 1992). Frank 
Zingrone’s com m ents in “Chaos and the M eaning o f  Electric Culture” are also illustrative here: “B io logy  
and physiology are finding chaos in the human body in w hich erratic, random behaviours, once thought to 
be pathological, are now  understood as ‘normal’ chaotic irregularities. A system  in extrem e disequilibrium  
can fluctuate in w ays that force the system  up into a state o f  higher organization, more com plex, more 
lively. Understanding such turbulent patterns, once thought to be dangerous, even life-threatening, is 
beginning to allow  for m ore effective therapies and a better understanding o f  the effects o f  electric process 
on the body. M edicine is d iscovering that som e degree o f  chaos is necessary for the healthy functioning o f  
the heart, as it is for the brain. A healthy heart is continually varying its beat over a range o f  frequencies. 
For the brain, especially  in literate, analytical pursuits, a high level o f  chaotic activity is generally expected  
in a healthy individual” (M cLuhan Studies  n.p.).
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is enhanced; in his essay, “Negentropy, Noise and Emanicpatory Thought," Edward 
Charles White confirms that chaotic fluctuation may actually lead a system to "‘organize 
itself into a more complex structure [and a] highly differentiated state” (263). Vann 
Spruiell provides an example o f this increased robustness in psychological systems: “We 
can begin to understand how a system under threat from impingements or perturbations 
from the external world may alter itself by cutting off or distorting communications 
among its parts, either dampening or intensifying its ‘optimal levels’ of chaotic behavior, 
but also restricting certain functional interactions” (30). Recent developments in 
evolutionary computing have also used chaotic modeling to develop “genetic 
algorithms,” 1 which form part of the “conceptual and computational model for problem­
solving and creativity” (Goertzel 9) that is being used in the fabrication of artificial 
intelligentsia.
Bringing chaos theory into the humanities has been both a revelatory and spurious 
exercise. Not everyone is happy with disciplinary mingling.2 I have mentioned the 
infamous Social Text hoax, which became the basis for Sokal and Bricmont’s book. 
Intellectual Imposters, a lengthy polemic against philosophical and critical 
“misappropriations” of scientific and mathematical ideas; the ninth chapter is devoted to 
writings by Deleuze and Guattari, which Sokal and Bricmont call an “avalanche of ill- 
digested scientific and pseudo-scientific jargon” (146). Similarly, in Higher Superstition: 
The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science (1994), Paul Gross and Norman Levitt
1 G enetic algorithms generate structures according to the behavior o f  “m em es.” C onceived  by Richard 
Dawkins in 1976, m em es are replicators o f  cultural information that one mind transmits (verbally or by 
demonstration) to another mind. Som e proponents o f  m em es suggest that they evo lve  via natural 
selection— in a way sim ilar to Darwin's notion o f  b iological evolution— on the prem ise that variation, 
mutation, com petition, and “ inheritance” influence their replicative success.
2 Perhaps this is w hy in (what is referred to among D eLillo buffs as his “sc ien ce  n o v e l”) R a tn er’s S ta r  
(1989), the eyepatched C eleste D essau says o f  her role at Field Experim ent N um ber One: “M y work here is 
interdisciplinary. This is the loneliest kind o f  work. I find it hard to m ake real friends” (114).
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refer to the “vaporous pontifications” (98) of Steven Best1 and the “amateurish errors" 
(99) of N. Katherine Hayles as “the metaphysical hubris of postmodernism as such" (98). 
To maintain perspective, however, we should acknowledge that displeasure exists on both 
sides o f the disciplinary divide; in “Blurred Genres," Clifford Greets offers a wry but 
telling account of indiscriminate promiscuity between intellectual tribes. The objects of 
his derision include:
scientific discussions looking like belles lettres morceaux (Lewis Thomas, 
Lauren Eiseley), baroque fantasies presented as deadpan empirical 
observations (Borges, Barthelme), histories that consist o f equations and 
tables or law court testimony (Fogel and Engerman, Le Roi Ladurie). 
documentaries that read like true confessions (Mailer), parables posing as 
ethnographies (Castenada), [and] theoretical treatises set out as travelogues 
(Levi-Strauss). (165-66)
Geertz continues his jeremiad against generic hybridization with reference to “Nabokov's 
Pale Fire (1962), that impossible object made of poetry and fiction, footnotes and images 
from the clinic, [which] seems very much of the time; one waits only for a quantum 
theory in verse or biography in algebra'* (166). One waits, indeed—if the number poems 
that Geertz augurs would constitute anything as magnetic and agonizing as the 
polymathic Pale Fire. But rather than engage in mud slinging with those who oppose 
cross-breeding of science and the humanities, it is perhaps more interesting to consider 
why the adoption of scientific concepts by non-scientists (or humanities models by those 
not formally educated in the humanities) might invoke such hostility from practitioners of 
the borrowed discipline. In Chaos Bound (1990), Hayles attempts to explain the so-called
1 Author o f  “Chaos and Entropy: Metaphors in Postmodern Science and Social T heory’’ in Science a n d  
C ulture  (1991).
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"science w ars,"1 stating that concepts like chaos “become highly charged and thus 
explored and exploited without the sanctioning of the established discourse owners in 
question" (116). The novelist, for example, has “no right" to home in on a body of 
knowledge that he or she did not help to create and (presumably) does not have the 
background to fully understand. Kurt Vonnegut acknowledges an (albeit dated by a few 
decades) intolerance to scientific knowledge even within literary studies, where “[t]he 
feeling persists that no one can simultaneously be a respectable writer and know how a 
refrigerator works" ( l) .2 From their respective vantage points as scientist/critic and 
author, Hayles and Vonnegut gesture toward an intellectual territorialism that, we must 
agree, is a (perhaps the) common denominator among not only research fields but also 
individual researchers within individual fields. Shunted as we are through institutions that 
(quite rightly) reward innovation and original thought, the impetus to specialize (and, 
within a specialist area, to become the specialist) is significant. The problem arises when, 
in our efforts to defend an exclusive expertise, we render the knowledge pertaining to that 
specialist zone exclusive. Postmodernism, for all o f the typological dissidence it breeds, 
“aspires to an interdisciplinarity that presumes a shared discourse, the diffusion of 
theoretical concepts into all quadrants of society, and a sense o f an integrated feedback 
loop among the disciplines" (Conte 15). It seems inevitable, then, that we would see 
during this period (at worst) an assault on the perimeters of would-be “specialist zones" 
and (at best) a willed circulation of ideas from laboratory to chapbook to website.
An embargo on free trade between the humanities and the sciences is, finally, an 
embargo on knowledge. By strictly delineating— ox, pace Deleuze and Guattari,
1 For a selection o f  these debates, see Keith Parson's The Science W ars (2003).
2 He continues: “C ollege may be to blame. English Majors are encouraged . . .  to hate chem istry and 
physics, and to be proud because they are not dull and creepy and hum ourless and war-oriented like the 
engineers across the quad” (1-2).
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territorializing— separate spheres of discourse and investigation, we prevent the 
circulation of ideas—the sifting, reconstituting, imagining and holding patterns that give 
rise to new information. In Man's Rage fo r Chaos: Biology. Behavior and the Arts 
(1967), Morse Peckham maintains that the roughly simultaneous emergence o f ideas from 
seemingly discrete disciplines reveals a rudimentary interdependence among operations 
and investigations from all discursive fields. Peckham finds that “the phenomenon that 
different individuals in the same culture arrive at the same solution to a problem, but 
quite independently of one another'’ testifies to a “cultural convergence” (11). Such a 
convergence is continually taking place, both visibly and invisibly. This is particularly 
true in the case of chaos theory and postmodernism, which are suffused with suspicions 
of scientific “universals” and cultural “master narratives,” respectively. It makes sense 
that both practices would gain momentum at a point when the edicts of determinability 
and order no longer resonate with a fractured and schizophrenic1 cultural consciousness. 
Sociologist T.R. Young’s characterization of chaos theory as undermining “all claims for 
perfection, finality, normality, or historical necessity” (290) could equally be applied to 
the postmodernism of Lyotard, McHale and others. Ecologist Michael E. Zimmerman 
reinforces this comparison, stating that “chaos theory seems compatible with postmodern 
theory’s critique of modernity’s search for a univocal, stable structure that organizes all
1 Here I em ploy Jam eson’s sense o f  the term, which associates postmodern aesthetic and cultural 
m ovem ents with schizophrenia. “The schizophrenic experience,” Jameson says, “ is an experience o f  
isolated, d isconnected, d iscontinuous material signifiers w hich fail to link up into a coherent sequence. The 
schizophrenic thus does not know  personal identity in our sense, since our feeling o f  identity depends on 
our sense o f  the persistence o f  the T  and the ‘m e’ over tim e” (119). A ccording to Jam eson, the 
schizophrenic lacks a personal identity, is unable to differentiate betw een se lf  and w orld, and is incapable 
o f  experiencing continuity through tim e. Jameson argues that contem porary capitalism has extended the 
sym ptom s o f  schizophrenia to the m asses in the form o f  postmodern culture. The schizophrenic confusion  
destroys the possibility o f  critical perspectives. C onversely, D eleuze and Guattari contend that 
“schizophrenia is not the identity o f  capitalism , but on the contrary its d ifference, its divergence, and its 
death” (A nti-O edipus  246); they advise radical political m ovem ents to “ learn from the psychotic how  to 
shake o f f  the Oedipal yoke and the effects o f  power, in order to initiate a radical politics o f  desire freed 
from all beliefs” (Seem  xxi).
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phenomena-’ (13). And if it appears that cross-referencing among disciplines is profitable 
only to the arts and so-called “soft sciences-’ like economics and sociology, we might 
consider Spruiell’s statements: “The science of the future will be less restrictive, range 
further, and be more modest in its claims to approach the truth. At the same time it will 
benefit from the cross-currents of information created by interdisciplinary studies-- (4).
The intercalations between chaos theory and postmodernism may now become 
apparent.1 As Hayles states,“[b]oth the literary and scientific manifestations of chaotics 
are involved in feedback loops with the culture. They help create a context that energizes 
the questions they ask; at the same time, they also ask questions energized by the context-’ 
[Chaos and Order (1991) 7]. Indeed, the structural features of postmodern fiction portray 
the randomness and incalculability that permeates postmodern culture; and just as chaos 
theory in physics studies the emergence of discrete structures from smooth, continuous 
ones, postmodern narratives depict the shift from linear and progressive notions of 
causality and history to a multifarious and, at times, paradoxical network of events and 
experience. I take as my point of departure that chaos theory has generated within 
literature a particular kind of fictional text. I would call these fictions chaotic narratives. 
The formal characteristics of chaotic narratives resemble those found in chaotic systems 
of the physical sciences— except in the case of fiction, these systems are made material in 
language and, in particular, narrative structure; reiteration, disorder/order, 
unpredictability, sensitive dependence upon initial conditions, indeterminate scale,
1 Critical discourse is itse lf a nonlinear dynam ic system — a veritable field o f  intersections and strange 
attractors, rather than a set o f  parallel lines that would process information autonom ously. There are (to 
evoke Brian M cH ale’s evocation o f  Kuhn) paradigm shifts. Like the multi-planar pendulum  that alters its 
orbit with each successive appendage, critical theory modulates around a basin o f  attraction that is 
continually shifting in relation to intellectual, social and political developm ent. C haotic iteration, 
furthermore, m ay be conceived  as the system atic process o f  inclusion and evolution , an at once  
dism em bering and coalescing operation that resists rigidity and orderly replication and works against 
hegem onic structures that require totality' and continuity. Structuralists and poststructuralists w ould thus 
find in chaos theory a means o f  form ally representing concepts o f  indeterm inacy and the absence o f  origin.
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alinearity and diffusion are all variously detectable in such texts. In some cases, literary 
applications o f chaos have been announced by authors: in Further Fridays (1995), John 
Barth says that he deliberately applied a nonlinear, dynamic structure in The Voyage o f  
Somebody the Sailor (1991), a novel that he refers to as “chaotic-arabesque 
Postmodernism” (289), whose “coaxial esemplasy” (282) is achieved through a continual 
movement between the poles of order and disorder; the protagonist in Barth’s Lost in the 
Funhouse (1988) laments the windy digressions of the plot in which he is enmeshed and 
foresees that “he will repeat the deception, at ever rarer-intervals all his wretched life” 
(93). In The Open Work (1962), Umberto Eco writes that the “tendency toward disorder 
characteristic of the poetics of openness, must be understood as a tendency toward 
controlled disorder, toward a circumscribed potential, toward a freedom that is constantly 
curtailed by the germ offormativity present in any form that wants to remain open to the 
free choice o f the addressee” (64-5). In other instances, chaotic etiology is made explicit 
in narratives themselves: Bharati Mukherjee’s Jasmine (1989), a novel about an illegal 
Indian immigrant in the United States, contains an epigraph from Gleick's Chaos:
Making a new Science; the citation informs our interpretation of Jasmine, whose 
seemingly erratic personal transformations belie a deeply embedded order. As Conte 
reminds us, William Gibson’s The Difference Engine (1991) mentions the “period- 
doubling route to chaos” (211) and Hanjo Berressem sees Brigadier Pudding of 
Pynchon’s Vineland (1990) “oscillating] catastrophically between two impossibilities” 
(38), trying to “list all historical bifurcations that might come to define the next epoch.”
In still other cases, while perhaps not directly signaled by either text or author, nonlinear 
dynamics are manifest in the formal properties of a narrative or the behavioral patterns of 
its characters: Richard Powers’ The Gold Bug Variations (1991) (whose title, o f course,
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references Bach's fugal masterpiece and Poe's short story) interposes four characters, 
whose actions and destinies are patterned out as a complex system. William Marshall's 
Roadshow (1985), which jump-cuts among those involved in a massive traffic jam, 
presents a similar complex system through variegated subjectivities and the coincidence 
of movement and stasis. Michael Ondaatje's The English Patient (1992) reveals the 
symmetries and orders that exist among geographically and historically disparate events. 
Beyond postmodernism proper, we can locate chaotic processes within the liminal or 
prescient texts by Beckett and Joyce; respectively, the iterative narration in How’ It Is 
(1965). and the implicate meanings of Finnegan's Wake (1939), both of which continue 
to unfold new insights, ever tending toward meaning without becoming exhausted by full 
explanation.
Attending these literary invocations (both explicit and implicit), a body o f critical 
work has been accruing since the early nineties, mostly in the form of articles by science- 
literature theorists like Hanjo Berressem, Paul Civello, David Porush, and Peter Freese.1 
Along with Hayles’ Chaos Bound and the essay collection she edited, Chaos and Order: 
Complex Dynamic Systems in Literature and Science, book-length discussions of chaos and 
literature include Susan Strehle's Fiction and Quantum Universe (1992), Gordon 
Slethaug's Beautiful Chaos: Chaos Theory and Metachaotics in Recent American Fiction 
(2000), Harriett Hawkins’ Strange Attractors: Literature, Culture and Chaos Theory 
(1995), and Joseph Conte's aforementioned Design and Debris.1 As yet unplumbed,
1 For exam ple, Berresserrfs “ Strangely Attractive: The T opology o f  Psychic and Social Space in Vineland" 
in P ynchon N otes (1994 ), C iv e llo ’s chapters on the new sciences and D eL illo 's fiction in A m erican  L ite ra iy  
N aturalism  a n d  its Twentieth C entury Transform ations (1994 ), Porush’s “M aking Chaos: T w o V iew s on a 
N ew  S cien ce” in The L itera ture o f  Science: P erspectives on P opu lar Scien tific W riting  (1993 ), and Freese's 
“The Entropic End o f  the Am erican Dream: Thomas Pynchon’s The C iy in g  o f  L ot 49" in A nglia  (1991).
2 W hile these w orks attend primarily to postmodern literature, several critical works exam ine modern and 
pre-modern literature in relation to chaos theory: Philip K uberski's C haosm os: L iterature, Science, an d
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however, are the psychological implications of chaotic narratives, which are essential in 
understanding the function and effects of this particular narrative mode. These functions 
and effects, I argue, can be gleaned by interpreting apposite texts through the philosophical 
writings of Deleuze and Guattari— specifically, their anti-psychiatry, which they label 
“schizoanalysis.” Itself rife with the structural and philosophical principles of chaos theory, 
Deleuze and Guattari*s writing provides the language and theoretical foundation for a 
literary psychochaotics.
iii. Schizoanalysis
A like determinism will govern the stones of the 
roadway and the brain of man.
- Emile Zola, The Experimental 
Novel and Other Essays, 17
I have tried to establish the historical background and conceptual fundamentals of chaos 
theory— as it is conceived in scientific and social discourse alike— and extrapolated from 
the theoretical to the literary dimension, where narrative systems can be seen to embody 
the “orderly disorder” of chaos. I would suggest that these “chaotic narratives” constitute 
a literary mode unto themselves, figuring prominently in the historical-aesthetic 
movement generally (if contentiously) referred to as postmodernism.1 It now remains for 
me to build upon this foundation, to respond to the materialist philosopher’s favourite 
retort: “If so, then what?” If  chaotic narratives are in fact a significant species o f text and
T heoiy  (1994), Thom as Jackson R ice’s Joyce, C haos an d  C om plex ity  (1997 ), and Ira L ivingston’s A rrow  o f  
C haos: Rom anticism  a n d  P ostm odern ity  (1997).
1 That they constitute one m ode, it should be noted, does not preclude such w orks from participating in 
other m odes; this is not an e ith er/o r  binary but, in true inclusive, chaotic fashion, an an d /an d  o f  coexisting  
possibilities.
29
not merely a structural curiosity among myriad other postmodern experiments in form, 
then what particular effects do these texts achieve that other literary works do not? While 
it might be (and has been) argued that nonlinear narrative systems function to disrupt 
those “master narratives" that would otherwise confine every body to the cause-and-effect 
regimes of capitalism, the penal code, and behavioral edicts inscribed by age, gender and 
race (all faces of what Foucault calls “the Normal"1), how is this in actuality 
accomplished? The printed page itself effects nothing; the person apprehending said page, 
however, may effect much.
I suppose divining— insisting upon— a textual function is at base an exercise in 
literary politicization. As an inherently subversive science (toppling and de-truthing 
formerly dominant scientific “givens’”), chaos theory, when deployed in the arts, brings 
with it a vindication of the anarchic, the uncodified, and the perpetually mutating. But 
how do these principles and themes move from the page and into the world? How does 
form become a political strategy? To wit: by textually staging a psychic scenario that 
accommodates— or, indeed, enacts— permutation, flux and systematic complexity. 
Literary manifestations of chaos, I contend, represent psychological operations as 
reiterative, indeterminate, interpolar and interconnected; in so being, these textual 
expressions activate (rather than suppress) in the reader analogous cognitive processes 
and ontological sensibilities. If it were the case that “the stones of the roadway” to which 
Zola refers in the above epigraph were deterministically governed, then we might identify
1 In D iscip line a n d  Punish  (1979) Foucault uses the principle o f  “the N orm al” (184 ) to illustrate the 
m echanism s and effects that cultural orders have upon citizens. A ccording to Foucault, the concept o f  
“norm alcy” is so thoroughly ingrained in public consciousness that it is practically indistinguishable from  
that o f  consciousness. The Norm al operates through negation, em phasizing difference to the point where all 
persons are inclined to operate in unison (e .g ., if  my lawn contains the only patch o f  ye llo w  grass on an 
otherw ise green block, 1 w ill be getting out the sprinkler and fertilizer). The value o f  such social 
hom ogeneity is, o f  course, its propensity^rescribe practices that are desirable to governing and marketing 
bodies, thus casting critical and radical elem ents into the unfavoured, “abnormal” margins.
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a “like determinism” in the “brain of man"— but, as studies in chaos have revealed, what 
regulates the behavior of those stones on the roadway is not reducible to a set of 
measurable and repeatable physical forces. If psychic development and psychological 
operations are understood to be at least as complex as the collection of stones in the 
roadway, then the representation of these operations must assume an accordingly chaotic 
form.
Enter Deleuze and Guattari, les enfants terribles of postmodern philosophy and 
fervent adversaries of all-things-hegemonic-and-determined-and-otherwise-totalizing. In 
the same way that chaos theory problematizes Newtonian causality, so too does the anti­
psychiatry o f Deleuze and Guattari problematize Freud’s psychic topography. At issue 
here, to put it bluntly, is the delimiting nature of Freudian psychoanalysis— the codes and 
myths which, Deleuze and Guattari argue, serve to condition and homogenize the subject 
towards the supposed goal of neuroses evacuation.1 In opposition to orthodox 
psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari posit another mode of psychic apprehension, 
which, in Anti-Oedipus (the first of two books composing their major work. Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia2) they label “schizoanalysis.” For Deleuze and Guattari, there is more 
at stake here than changing the rhythms and routines of free association and dream 
analysis in the fifty-minute session (which Lacan had already tampered with); the
1 Their project can be compared to N ietzsche's The A n ti-C hrist (1892), an attack on Christianity and the 
herdism it prom otes. Here, the com m onalities between psychoanalysis and religion becom e important: a set 
o f  beliefs propagated by the faithful in a m ove to find security and legislation where none ex ists— a system  
“in w hich every lie is sanctified” (N ietzsche 38).
2 Stuart M oulthrop, in “R hizom e and Resistance: Hypertext and the Dreams o f  a N ew  Culture,” propounds 
the importance o f  this work: “C apita lism  an d  S ch izophren ia  sets in m otion perhaps the m ost radical 
reinterpretation o f  W estern culture attempted in the second half o f  this century. G eopolitics, 
psychoanalysis, neurobiology, sexuality, mathematics, linguistics, sem iotics, and philosophy all fall within 
the purview o f  their encyclopedic project. . . . [T]heir various co-resonating tropes o f  nom adology, 
deterritorialization, lines o f  flight, sm ooth and striated spaces, double articulation, war m achines, refrains, 
and rhizom es. The generating body for all these tropes (the arch-rhizome) is the concept o f  a social order 
defined by active traversal or encounter rather than objectification. . . . what D eleuze and Guattari have in 
mind is a chaotically distributed network (the rhizom e) rather than a trunk and branches” (301).
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reconstitution of psychoanalytic methods is simply the first, critical line of attack— an 
“effective politicizing of psychiatry" (320)— that would bring about change in the culture 
at large. Deleuze and Guattari are explicit about the broad consequences of the 
schizoanalytic project:
[A] revolution— this time materialist— can proceed only by way of a critique 
of Oedipus, by denouncing the illegitimate use o f the synthesis of the 
unconscious as found in Oedipal psychoanalysis, so as to rediscover a 
transcendental unconscious defined by the immanence o f its criteria, and a 
corresponding practice that we shall call schizoanalysis. (75)
That psychological conceptions and treatments affect social and political realities is 
proposed here and throughout Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalytic discourse. The 
authors write o f “revolution” and “practice,” where the denunciation of a reigning mode 
is a way to rediscover what has ever-existed but has, for a time, been eclipsed by another, 
synthesizing psychoanalytic strategy.
But what, precisely, is it about the Freudian practice that would render it the 
object of such a vehement, politicized attack? Deleuze and Guattari do credit Freud with 
establishing a zone and a language for the investigation of the unconscious.1 They take 
exception, however, to the fruits of Freud's investigation: his psychic topoi and, in 
particular, the instantiation of the Oedipus myth as the allegory for psychic development.
1 They limn their position in relation to Freud thus: “[A ]ll [psychoanalytic cartographies] are important 
insofar as they support a certain context, a certain framework, and existential armature o f  the subjective  
situation. Our question here is not sim ply o f  a speculative order, but is posed in very practical w ays: how  
appropriate are the concepts o f  the U nconscious, offered to us on the psychoanalytical ‘market,’ to actual 
conditions o f  the production o f  subjectivity? Should they be transformed, should new ones be invented? . . . 
What processes unfold in consciousness affected by the shock o f  the unexpected? How can a m ode o f  
thought, a capacity to apprehend, be m odified when the surrounding world itse lf is in the throes o f  change?” 
( 1 1 - 1 2 ).
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This excerpt from Anti-Oedipus makes clear where Deleuze and Guattari's appreciation 
for the Freudian project ends and where their objections begin:
For what Freud and the first analysts discover is the domain of free syntheses 
where everything is possible: endless connections, nonexclusive disjunctions, 
nonspecific conjunctions, partial objects and flows. The desiring-machines 
pound away and throb in the depths of the unconscious: Irma's injections, the 
Wolf M an's ticktock, Anna's coughing machine, and also all the explanatory 
apparatuses set into motion by Freud, all those neurobiological-desiring- 
machines. And the discovery of the productive unconscious has what appear 
to be two correlates: on the one hand, the direct confrontation between 
desiring-machines and social production, between symptomological and 
collective formations, given their identical nature and differing regimes; and 
on the other hand, the repression that the social machine exercises in desiring 
machines and the relationship between psychic repression and social 
repression. This will all be lost, or at least singularly compromised, with the 
establishment o f a sovereign Oedipus. Free association, rather than opening 
onto poly vocal connections, confines itself to a univocal impasse. All the 
chains of the unconscious are biunivocalized, linearized, suspended froTn a 
despotic signifler. The whole of desiring-production is crushed, subjected to 
the requirements of representation, and to the dreary games of what is 
representative and represented in representation. And there is the essential 
thing: the reproduction of desire gives way to a simple representation, in the 
process as well as theory of the cure. The productive unconscious makes way
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for an unconscious that knows how to express itself—express itself in myth, 
in tragedy, in dream. (54)
Though its ills are multiply identified in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, the chief 
malevolence of conventional psychoanalysis, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is its 
adherence to a predetermined template o f psychic development and the therapeutic 
process. Their prose is bellowing, their language militant: part of the “social machine,” 
Freud’s methods produce “psychic repression” that is engineered through a “despotic” 
and “univocal” streamlining of “polyvocal connections” and “nonexclusive 
disjunctions.”1 The reductive, delimiting and, finally, ineffectual Freudian program, as 
Deleuze and Guattari see it, is analogous to Laplacian mathematics and Newtonian 
physics, which would attempt to reduce natural phenomena to repeatable, soluble 
systems but, in this attempt, ignore those phenomena that do not comply with the 
proposed solution.
[H]ow does psychoanalysis go about reducing a person, who this time is not a 
schizophrenic but a neurotic, to a pitiful creature who eternally consumes 
mommy-and-daddy and nothing else whatsoever? How could the conjunctive 
synthesis o f “so tha t’s what it was!” and “So it’s meC  have been reduced to 
the endless, dreary discovery of Oedipus: “So it’s my father, my mother”? 
(20)
1 In R eading  fo r  the P lo t (1984), Peter Brooks maintains that Freud's schem a o f  psychic developm ent may 
be mapped onto the plot structures o f  (primarily nineteenth-century) novels, thus revealing their narrative 
m echanism s; B rooks’ description o f  the analytic environm ent, how ever, abounds in the language o f  
subjugation, depicting it as more a context o f  im position than one o f  revelation: “the patient com es to the 
analyst with a story to tell, a story that is not so  much fa ls e — since it does in som e m anner  sign ify  the 
truth— as it is incom plete  and un-therapeutic. Its plot lacks the dynamic necessary to creating sequence and 
design that integrate and explain. The fu lle r  plot constructed by the analytic work m ust be more dynam ic, 
thus more useful as a shaping and connective fo rce . A bove all it must be herm eneutically m ore forceful"  
(em phases m ine 283 -4 ). I w ill return to Brooks later on to elaborate upon the lim itations o f  his 
psychoanalytic storyboard.
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The authors o f Anti-Oedipus here point to the error of assigning the same narrative 
structure to each experience of self-discovery. Invariably, during Freudian analysis,
“that" (an event, idea, object) and “me” (a self) become reconstituted to conform to the 
Oedipal story, where psychic agency is the exclusive province of (to cite Deleuze and 
Guattari’s oft-scorned trinity) “mommy-daddy-me.”
It is no great secret that Freud’s first and precedent-setting patient, from whose 
experience many of his theories extend, was himself. His psychic topology, for example, 
was based upon insights he achieved through self-analysis.1 In a letter to William Fleiss, 
Freud explained this extrapolation from the specific to the general: ‘i  have found, in my 
own case too, [the phenomenon of] being in love with my mother and jealous o f my 
father, and now I consider it a universal event in early childhood, even if not so early as 
in children who have been made hysterical” (271). In The Interpretation o f  Dreams 
(1900), Freud maintains that “[t]here are a certain number of dreams which almost 
everyone has dreamt alike and which we are accustomed to assume must have the same 
meaning for everyone” (241). Deleuze and Guattari find Freud’s assumption that 
“[Oedipus’s] destiny moves us only because the oracle might have been ours” (262) to be 
dangerous in the extreme because it assigns a particular narrative to the cusp between 
experience and the unconscious, which must be a zone of overdetermination if we are to 
be anything other than robots. Such an assignation, they claim, is nothing less than 
tyranny under mommy-daddy-me, where you must “say that it’s Oedipus, or you’ll get a 
slap in the face” (45). As an example of the dictatorial function of this trinity, Deleuze 
and Guattari refer to an episode from Melanie Klein’s work with children— an episode 
which the philosophers call “a sheer moment o f terrorism” (45). Klein asks a child what
1 Evidence o f  this presented in Grossm an’s “Hierarchies, Boundaries, and representation in the Freudian 
M odel o f  Mental Organization” (1989).
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he thinks about the toys he is playing with: a train and station. Dismissing the child's 
initial remarks about the toys, Klein "tells'’ the child that the train entering the station is 
the father entering the mother. This “information” prompts the child to run out of the 
room and stand in the adjoining hallway. Rather than suspecting that the child's defiant 
behavior might constitute his reaction to having his view about the toys discounted, Klein 
takes the boy’s retreat to the hallway as (further) evidence that his play has been an 
enactment of, and a move to master, the primal scene between mother and father. Deleuze 
and Guattari react:
The psychoanalyst no longer says to the patient: “Tell me about your 
desiring-machines, won’t you?” Instead he screams: “Answer daddy-mommy 
when I speak to you!” Even Melanie Klein. So the entire process of desiring- 
production is trampled underfoot and reduced to (rabuttu sur) parental 
images, laid out step by step in accordance with supposed pre-oedipal stages, 
totalized in Oedipus. (45-46)
Oedipus, by way of the analyst, becomes power as such— and neurosis, even in Freud's 
conception, results from the imposition of an external power!1 How can oedipalization be 
a means o f quelling neurosis when it is itself a neurotogenic?
Deleuze and Guattari would have Freud’s “tripartite formula—the Oedpial, the 
neurotic one: mommy-daddy-me” (23) transformed into a flexible and individually 
wrought structure, one that nests in a statement like: “/  have been my own father and I  
have been my son” (15). The literal impossibility or paradox in such a statement is part of
1 In C iviliza tion  a n d  its D iscon ten ts  (1930), Freud contends that culture necessarily develops in a fashion at 
odds with the individual, where the universal needs o f  man are overshadow ed by the inclination to 
"progress” ; this discrepancy g ives rise not only to neuroses but also to an array o f  practical problems.
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its success, demonstrating a self-determination that occurs in spite of logical incongruity.1 
Rather than passively receiving adjudication from a position o f therapeutic prostration, 
the schizoanalysand effects his or her own revelation during a breakdown, “a system o f  
interruptions or breaks" (36). The “breaks" to which Deleuze and Guattari refer must be 
distinguished from psychotic breaks—just as the “schizoid” subject o f schizoanalysis 
must be distinguished from one who suffers from the mental illness schizophrenia.2 The 
Deleuzo-Guattarian schizophrenic is a symbolic figure, one who, like the psychiatric 
schizophrenic, cannot be oedipalized3 and who maintains an “ontological heterogeneity" 
(61 ).4 For Deleuze and Guattari, the schizophrenic possesses a revolutionary capacity for 
individuality and a flexibility that enables him to “[pass] from one code to another, 
deliberately scrambling] all the codes, by quickly shifting from one to another, according 
to the questions asked of him, never giving the same explanation from one day to the 
next, never invoking the same genealogy, never recording the same event in the same
1 In A R e a d e r ’s G uide to C apita lism  a n d  Sch izophren ia  (1992), Brian M assum i g iv es us versions o f  the 
schizoanalytic mandate: “D on ’t toe the line— be superlinear. D on't plod the straight and narrow path down  
the aisle— marry the void. Rewrite the slogan o f  the United States Armv: dare to becom e all that you cannot 
be” (41).
2 Schizophrenia, the psychiatric condition [according to the D iagn ostic  a n d  S ta tis tica l M anual o f  
P sych ia tric  D isorders  IV-TR (2000), the standard means o f  diagnosing psychiatric illnesses], “ is a disorder 
that lasts for at least 6 months and includes at least 1 month o f  active-phase sym ptom s, (i.e ., tw o [or more] 
o f  the fo llow ing: delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, 
negative sym ptom s)” (298).
3 The schizophrenic, D eleuze and Guattari contend, dw ells in a heightened version o f  a state that is already 
part o f  the life the “ordinary” person: “M adness enclosed in its strangeness, reified in alterity beyond return, 
nevertheless inhabits our ordinary, bland apprehension o f  the world. But w e  must go  further: chaotic 
vertigo, w hich finds one o f  its privileged expressions in madness, is constitutive o f  the foundational 
intentional ity o f  the subject-object relation. P sychosis starkly reveals an essential source o f  being-in-the- 
w orld” (A nti-O edipus  77).
4 Baudrillard’s concept o f  the schizophrenic, though relatively n ihilistic, is sim ilarly metaphorical: “The 
sch izo  is bereft o f  every scene, open to everything in spite o f  h im self, living in the greatest confusion . He is 
h im self obscene, the obscene prey o f  the w orld’s obscenity. What characterizes him is less the loss o f  the 
real, the light years o f  estrangements from the real, the pathos o f  distance and radical separation, as is 
com m only said: but, very much to the contrary, the absolute proxim ity, the total instantaneity o f  things, the 
feeling o f  no defense, no retreat. It is the end o f  interiority and intimacy, the overexposure and transparence 
o f  the world w hich traverses him w ithout obstacle. He can no longer produce the lim its o f  his own being, 
can no longer play nor stage him self, can no longer produce h im self as mirror. He is now  only a pure 
screen, a sw itching center for all the networks o f  influence” (“The E cstasy o f  C om m unication” 133).
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way" (15). “Schizoanalysis;’ explains Guattari in Chaosmosis (1992), “does not consist 
in miming schizophrenia, but in crossing, like it, the barriers of non-sense which prohibit 
access to a-signifying nuclei of subjectification, the only way to shift petrified systems of 
modelisation” (68).
Critique of Freudian ideas and methods is, of course, practically an industry unto 
itself. The problems of reduction and oversimplification in Freud’s interpretive models 
have been a refrain, for example, in narratological and structuralist discourse. “How many 
times,’’ wonders Judith Mayne in Cinema and Spectatorship (1993), “does one need to be 
told that individual film x, for film genre y, articulates the law of the father, assigns the 
spectator the position of male oedipal desire, marshals castration anxiety in the form of 
voyeurism and fetishism, before psychoanalysis begins to sound less like an exploration 
of the unconscious and more like a master plot?” (68-9). Dissent surfaces even from 
ostensible “psychoanalytic critics” like Shoshana Felman, who warns that ‘[i]n its efforts 
to master literature, psychoanalysis . . . can thus but blind itself: blind itself in order to 
deny its own castration, in order not to see, and not to read, literature’s own subversion of 
the very possibility of psychoanalytic mastery” (156). Similar complaints have emerged 
from the many-faceted realm of psychological discourse— from neurological, psychiatric 
and cognitive theorists alike. Even before the publication of The Interpretation o f  
Dreams, William James opposed the “automaton theory” of the brain (the prevailing 
paradigm of the time, emphasizing determinacy); he foregrounded the unknowability of 
mental processes, claiming th a t4 [t]he performance of the high-brain (cerebral 
hemispheres) are like dice thrown forever on a table” (6). Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, the 
systems analyst whom I mentioned in the preceding section, extended his findings from 
biological population studies into the realm of psychology, calling deterministic
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psychology a “robot concept" (Klee 194). Indeed, although theories of psychology may 
be loosely divided into studies of perception, personality, and cognition, the field is 
generally united in considering mental processes “complex systems"— interactive with 
each other and physiological processes throughout the body. “Vision processing," for 
example, “is based on interconnections with cognitive, motor, and emotional centers of 
the brain" (Goertzel xviii). The dynamic interfacing between physiological zones is also
believed to be integral to phenomena that might be best described as emergent 1 from 
(rather than biologically rooted in) complex interactions between systems. An example of 
such an emergent phenomeflonis innate creativity, which, Crutchfield et al maintain in an 
article in Scientific American (1986), “may have an underlying chaotic process that 
selectively amplifies small fluctuations and molds them into macroscopic coherent mental 
states that are experienced as thoughts'5 (47).
As early as 1976, chaos theory was described as the “third force5'2 in American 
Psychology (Poppen, Wandersman and Wandersman)— a notion that is still held nearly 
twenty years later by Spruiell, who calls psychoanalysis itself a “theory of a complex 
system55 (4). Part of the affinity between psychic operations and nonlinear dynamics, as 
Stanley Krippner explains in “Chaos Theory and Humanistic Psychology: The Third 
Revolution and the Third Force,5' is born from the failures of previously dominant 
scientific and psychoanalytic approaches: “Just as the attempt to study chaotic systems 
with linear analysis had yielded little— or incorrect— data, the attempt to use behavioral 
and psychoanalytic models to study complex human experiences has been unsatisfactory55 
(n.p.). Possibly the most weighty connection is advanced by Alvin Toffler— weighty
1 I use Anthony W ilden 's definition o f  “em ergent” phenom ena, w hich are “qualities not included in, and 
generally not predictable from, know ledge o f  the quantities o f  the system s in w hich they arise” (170).
2 The “third” force refers to a triangulation o f  factors that transforms a system ’s behavior from stable to 
erratic.
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because it appears in his forward to Prigogine and Stengers' Order Out o f  Chaos— who 
calls for a “new interpretation of chaotic psychological processes'’ (xxiv).1 All of these 
arguments promote the chaotizatiorr if you will, o f psychoanalytic concepts and 
practices.
Interestingly, recent studies in cognitive and psycho-computational sciences have, 
through quantitative analysis, arrived at some of the same criticisms of psychoanalysis as 
the ones put forward by Deleuze and Guattari— namely, the reductive nature of Freud's 
psychic template and the dearth of empirical data to support its scientific petition. In 
From Complexity to Creativity (1997), math scholar and AI researcher Ben Goertzel 
criticizes Freud’s personality theories for their “lack of subtlety” (310):
These theories simply do not do justice to the complexity of personality.
What past personality theories have done is to replace complexity with simple 
stock ideas— ideas “pulled out o f a hat,” with no scientific or mathematical 
foundation, for the sole purpose of making personality theory simpler. (310)2 
Efforts to model the mind through computational means have cast Freudian theory even 
further to the margin, turning to chaos theory for organizing systems that can 
accommodate psychological and neurobiological complexity. In “Neural Nets, Chaos and
1 M oran’s “Chaos and psychoanalysis: the fluid nature o f  the mind” w as the first article on the subject to be 
published in an established psychoanalytic journal, International R eview  o f  P sych oan a lysis  (1991). Other 
exam inations o f  the intercalations betw een chaos theory and psychoanalysis include R.F. B lackerby’s 
A pplica tion s o f  C haos Theory to P sych o log ica l M odels (1993 ) and J. W eiland-B urstannf s C haos a n d  
O rder in the W orld o f  the P syche  (1992). A m ong his many studies on psychoanalysis and computer 
science, G alatzer-Levy has written about the relationship between psychoanalysis and catastrophe theory (a 
close  relative o f  chaos theory, invented by Rene Thom in 1975) in “Q ualitative change from quantitative 
change: mathematical catastrophe theory in relation to psychoanalysis” (1978).
2 Goertzel continues: “The biggest difference is that Freud built his m odels from concepts like id, ego , and 
super-ego, w hich w ere fabricated especially  for the purpose o f  m odeling the mind. Thus one finds that 
many o f  Freud’s m odels are clear and sensible in their abstract structure but unclear or unreasonable in their 
details. In the system -theoretic approach, on the other hand, the details are not left “dangling” into a sea o f  
jargon and ad hoc concepts, but are rather grounded in concrete com putational and com plex system s  
m odels. Even if, as a consequence o f  lack o f  data, a system -theoretic m odel o f  som e personality  
phenom enon must be constructed on intuitive rather than deductive grounds, at least the concepts used as 
building blocks for the m odel w ill be scientifically  m eaningful” (312).
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Psychotherapy," Gerald Klee, a psychiatrist and lecturer at Johns Hopkins School of 
Medicine, envisions a point where computer modeling (itself enabled by advanced maths) 
could provide a means of exploring complex psychological processes in live subjects:
[I]t is now possible to describe systems in operational detail, in terms of 
nonlinear differential equations. From these, computer models of multiple 
variables in interaction can be produced. In turn, these possibilities will allow 
experimentation on the models by altering the live variables in the subject 
being investigated. At the present time, however, psychoanalysis can only use 
deterministic chaos and fractals metaphorically. In the future, especially if 
psychoanalysis is seen in terms of process or organismic theory, it is likely 
that within such models will be produced the origins o f major changes among 
those disciplines having to do with mind, brain, and the reorganization of 
concepts of these interactions. (3)
Ray Kurzweil states in The Age o f  Spiritual Machines (1999) that simulated thought 
models of this kind must use parallel systems rather than series (like most of today's 
computers); “the system would be non-linear, chaotic, self-organizing and emergent'"
(82).1 Goertzel points to the same limitations of linearity psychological models:
Freud was trying to formulate laws to explain the behavior of a complex 
system, the personality, but he had no concept of the brain/mind as a complex 
system to fall back on, and one can see this shortcoming in the details of his 
personality theories. The whole idea of a symptom as a consequence of the
1 Briggs and Peat presage this argument, citing the nonlinear neurological m odels devised  by W illiam  Gray 
and Paul LaViolette: “They've proposed that thought starts as a highly com plex, even chaotic bundle o f  
sensations, nuances, and ‘feeling ton es’ w hich cycle from the limbic system  through the cortex. During this 
feedback cycling , the cortex selects out, or ‘abstracts’ som e o f  these feeling tones. T hese abstractions are 
then reinserted back into the loop. The continued abstracting process has the effect o f  nonlinearly  
am plifying som e nuances into cognitions or em otions, w hich becom e organizers for the com plex bundles o f  
nuance-filled sensations and feelin gs” (170).
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underlying problem bespeaks a failure to appreciate the circularity o f complex 
system dynamics. The symptoms maintain and produce the underlying 
problem, and the underlying problem maintains and produces the symptoms: 
the whole “complex’’ is an autopoietic self-organizing system. In some 
situations, removing one element from an autopoietic system will destroy the 
whole system: in some situations it will not. (311)
If personality is a complex system—where multiple variables are in play at any given 
instant— then the recursive properties of this system must be taken into account when 
trying to understand the system’s behavior. Freud's discernment of the compulsion to 
repeat cannot be considered anything but a stroke of genius; but (armed with computer 
technologies that make such insights possible and, moreover, workable), Goertzl 
illustrates how the loops involved in psychic systems feed back upon themselves, where 
the output is factored back as new input, which in turn transforms the nature of the 
system in highly unpredictable ways. Because the system is generating change from 
within— it is, as Goertzl says, autopoietic1— any relation we might intuit between the 
system’s behavior and a primal scene (or other external factors) will bring us scarcely 
closer to understanding, predicting, or altering that system. By emphasizing repetition 
rather than recursion, Freudian theory renders itself incompatible with the nature of its 
very object.
I hope that the links among chaos theory, psychology, schizoanalysis and culture 
are now beginning to materialize in the shape of a network, a rhizome of associations and 
knowledge. Like Klee, Goertzl and others I have mentioned, Deleuze and Guattari view
1 Joseph Tabbi’s C ogn itive  F ictions (2002) provides a detailed analysis o f  autopoietic processes in recent 
American fiction; Tabbi asserts that “[t]here can be no question o f  studying either the work or its tradition 
for direct insight into the working o f  society: both the work and the society  are self-constitu ting, or 
autopoietic, system s” (298).
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the psyche as a complex system— though they arrive at this view by way o f philosophy 
and aesthetics rather than neurobiology or computer science.1 Chaosmosis. a kind of 
reflective text wherein Guattari reviews and qualifies the most salient themes of his 
career, includes some of the most penetrating and personalized justifications of 
schizoanalysis:
I opted for an Unconscious superimposing multiple strata of subjectification, 
heterogeneous strata of variable extension and consistency. Thus a more 
“schizo” Unconscious, one liberated from the familial shackles, turned more 
towards actual praxis than towards fixations on, and repressions to, the past. 
An Unconscious of Flux and of abstract machines rather than an Unconscious 
of structure and language. (12)
In signature seditious rhetoric (“subjectification," “liberation,” “shackles"), Guattari 
affirms the ultimately pragmatic imperative underpinning schizoanalysis, a 
“heterogeneous” and “variable” conception of the unconscious. Perhaps to redress some 
of the “problems” o f Capitalism and Schizophrenia (namely, the convoluted and 
neologism-rich prosody that some readers find offputting—though other readers consider 
the ballectic expressiveness in such earlier texts invigorating2), Chaosmosis contains 
concrete sociopolitical instruction:
1 H ow ever, as John Johnston points out in “Machinic V ision ,” the “significant references to the 
neurophysiology o f  the brain and to chaos theory in Cinem a 2: The Time Im age  and What is P h ilosophy?  
suggest that [D eleuze] w as m oving toward a critical encounter w ith aspects o f  cognitive sc ien ce” (47). In 
What is P h ilosophy?  D eleu ze says that, in relation to a supposedly objectified brain, art, science, and 
philosophy are not mental objects but vectors o f  deterritorialization— “the raft on w hich the brain plunges 
into and confronts chaos” (41).
2 Foucault, in his forward to A n ti-O edipu s , suggests that w e “read” the book in the sam e way w e w ould  
listen to a record— sam pling sections, replaying certain parts, skipping over others. Brian M assum i 
encourages further readerly flam boyance: “[T]he reader is invited to lift a dynam icism  out o f  the book and 
incarnate it in a foreign m edium , whether painting or politics. D eleuze and Guattari delight in stealing from  
other discip lines and they are more than happy to return the favour. D eleu ze's ow n im age for a concept is 
not as a brick but a tool box. He calls this kind o f  philosophy ‘pragm atics’ because its goal is the invention
43
The refoundation of politics will have to pass through the aesthetic and 
analytical dimensions implied in the three ecologies— the environment, the 
socius and the psyche. We cannot conceive of solutions to the poisoning of the 
atmosphere and to global warming due to the greenhouse effect, or to the 
problem of population control, without a mutation of mentality, without 
promoting a new art of living in society. We cannot conceive of international 
discipline in this domain without solving the problem of hunger in the third 
world. We cannot conceive of a collective recomposition of the socius, 
correlative to a resingularisation o f subjectivity, without a new way of 
conceiving political and economic democracies that respect cultural 
differences— without multiple molecular revolutions. We cannot hope for 
amelioration in the living conditions of the human species without considerable 
effort to improve the feminine condition. The entire division of labour, its 
modes of valorization and finalities need to be rethought. Production for the 
sake of production— the obsession with rate of growth, whether in the capitalist 
market or planned economies— leads to monstrous absurdities. The only 
acceptable finality of human activity is the production for a subjectivity that is 
auto-enriching its relation to the world in a continuous fashion. (20-21)
o f  concepts that do not add up to a system  or belief or an architecture o f  propositions that you either enter 




It is fiction's role to imagine deeply, to follow obscure 
urges into unreliable regions of experience— child- 
memoried, existential, and outside time.
- Don DeLillo, “The Power o f 
History, 60
[T]he narrator-spider never ceases undoing webs and 
planes, resuming the journey.
- Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 318
“Ultimately,” writes Peter Brooks in the opening section of Reading fo r  the Plot: Design 
and Intention in Narrative,
we may dream of a convergence of psychoanalysis and literary criticism 
because we sense that there ought to be a correspondence between literary 
and psychic dynamics, since we constitute ourselves in part through our 
fictions within the constraints of a transindividual symbolic order, that of 
signs, including, pre-eminently, language itself. Through study of the work 
accomplished by fictions, we may be able to reconnect literary criticism to 
human concerns, (xiv)
It will be evident from the nature of my project that, in principle, I share Brook's desire 
for a psychoanalytical and literary critical convergence. What is the purpose of literary 
criticism, if not to illuminate “human concerns,” and what is of greater concern to 
humans than the very nature of ourselves? Later on in Reading for the Plot, Brooks 
claims that “by attempting to superimpose psychic functioning on textual functioning, we
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might discover something about how textual dynamics work and something about their 
psychic equivalencies” (90). With this, too, I tend to concur. What strikes me as 
problematic about the “psychic superimpositions” suggested here, however, is the rigidity 
of the framework that Brooks would have literary critics superimpose. In his chapter 
(rather menacingly) entitled “Freud’s Masterplot: a Model for Narrative,” Brooks 
contends that the psychic formula outlined in Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(1920) offers a kind o f iiberplot, to which both fictional and actual (i.e. lived, by you and 
me) narratives structurally correspond. Brooks says that this text by Freud
lays out most fully a total scheme of how life proceeds from beginning to 
end, and how each individual in its own manner repeats the masterplot and 
confronts the question of whether the closure of an individual life is 
contingent or necessary. . . . [Freud’s] boldest intention may be to provide a 
theory o f comprehension of the life span, and hence of its narrative 
understanding. (96-7)
The precise nature of this “total scheme” is, by this point in my introduction, both 
obvious and irrelevant. It is the fact of a total scheme that I find dubious— and it is toward 
debunking this fact of a total scheme that I examine a group of fictional works. Novels 
like City o f  Glass (1985), Infinite Jest (1996), Unde w o r ld  (1997), and House o f  Leaves 
(2000) variously resist total schemes (masterplots, masternarratives) that would be 
established in psychological, historical, political and cultural contexts. The works that I 
will deal with in the following pages effect this resistance by representing characters, 
environments and events as indeterminate, complex— chaotic— systems. Although not 
apparently a fan, Brooks provides an excellent description of this non-schematic type of 
fiction:
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The plots of narrative have become extraordinarily complex, self­
subversive, apparently implausible. They have been forced to abandon clear 
origins and terminations in favor of provisional closures and fictional 
inceptions; their causes may work by deferred action and retroaction; their 
connections are probable rather than logical; their individual dramas stand in 
uncertain tension with transindividual imaginings. (285)
Brooks goes on to expatiate on “the importance of issues in narrative that Freud so 
forcefully poses’’ in light of these “self-subversive” narratives, stating that “Freud’s 
restless thought and his dynamic model of psychic life summon us to think beyond 
formalist paradigms, to engage the dynamic of memory and desire that can reconnect, 
however provisionally, time lost and time continuing.” Aside from being confusing, these 
last comments ring rather false: linking past and present through memory and desire is the 
very kind of “formalist paradigm” that Brooks says Freud “summon[s] us to think 
beyond” (emphasis mine). A little earlier, Brooks had described Freud’s “dynamic 
model” as “a total scheme of how life proceeds from beginning to end,” but it becomes 
difficult to locate any real dynamicism in the model as it is actually described in Reading 
for the Plot. Rather than using the Freudian model to reconstitute or “reterritorialize” 
narratives that are (as Brooks says in the block quotation above) “extraordinarily 
complex, self-subversive, [and] apparently implausible,” we might be better served by 
contemplating what new information is communicated by these unconventional 
narratives. If fiction has “been forced to abandon clear origins and terminations in favor 
of provisional closures,” then why has this happened and what h a s forced the 
abandonment? If individual dramas in literature “stand in uncertain tension with
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transindividual imaginings,” perhaps we should reconsider our transindividual imaginings 
or, even better, the very idea of the transindividual.
Brooks might take a lesson from Don DeLillo, who, in “The Power of History,” 
describes the author as “violator” of sanctioned codes:
Against the force of history, so powerful, visible and real, the novelist poses 
the idiosyncratic self. Here it is sly, amazed, mercurial, scared, half-crazy. It 
is also free and undivided, the only thing that can match the enormous 
dimensions of social reality. . . .  It is almost inevitable that the fiction writer, 
dealing with this reality, will violate a number of codes and contracts. He will 
engineer a swerve from the usual arrangements that bind a figure in history to 
what has been reported, rumoured, confirmed or solemnly chanted. (60)
The texts I have chosen to explore may not neatly align with any “code or contract”—  
social, existential or otherwise— but neither do they completely eschew cultural myths, 
psychosocial regimes— in short, the delimiting patterns within and between which we 
reside. If it is to have any relation to our lives, literature must account for the constraining 
and the coercive as well as the idiosyncratic and the radical. This dialectic, in part, 
explains why Deleuze and Guattari dub Proust’s In Search o f  Lost Time (1927) “the 
schizoid work par excellence” (Anti-Oedipus 42). Through M arcel's ponderous and 
anachronistic reminiscences, Proust depicts a mind in perpetual and productive tension 
between the regimental march of time and the aleatory functions of desire— a tension 
intrinsic to the orderly disorder of memory, which is always a mixture o f truth, 
perception, and invention. In Proust’s narrative, Deleuze and Guattari find that “all the 
parts are produced as asymmetrical sections, paths that suddenly come to an end in 
hermetically sealed boxes, noncommunicating vessels, watertight compartments, in which
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there are gaps even between things that are contiguous.” These “gaps" and 
“asymmetries,” furthermore, become the space of individual expression, and not the 
consolidation of a unified, “watertight” and “contiguous” life narrative. Deleuze and 
Guattari identify similar fissures and gaps in works by Maurice LeBlanc, Borges, and 
Joyce, where “bifurcations, divergences, incompossibilities, and discord belong to the 
same motley world that can no longer be included in expressive units” (81). The non­
viability of expressive units is captured, for example, in Borges* “The Analytical 
Language o f John Wilkins,” which describes an entry from the Celestial Emporium o f  
Benevolent Knowledge (“a certain Chinese encyclopedia”) that divides animals into 
perplexing categories such as “embalmed ones,” “fabulous ones,” and “those that from a 
long way off look like flies” (98). Here Borges presents the “motley world” that resists 
categorization even as it is typologically organized— a paradoxical scenario that supports 
the chaologisf s belief that “behind every infraction is a rule [and] underlying every 
uncertainty there is certainty” (Slethaug xiii). Borges’ writing is, of course, filled with 
these kinds o f improbable possibilities— some of which I adumbrate later on—that 
expand our imaginings beyond ontological and epistemological “masterplots.”
The texts I will be concentrating on participate in a Borgesian subversion of 
customary knowledge and its orders. But where Borges depicts philosophical puzzles 
through magical or historically fantastic allegories, writers like DeLillo and Wallace 
ground their work in contemporary America. These authors do not encode abstract 
problems or political polemics in an invented universe, but, as DeLillo avers in the above 
quotation, they “engineer a swerve” from “what has been reported, rumoured, confirmed 
or solemnly chanted,” keeping social reality always in full view even as it is critiqued. 
That said, Paul Auster’s City o f  Glass, the focal point o f discussion in my first chapter,
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verges on allegory in its depiction of quasi-fantastic events that take place in New York 
City. This short novel follows Daniel Quinn, a bereaved and reclusive detective novelist, 
who receives a phone call for “Paul Auster” and becomes embrangled in a (frayed and 
knotted) yarn of urban surveillance, ambiguous identity, and linguistic intrigue. My 
analysis of the novella demonstrates how the distinctly chaotic structures in the narrative 
(chiefly, a sensitive dependence upon initial conditions, systematic bifurcation, and 
fractal recursion) problematize psychological “masterplots” (vide Brooks and Freud) such 
as the knowability of the self and the analytic omnipotence of “mommy-daddy-me.'’ I 
read the phone call as a point of bifurcation, which sets off a reiterative process of 
“doubling” in Quinn’s identity, his environment, and the narrative domain at large. City 
o f Glass shows how a relatively tiny change in a system (the unexpected phone call) can 
lead to catastrophic change in a system’s behavior. In response to the personalities and 
mysteries he encounters, Quinn’s identity continually splinters and diverges along 
increasingly unlikely trajectories, becoming, finally, living testimony that the self is a 
“connective synthesis” (Deleuze and Guattari A Thousand Plateaus 41),“part o f an all- 
encompassing system of mutually interacting systems” (Civello 123).
Dealing primarily with Don DeLillo’s Underu’orld and Cosmopolis (2003), the 
second chapter discerns the radical potential of chaotic narratives—radical in the sense 
that the employment of nonlinear structural dynamics allows for a historiographic 
multiplicity that reinstantiates individual agency. DeLillo’s novels evince the principles 
of indeterminacy and ontological instability that govern Auster’s City o f  Glass, but 
DeLillo extends these principles into the greater geographical, cultural and historical 
domains. An anatomy of the latter half of the twentieth century in America, Undei'M’orld 
is a vast, heterogeneous polyphony, whose content ranges from a 1951 Dodgers and
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Giants pennant game to Lenny Bruce stand-up routines, from a hypothetical long-lost 
Eisenstein film to a mass Moonie wedding. While in Underw orld DeLillo depicts the 
deep structures—the hidden strata of individual experience that exist beneath the crust of 
“official” history— his Cosmopolis effects an expansion along a different axis, revealing 
the impossibility of subjective autonomy and the individual's necessarily symbiotic 
relationship with the surrounding environmental and cultural systems. In Cosmopolis, a 
New York mogul attempts to cross the city in a limousine, but he is perpetually 
sidetracked by the unexpected: protest demonstrations, a celebrity funeral procession, and 
collisions with wife, lovers, employees, and the man who is trying to assassinate him.
One of the main ways DeLillo subverts the masterplot is by diffusing ostensibly linear 
systems: Underworld dismembers historical chronology and transforms finite instances 
into reiterative loops, while Cosmopolis posits unpredictable digressions and expansion 
that complicate a would-be linear trajectory. The emergence of variable structures from 
smooth, continuous ones in both Undei~world and Cosmopolis encourages us to think 
about history and ourselves as part of a rhizomatic, flexible network of associations, 
rather than deterministic products of unassailable causality.
In the third chapter, I turn to the writing of David Foster Wallace. Chaotic 
indeterminacy and flux inform the narrative structure of many of Wallace's texts and the 
cyclical, irresolvable social formulations he depicts. In his massive novel, Infinite Jest, 
characters, items, thoughts and symbols circulate perpetually throughout the narrative 
domain at large, their patterns and behaviors not leading toward any final, quantifiable 
result or objective “solution,” but rather conveying meaning in their unwieldy 
reverberations. On a fundamental level, Infinite Jest is very similar to Auster’s City o f  
Glass: both novels, while inhabiting opposite poles in terms of character density and
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geographical scope, depict a non-deterministic and reiterative portrait o f the psyche— 
amenable to schizoanalytic rather than Freudian interpretation. Wallace’s much heftier 
book chronicles (among myriad other things) the evolution of the eccentric Incandenza 
family and the morbid antics at a Boston drug rehabilitation clinic. A temporally 
disordered narrative (like Underworld), Infinite Jest embodies the chaotic process of 
recursion, which permeates the novel in the form of behavioral, situational, and 
psychological fractals. These indeterminacies and loops, I assert, reflect the “real,” 
rhizomatic infrastructure of late-capitalism and postmodern psychologies.
Mark Z Danielewski’s House o f  Leaves expresses a chaotic complexity through 
uniquely visual means: the tension between order and disorder is materially manifest in a 
typographic and pictographic diversity that approaches a hypertextual, collage aesthetic. 
The heterogeneity of the work is due, in part, to its indeterminate authorship; House o f  
Leaves is collectively narrated by a delinquent twenty-something, his incarcerated 
mother, an old blind man, and the “Editors”—-each of whom contributes information 
about an impossible house whose interior is larger than its exterior. The cumulative 
“information,” however, merely engenders further uncertainty about the nature of the 
house on Ash Tree Lane and the ontological complexes governing those who attempt to 
explore and document the house. Although House o f Leaves participates in the 
psychochaotic mode of City o f  Glass, Underworld and Infinite Jest, Danielewski’s novel 
departs from its predecessors by depicting an abstract “psychic architecture” that finds its 
concrete analogue in a disparate and multifarious narrative architecture. Considered in 
relation to each other, the four novels provide a literary domain within which the 
intercalations between complex dynamics and psychology may be investigated.
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Chapter 1
Self and the City: Ontological Chaos in 
Paul Auster’s City o f  Glass
A schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than 
a neurotic lying on a couch.
- Deleuze and Guattari,
Anti-Oedipus, 2
I have delineated the various scientific and cultural sources of chaotic narratives and 
presented the theoretical ideas— synthesized in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's 
schizoanalysis— through which the psychological meanings of these narratives may be 
ascertained. I have termed the field of intersection between chaos theory and 
schizoanalysis psychochaotics. In this chapter, I will demonstrate how chaotic structures 
in an important postmodern novella function to express the dynamic processes o f psychic 
disintegration and reconstruction. City o f  Glass, part o f Paul Auster’s The New’ York 
Trilogy, is wrought according to a physical model of recursion— which permeates 
narrative in the form of behavioral, situational and psychological fractals; this formal 
constitution, along with Auster’s explicit interest in the nature of the “self,” renders City 
o f Glass an exemplary psychochaotic text. Daniel Quinn, a detective novelist and 
widower, receives a midnight phone call from someone who asks to speak to a private 
detective named “Paul Auster.” Quinn “has long ago stopped viewing himself as real” (5)
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and, as if replacing one non-reality with another, he assumes the identity of the 
summoned “Paul Auster.” Quinn becomes increasingly fixated with the man he is hired to 
tail, Peter Stillman, who is himself consumed with a fantasy of recovering the Edenic 
language, the prelapsarian tongue that will allow us “to become masters of the words we 
speak, to make language answer our needs” (98). Issues o f ontological indeterminacy and 
the limits of surveillance are carried into the second story of Auster’s trilogy, Ghosts, 
which traces Blue, a private eye who is hired by White to observe and record the activity 
of Black. Taking up residence across the alley from his subject’s flat, Blue monitors 
Black’s decidedly unextraordinary doings: “Black writes, reads, shops in the 
neighborhood, takes an occasional stroll” (185). Finally, after years of watching and 
documenting, Blue breaks into Black’s apartment and finds the very reports he has 
written about Black. White and Black, Blue realizes, must be the same person, and, 
indeed, Black confesses that he hired Blue to track his own activities “[t]o remind 
[himself] of what [he] was supposed to be doing” (230). Blue’s constant monitoring 
sutures Black to reality; he recounts: “Every time I looked up, you were there, watching 
me, following me, always in sight, boring into me with your eyes. You were the whole 
world to me, Blue, and I turned you into my death. You’re the one thing that doesn’t 
change, the one thing that turns everything inside out” (23 0).1 In The Locked Room, the 
final work in The New York Trilogy, an unnamed first-person narrator fixates upon 
Fanshawe, a childhood friend turned literary genius, whose work the narrator publishes 
posthumously. Whilst writing Fanshawe’s biography, the narrator slowly takes on his 
subject’s former life— marrying his wife, adopting his child, and even sleeping with
1 Staging an investigation o f  h im self “from the outside,” as it were, Black attempts to short-circuit the 
problematic o f  subject position and know ledge acquisition, made fam ous by W ittgenstein— that is “to 
represent logical form, w e should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions som ew here outside  
logic, that is to say outside the w orld” ( Tractatus 4 .12).
54
Fanshawe's mother. The narrator's role as biographer thus transforms into a pathological 
process of identity appropriation.
Each of these short novels is about the impossibility of achieving or representing 
(through surveillance, performance, or writing) a coherent and orderly self. Ontological 
stability is progressively compromised (or, more precisely, it is revealed to have alw'ays 
been illusory) through a series o f irresolvable shifts in the characters' identities and the 
perplexing discontinuity of the narratives themselves. It is true that Auster’s literary 
oeuvre abounds in the inexplicable and the synchronous. In Leviathan (1992), a writer 
mulls over the convoluted circumstances leading up to the death o f the infamous bomber, 
“the Phantom of Liberty” (243), who accidentally blows himself up; in The Music o f  
Chance (1991), with a hat-tip to Sisyphus, two unlucky gamblers must resolve a poker 
debt by erecting a purposeless stone wall on the property of two eccentrics; and Moon 
Palace (1990) describes a young man’s apparently random actions that lead him to 
discover his father's identity. In these novels, Auster connects the complex puzzles in life 
with the opaque logic of chance. In an essay collection, The Art o f  Hunger (1982), Auster 
admits a fascination with “the presence of the unpredictable, the utterly bewildering 
nature of the human experience. From one moment to the next, anything can happen. Our 
life-long certainties about the world can be demolished in a single second. In 
philosophical terms, I'm  talking about the power of contingency” (278-79).
If The Music o f  Chance suggests that “random, accidental encounters” (1) can 
provide information about one’s “place in the invisible order of things” (10), then City o f  
Glass proposes the reverse. In this work, seemingly meaningful encounters make visible 
the disorder of things, where patterns are imposed upon the world rather than discovered. 
Quinn searches for meaning and order as psychological and epistemological systems
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become progressively unstable and unpredictable. Like the indeterminacies propounded 
in structuralist inquiry, Auster's novel conveys the impossibility of locating a coherent 
center in both subjects and language, thus denying the causal continuity we expect from 
fiction— especially, as I will discuss in the following pages, detective fiction. City o f  
Glass, not only portrays chaotic processes through the bifurcation of identity and iterative 
dissolution of stable systems, but it also projects an order and logic of its own, emergent 
from the convolution and excesses of indeterminacy. In a way, the novel is unjeu ideal—  
an ideal game, the model for which is the Borgesian labyrinth— where, in a field o f 
bifurcations, we become privy to possible divergences, rather than oppositions, or what 
Deleuze in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1993) calls “compossibilities.” What is 
generated is a paradoxically kinetic and inert kind of story, whose narrative processes are 
counterbalanced by an equivalent but antithetical stasis, so that “progress'5 is continually 
delayed, thwarted by so much canceling-out. The perpetual vacillation between states of 
knowledge and ignorance—about the self, other selves, “reality,55 and the urban 
environment—the piling up of fractals of various scales—creates a narrative density that 
deepens the psychic and historical burdens o f the characters portrayed.
i. Diffuse detection
A city is a material and social organization which 
derives its reality from the ubiquity of its absence.
- Alan Trachtenberg, “Experiments 
in Another Country,” 138
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Most of what has been written about City o f  Glass focuses upon its status as a type of 
“detective'’ novel. Confronted with mystery and complexity, the detective sorts through 
clues, adding and subtracting signs in an effort to determine a solution to the riddle at 
hand. “ [T]he detective story,” according to Brooks, epitomizes what he calls the 
“hermeneutic code” 1 for plots in general, “in that everything in the story’s structure, and 
its temporality, depends on the resolution of an enigma” (18). At its outset, Auster’s 
novella appears to be erecting such a plot: Quinn, a bereaved and reclusive detective 
novelist, receives a mysterious phone call for “Paul Auster” and becomes involved in a 
perplexing yam of urban surveillance, ambiguous identity, and linguistic intrigue. But 
while truth in the conventional detective novel can be arrived at through the logical 
assessment o f facts, Auster’s work, despite its many conspicuous and suggestive “clues,” 
expresses the insufficiency of reason as a means of acquiring knowledge. What 
constitutes a “clue” depends upon the subject position of the investigator, which is itself 
opaque (probably, even, to himself). And if there were such things as legitimate, “truth- 
imputing” clues in City o f  Glass, they simply do not add up. Still, the countless 
symmetries and resonances (both inter- and intra-textual) suggest an overarching design 
that can eventually be known: Quinn, whose initials ascribe him (at least a symbolic) 
kinship with Don Quixote, seeks assistance from the New York author Paul Auster, who 
is writing an essay about Don Quixote; Quinn’s client, Peter, is the namesake o f Quinn’s 
son, while Auster’s son, Daniel, is Quinn’s namesake. Surely, all this must mean 
something. But if Quinn’s detective work reveals anything, it is that meaning is 
contingent upon the context in which it is sought, which is itself subject to change. One
1 For Brooks, a p lo t  “concerns the questions and answers that structure a story, the suspension, partial 
unveiling, temporary blockage, eventual resolution, with the resulting creation o f  a ‘dilatory sp ace’— the 
space o f  suspense— w hich w e work through toward what is felt to be, in classical narrative, the revelation  
o f  meaning that occurs when the narrative sentence reaches full predication” (18).
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moment Quinn is attempting find the logic underlying a network of namesakes, and the 
next moment he is adding to that network—by introducing himself to Stillman as “Henry 
Dark;' the name of the central figure in Stillman's Ph.D. dissertation. Thus meaning may 
be (mis)inferred and (mis)construed, where (mis)information is (mis)taken for 
knowledge. Quinn calls himself “Henry Dark” because he believes that this name will 
“mean” something to his interlocutor—but “Henry Dark” is not his real name. Then 
again, the young Peter Stillman says repeatedly, “I am Peter Stillman. That is not my real 
name” (22). Indeed, in the context of a novella that swells with pseudonyms, misnomers, 
and namesakes, the “facts'’ are impossible to determine. Instead, each “clue” (a name, a 
number, a pattern) in City o f  Glass feeds back into the prevailing algorithm of 
uncertainty, so that each attempt to derive meaning generates exponential growth in 
uncertainty.
Auster said in a 1992 interview: “I was employing . . . detective conventions only 
as a way to get somewhere else entirely” (22). Auster uses the detective genre— a genre 
that is supposedly “all center,” where all material factors into the overarching mystery—  
to express the fundamental absence of center in both the narrative and the selves it 
contains. The unsolvable puzzles of City o f  Glass, Richard Swope notes (following 
McHale), mark a shift from the epistemological dominant of classic detective fiction to 
the ontological concerns o f postmodern detection— wiiat Stefano Tani, in The Doomed 
Detective (1984), calls an “anti-detective” novel (11). While detection in Raymond 
Chandler’s works, for example, leads to definitive answers, the anti-detective novel 
reveals the infirmity of so-called “facts” and the sobering futility underpinning every 
investigation. Instead of providing “reassurance,” states Michael Holquist, these novels 
“disturb” (153) notions that coherent subjects exist and that mystery and perplexity can be
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resolved. In the case of City o f  Glass, this disturbance extends to the phenomenological 
status of the fiction itself, in which a “Paul Auster” participates, but another, unidentified 
writer is, in the final two pages, posited as the “real*’ author. With this additional mystery 
of authorship, the generic permutation becomes even more complex, its multiple levels of 
self-referentiality prompting Madeleine Sorapure to call City o f  Glass a “meta-anti­
detective story” (72). This kind of “metaphysical detective’' fiction, according to William 
Spanos, is “the paradigmatic archetype of the postmodern literary imagination" (154).
The mirrors, counterparts, fluctuations, and absences in Auster's novella embody a 
postmodernism that negates the possibility of continuous systems and coherent identity. 
These themes will again surface in chapter four, in which I examine similar “impossible 
cues” (or “clues”) in Danielewski’s House o f Leaves.
In addition to generic considerations, the explicitly semiotic aspect of Quinn's 
investigation has prompted much deconstructionist attention. Alison Russell reads City o f  
Glass as a text in which “[m]eaning is differed in an endless movement from one 
linguistic interpretation to the next, as an incessant play o f 4differance'” (72). Both the 
detective (Quinn) and the ostensible object of detection (Stillman) are interminably 
caught up in the production and evaluation of language. Everyone in the novel writes, 
logs, encrypts, drafts; characters send letters, pen dissertations, sign cheques, produce 
essays, keep journals, name and rename objects. The domination o f language extends 
from individual subjects to tangible objects and terrain. As Stillman and Quinn move 
through New York, the city becomes the vocabulary and documentation of experience. 
City blocks are alphabets and trash is testimony. But the production of language does not 
lead to the production of meaning. Writing both creates the case and effaces it. More 
documentation means more indeterminacy. The proliferation of language leads to inertia
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rather than illumination. An assemblage of indeterminate cues, the novella may well be, 
as Russell claims, a deconstruction of logocentrism. Even Quinn’s written account— and 
his existence—are finally contingent upon the number of remaining pages available to 
him. The detective's ultimate question, “What will happen when there are no more pages 
left in the red notebook?” (157), is swiftly answered: the text and he will come to an end. 
But that is not to say the case is closed.
ii. Bifurcation and compossibilities
His life, which used to be a straightforward set of 




In Beautiful Chaos, Gordon Slethaug says that a chaotic novel “may be posited upon the 
basis of a sensitive dependence upon an initial condition and then follow through the 
extreme turbulence of its conclusion” (15). Auster’s novella is posited on such a basis. If 
we understand the beginning of a narrative as the “setting-up of stakes,*’ the opening 
passages o f City' o f  Glass do not present particularly interesting stakes. The stakes are not 
high; there are no stakes. There is, rather, an arrestingly inert Quinn, who is defined by a 
“salutary emptiness” (4), the almost complete absence of subjectivity: “He no longer 
wished to be dead. At the same time, it cannot be said he was glad to be alive” (6). Quinn, 
living a kind of “posthumous life” (6), is as close to non-existent as one can be without 
being dead. And whatever faint residue of “him self’ remains, Quinn methodically works 
to efface. This work, predominantly, takes the form of Max Work, the alter ego Quinn
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erects in his fiction, one of the “triad of selves Quinn had become” (6). Along with 
Quinn's pseudonym, William Wilson, Work becomes a vessel into which his inventor's 
subjectivity is transmitted. And, in Quinn's estimation, Wilson and Work are the more 
“concrete" or real, calling Wilson a “ventriloquist,” himself the “dummy,” and Work, 
“the animated voice that gave purpose to the enterprise” (6). What is left for Quinn is 
merely form, a biophysical life without concomitant development on psychic, moral, or 
ideological levels. In such a system, any small variation is apt to cause severe 
disturbances, since Quinn’s “initial conditions” are characterized by an absence o f 
force—objects and selves at rest. Instead of willfully acting, Quinn functions like a 
pinball, finding himself “doing a good imitation of a man preparing to go out” (14). 
Penning the lives of fictional characters, Quinn is reduced to a wooden husk, a “dummy” 
whose gestures are governed by dislocated projections of his imagination. Walking the 
streets of Manhattan, Quinn becomes a “seeing eye” and is “able to feel that he [is] 
nowhere” (4). He becomes sealed into a mechanical routine like the clarinetist whom he 
later observes “inside that music. . . drawn into the circle o f its repetitions” (130). He is 
“[l]ost, not only in the city, but within himself as well. Each time he took a walk, he felt 
as though he was leaving himself behind and giving himself up to the movement o f the 
streets” (4). Even the recollection of his deceased child is experienced physically and not 
emotionally, “an imprint o f the past that had been left on his body” (6).
The emphasis on the physical texture of Quinn’s character, as it is established 
from the beginning of the story, lends a disarmingly mechanical aspect to the ensuing 
narrative. On one hand, Quinn is a pathetic figure, traumatized by a series of losses; his 
inability to feel pleasure and his dissociation from himself and the world might be 
interpreted as the symptoms of a depressive disorder, brought about by bereavement and
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exacerbated by isolation. Reflecting upon the source of his numbness, however, is as 
unpalatable a prospect as facing his own reflection, as Quinn finds it “unpleasant to look 
in the mirror and kept trying to avoid himself with his eyes” (125). But whatever 
“reasons” we might assign to Quinn's state at the beginning of the novella, his subjective 
vacancy renders him particularly effective as a “factor” in a narrative system, a variable 
in an equation, or what William Lavender calls a “humanoid narrative function” (225). 
Without the complexity and nuance of interiority, the patterns and (dis)orders o f the 
systems that encompass Quinn— a kind of neutral barometer— are brought to the fore.
The question becomes not What kind of person is Quinn? but What kind of structure is 
he? or What kindj^ystem does he inhabit? How does the reclusive, routine-driven Quinn 
ultimately (at the end of the narrative) find himself crumpled on the floor of an 
abandoned apartment, hallucinating, and scribbling incoherent “data” about recent 
acquaintances or imaginings? Over the course of the short novel, Quinn moves from 
stable, if lifeless, inertia to physical and mental catastrophe. But the rate and contours of 
this decomposition can be identified by neither the reader nor Quinn—both of whom 
become detectives o f a kind. The single “clue” about the nature o f the system we are 
reading is provided by the midnight phone call, the “wrong number” that prompts Quinn 
to swerve from his regime. The call works on a number o f levels. The voice, asking for 
“Paul Auster” establishes an authorial absence, adding another layer of ontological 
“vacancy” to the narrative. The request for “Paul Auster” also invokes the reader’s appeal 
for authorial guidance that is implicit whenever someone undertakes to read a novel. But, 
as Quinn says to the disembodied voice, “There’s no one here by that name” (7), a 
response that announces the meta-fictional concerns both in and o f City o f  Glass; “I 
suggest you dial again. This is not a detective agency” (8). In other words, “Paul
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Auster"— as a conventional author who makes sense of the details— is not to be found in 
this text, which won’t provide the answers to a puzzle as another “agent” o f detection 
might.
The sequence of phone rings, the number of calls, and the “wrong number” dialed 
establish the narrative significance of numbers. The first call rings twice before Quinn 
responds; the second call rings six times; the third call comes on May nineteenth, Quinn's 
“parents’ anniversary” which Quinn believes was “the first moment of his existence” (6). 
The numerical linkage of the telephone call and Quinn’s conception suggests associations 
beyond the level of coincidence—that we are here dwelling in a mathematical world, 
where objects and events are related in some system that can be numerically defined. The 
phone call might, too, bring about another kind of “conception”— but what matters is the 
suggestion that disparate events are related by the numbers attached to them. Stillman's 
fictional Henry Dark’s fictional 1690 pamphlet marks 1960 as the year that a foundation 
would be laid “for the new Babel” and, Quinn realizes, “ 1960 was the year Stillman 
locked up his son” (49). Peter and Virginia live on 69th Street. Dates, times, street 
addresses, arithmetic, baseball jerseys and train numbers are enumerated throughout the 
text. The conspicuous detailing of repetitions and numerical connections implies that the 
events cohere according to mathematical logic. Experience is encoded and, with enough 
ciphering, the code can be cracked. In one respect, the phone call represents all things that 
are opposed to the static, reclusive scenario that Quinn calls his life. Its mysterious source 
and content, further, are appropriately synchronous with issues of detection and identity 
central to Quinn’s character. “There’s no one here by that name,'’ Quinn tells the voice at 
the end of the wire; but there are three others present— at least their names are: Wilson, 
Work and Quinn. The appeal for “Paul Auster,” too, speaks to the absences, or lack of
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influence and meaning, which defines Quinn's life on many levels; he “did not consider 
himself to be the author of what he wrote,'’ and “he no longer had any friends'’ (5). The 
urgency of this unexpected appeal is starkly contrasted with Quinn, who “stood there on 
the cold floor, looking down at his feet, his knees, his limp penis'’ (8). The call is, then, a 
paradoxically unsettling and regenerating interruption of a static situation. In terms o f the 
narrative system we are engaging, however, the phone call functions as a point of 
bifurcation in the trajectories of plot and character, reminiscent of a forking path one 
inevitably confronts whilst navigating a labyrinth. Referring to Borges' story, “The 
Garden of Forking Paths,” Deleuze shows how the bifurcation effects a multiplication of 
narrative possibilities:
A bifurcation . . .  is called a point in the neighborhood of series’ 
divergence. Borges, one of Leibniz's disciples, invoked the Chinese 
philosopher-architect Ts’ui Pen, the inventor of the “garden with the 
bifurcating paths,” a baroque labyrinth whose infinite series convene or 
diverge, forming a webbing of time embracing all possibilities. Fang, for 
example, keeps a secret; a stranger knocks at his door; Fang decides to kill 
him. Naturally, several outcomes are possible: Fang can kill the intruder; 
the intruder can kill Fang; both can die, etc. In Ts’ui Pen’s work, all 
outcomes are produced, each being a point of departure for other 
bifurcations. {The Fold 62)
The phone call is like the knock on Fang’s door—an act, as expressed in this fittingly 
multilayered reference (I reference Deleuze, who references Borges, who references Ts’ui 
Pen) that is pregnant with numerable outcomes— all of which are “are produced, each 
being a point for other bifurcations.” Similarly in Auster’s text, all possible responses to
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the phone call are produced: on the occasion of the first call, Quinn, answers the phone 
and '■truthfully’' responds, “There is no one here by that name.'’ The second time the 
phone rings, Quinn, disliking the “tyranny'’ of the telephone, remains seated on the toilet 
and chooses not to pick up. Though curious about the caller and the mysterious “Paul 
Auster,” Quinn, in this instance, puts his biophysical routine above an intellectual 
interest. The figure who remains on the toilet and “decide[s] to resist” (5) the ringing 
phone, is one bifurcated strand of Quinn’s identity— the identity he will assume until the 
next point of bifurcation. There is, however, a third occasion, another strain in the system 
of calls, which mirrors its predecessors. The figure that receives this call is another 
potential version o f Quinn’s identity; and this version finally subordinates Quinn who sits 
inert night after night ignoring or awaiting another strange ring. Thus deviating from the 
initial conditions, this counterstrand—this particular “se lf’— is actualized at the moment 
when Quinn tells the caller, “This is Paul Auster speaking” (12).
What I term “counterstrands'’ or “potential versions” Deleuze would call 
“compossibilities.” All possible events take place; we experience the “one” event that 
gets filtered through, but all other variations remain simultaneously “compossible.” 
Following his discussion of Borges’ multi-outcome tale (of Ts’ui Pen’s Fang), where 
each result o f an act is represented in the narrative, Deleuze theorizes this multiplicity in 
terms of both narrative and subject identity. While at any given moment, a subject will 
inhabit a single strand— a single reality—this inhabited strand represents only one of 
many “compossible'’ strands which persist (even though they are not inhabited or 
realized, as it were).
At the core of every monad there exist singularities that in every case are the 
requisites o f the individual notion. That each individual clearly expresses only
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a part of the world derives from the real definition: is clearly expressed in the 
region determined by its constituent singularities. That every individual 
expresses the entire world also derives from the real definition: the 
constitutive singularities of each are effectively extended in all directions up 
to the singularities of others, under the condition that the corresponding series 
converge, such that each individual include the sum of a compossible world, 
and excludes only the other worlds incompossible with that world (where the 
series would diverge). (63)
To put this another way, Deleuze explains: “Adam sinned, but his opposite, Adam the 
nonsinner, is neither impossible nor inherently contradictory” (59). At any given juncture, 
several divergent series or compossibilities are present rather than relegated to entirely 
distinct worlds. The series of phone calls—the first one disturbing, the second over-ruled, 
the third invigorating— can be considered a “playing out” of compossibilities. But more 
than this, the calls disrupt the status quo, introducing turbulence to a stable system and 
igniting a pattern of reiteration that will dominate the remainder of the novella. From the 
set of midnight calls onward, structures in the narrative system are shadowed by their 
mirror, a compossibility. Obvious character doubles permeate the text: Daniel Quinn and 
Don Quixote. Quinn and William Wilson. Quinn and Max Work. Quinn's deceased wife 
and child and Paul Auster's wife and child. Daniel Quinn and Daniel Auster. The Peter 
Stillmans. The twin Senior Peter Stillmans at the train station. Peter Stillman and Peter 
Quinn. Peter Stillman, Jr., isolated and without language throughout childhood, and 
Quinn, isolated and without language before his “termination.” Saavedra, who 
recommends the Paul Auster Detective Agency to Virginia Stillman, and Saavedra, the 
alleged translator of Don Quixote. The unidentified narrator, just returned from Africa,
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and Paul Auster, the unbeatable author of City o f  Glass. Paul Auster, the writer who 
makes Quinn an omelet, and Paul Auster, the author of City o f  Glass.
It has been suggested that the one component in each pair works as a foil for the 
other component, conveying what Russell calls, “the deconstructive denial of a single 
self' (81); coherent identity is not possible in a scheme where, at every turn, subjects are 
reflected, absorbed, or cancelled out by other subjects. Indeed, the bifurcating series 
refuses the structuralist attempt to “grasp the ‘center’ o f the system which functions as a 
principle of inclusion and exclusion” (Culler 99). But while these doubles speak to the 
Derridian fallacy of “presence,” their significance, I think, is not fully realized if 
considered in terms of deconstruction alone. The doubling that dominates City o f  Glass is 
not merely a situation of self-effacing binaries that illustrate, as Steve Alford says, that 
“the self is a textual construct subject to the difference and deferral inherent in language" 
(17). These doubles, rather, are iterations that refract perpetually throughout the narrative 
system, opening up realms in which new information and alternate perspectives may 
emerge. The three narrative pieces that compose The New York Trilogy, in effect, 
illustrate this expansion; as the narrator of the final section says, they “are finally the 
same story, but each one represents a different stage in my awareness of what it is all 
about” (346). Deleuze explains how this “divergent” and “decentered” reproduction—the 
single story birthing multiple “same stories”— creates autonomies for each possible 
perspective:
To every perspective or point-of-view there must correspond an 
autonomous work with its own self-sufficient sense: what matters is 
the divergence o f series, the decentering of circles, ‘monstrosity.’ The 
totality of circles and series is thus a formless ungrounded chaos that
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has no law other than its repetition, its own reproduction in the 
development of what diverges and decenters. (Difference and 
Repetition 69)
Thus, the thrice-reiterated story of The New’ York Trilogy. Even within one “independent" 
iteration, other micro-iterations are apparent. On the third phone call, for example, Quinn 
asserts, “I don’t go around killing people,” and the voice objects: “No . . .  1 mean the 
reverse” (13). Here, the opposing propositions effect a type of cognitive doubling, a 
strand and counterstrand that are derived from the larger, encompassing dialectic. The 
same doubling and splintering takes place in Quinn's identity, beginning with his 
pseudonym, William Wilson, and his heroic alter ego, Max Work. When the opportunity 
presents itself, he impersonates Paul Auster, the detective. Due partly to his internal 
vacancy, he adapts seamlessly to each new scenario—without much substance o f his 
“own,” he is particularly malleable. The iterative function of doubling is clearly 
demonstrated during the series of encounters Quinn has with the elder Stillman. The first 
encounter is a performance of ambivalence, a swaying between polar identities and ideas. 
Quinn begins by “stubbornly fixing his eyes on the wrinkled profile” of Stillman (88).
His marked interest is countered by a blockade. Stillman says, “I ’m sorry but it won’t be 
possible for me to talk to you” (88). The mirroring interlocutors, each with his own red 
notebook, immediately set up antithetical objectives. This double folds again into another 
set of opposing positions. Shifting at once from his initial engrossment, Quinn’s “whole 
being exude[s] indifference” (89), at which point “Stillman smile[s] brightly, . . . lean[s] 
toward Quinn, and [says] in a conspiratorial voice, ‘I think we’re going to get along’” 
(89). Like Democritus and Heraclitus, whom they later discuss, Quinn and Stillman are 
“two poles of the dialectic” (97). Their gestures and dialogue fluctuate in an oppositional
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but complementary fashion, demonstrating the flexibility o f doubling functions. Their 
status as doubles, furthermore, indicates the unlikely mathematical situation where one 
factor equals two of the same factors.
Quinn and Stillman, Sr., both name and rename things in an effort to solve their 
respective puzzles, to right the particular wrongs they detest. Working to save the young 
Peter from paternal threat, Quinn changes appellation each time he meets with Stillman. 
Stillman, for his part, provides names for objects that, he 's convinced, are no longer 
connected to their current, post-lapsarian names. Quinn's seamless switching of identity 
performs Vladimir Propp’s notion that within a genre only character names (and not 
functions) change from one tale to the next.1 But the name changes also reflect Stillman's 
conviction that “words no longer correspond to the world" (92). Ironically, the first alias 
Quinn supplies is “Quinn," which he makes a point to spell out, breaking it apart to its 
smallest components for Stillman’s inspection. Stillman points out that the name “rhymes 
with twin" (89) and proceeds to enumerate other rhymes and resonances; he notes the 
name’s paradoxical “quintessence . . .  of quiddity'’ and its propensity to “[fly] off in so 
many little directions at once'’ (90). Henry Dark, the name Quinn uses at the second 
meeting, undergoes a similar dissection, but this time Quinn does the sussing: he 
proposes Henry David Thoreau, Hilda Doolittle, Heraclitus and Democritus as the name's 
sources. Quinn, in this instance, identifies himself as Stillman’s fictional creation, while 
on the third meeting, Quinn assumes the name of Stillman’s biological creation, Peter. 
Stillman Sr. accordingly bends with each successive introduction, accommodating the 
“new" Quinn with whom he speaks. These transformations, though “false,” illustrate 
ontological adaptation through systematic recursion. And if, as Stillman says, “little by
1 Propp discusses genre and character in The M orphology o f  the R ussian  F olktale { 1928).
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little . . . things have broken apart, shattered, [and] collapsed into chaos’' (93), it follows 
that other interconnected systems fluctuate and adapt in chaotic sympathy.
Hi. The implicated observer
We have to remember that what we observe is not nature in 
itself but nature exposed to our method of questioning.
- Werner Heisenberg,
Physics and Philosophy, 58
The double, a key structural feature in City o f  Glass, turns out to be much more than a 
unit o f simple polarity. Not only do terms feed back upon themselves and produce new 
terms, but the system is also complicated by the involvement of an observer, a less 
conspicuous third variable. Quinn, for one, “had always imagined that the key to good 
detective work was a close observation o f details. The more accurate the scrutiny, the 
more successful the results’* (80). But, as Heisenberg postulated in 1927, an observer is 
always implicated in what he or she observes; such were Heisenberg’s findings, 
extrapolated from his discovery that we cannot measure accurately both the velocity and 
position of subatomic particles because the means needed to measure one aspect disturbs 
the nature of the other aspect. This paradox is echoed in Theory o f  Heat, where James 
Clerk Maxwell describes how the most efficient experimenter will inadvertently and 
“without the expenditure of work,” alter the transfer of heat molecules in a manner that, 
consequently, “contradict[s] the second law of thermodynamics” (328). This observer, 
known as Maxwell's Demon, demonstrates that any attempt to reveal order, no matter 
how benign or meticulous the investigator, is an imposition of order. “When the 
scientist,” as Susan Strehle asserts in Fiction and the Quantum Universe, “for centuries a
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figure typifying neutrality, distance, passive observation, becomes an actor in the 
interplay, the entire set of relations between mind and world has changed”’ (13). Hayden 
White describes similar effects of the historical theorist, whose conception of historical 
structure— his choice of archetypes— shapes the way in which “the facts” are organized 
and narrated;1 preconceived systems in the mind of the documentarian determine the way 
in which facts are structured. We can safely say that Deleuze and Guattari would consider 
the psychoanalyst to be a version of Maxwell’s Demon.
The interactive dynamic between the observer and the observed is a good example 
of systematic complexity. Because, as Niels Bohr says, “[a]n independent reality in the 
ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of 
observation” (54), we must view both operations together. Furthermore, in the absence of 
“independent reality,” it becomes prohibitively difficult to evaluate the material at hand, 
to differentiate meaningful from irrelevant. “Since there is nothing outside the field,” 
writes Paul Civello, taking up Hayles’s “field theory” of science and art discourses,2 
“there is no frame of reference either” (116). While he tracks Stillman’s course, for 
example, Quinn, like Maxwell’s Demon, must sort through information and privilege 
some items over others. But his selections, his particular “logic of hierarchy” (Chatman 
53) creates the narrative he studies. No matter how objective he tries to be, or how 
precisely he records the data, Quinn— simply because he observes— will participate in the 
system under his observation, and, in so doing, he will have an impact on how the system 
is interpreted. The most striking instance of this observational influence occurs at the 
train station where Quinn awaits the arrival of the elder Peter Stillman. As the passengers
1 This is a central contention in W hite’s essay, “The Structure o f  Historical N arrative1' (1972).
2 In N . Katherine H ayles’ A C osm ic Web: Scientific F ie ld  M odels a n d  L iterary  S tra teg ies  in the Twentieth  
C entu iy  (1984).
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alight the train, Quinn sees the “unmistakable” (67) object of his pursuit and begins to 
follow him. When Stillman puts down his bag, however, Quinn happens to “glance to 
Stillman's right, surveying the rest of the crowd to be doubly sure he had made no 
mistakes'’ (67). Quinn is horrified:
Directly behind Stillman, heaving into view just inches behind his right 
shoulder, another man stopped, took a lighter out of his pocket, and lit a 
cigarette. His face was the exact twin o f Stillman’s. For a second, Quinn 
thought it was an illusion, a kind of aura thrown off by the electromagnetic 
currents of Stillman’s body. But no, this other Stillman moved, breathed, 
blinked his eyes; his actions were clearly independent of the first Stillman. 
(67-8)
The object of Quinn’s investigation effectively bifurcates, making explicit the doubling 
principle that governs the narrative as a whole. The episode positions the observer as 
simultaneously detached from and participatory in the system under observation. Faced 
with twin specimens, Quinn knows that “whatever choice he made— and he had to make 
a choice—would be arbitrary, a submission to chance” (68). At first Quinn follows the 
second Stillman for a few paces, then realizes “he was acting out of spite, spurred on to 
punish the second Stillman for confusing him” (68). That Quinn is influenced by his 
spiteful feelings— and, even, that he feels spite at all, where he should be neutral—  
exposes the fallacy o f “detective” as a roving, disassociated eyeball. And just as surely 
as “spite” has him choose one Stillman over the other, it promptly works to counteract 
that decision. Trembling, Quinn switches course and undertakes to trail the first Stillman.
The scenario at the train station is problematic on several levels. Because Quinn 
cannot differentiate between the two Stillmans, he must rely upon intuition and (though
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perhaps not consciously) his own beliefs and apprehensions to decide which man to 
pursue. O f his accuracy, “[tjhere was no way to know*’ (68). The quest for meaning is 
thus fundamentally skewed because so much—indeed, the central figure under 
investigation—becomes contingent upon Quinn’s perceptions, which are infused with 
unquantifiables like “spite.” Quinn hopes that “beneath the infinite facade of gestures, 
tics, and silences, there was finally a coherence, an order, a source of motivation” (80), 
but, ironically, the motivation and order he seeks to reveal in Stillman’s actions are the 
very forces that have contaminated his investigation. Beyond the interpretive partiality of 
the detective, the scene at the station implicates the reader in the system that is the novel, 
City o f  Glass. Full of contradictions and doubles, the novel requires that the reader assess 
which “twin”— be it a character, an image, or an idea— should be given precedence over 
its counterpart. Of course, the “plot” does not alter under a reader’s influence, but the 
meaning of its many conflicting signals are subject to the unpredictable deductions made 
by a “textual observer.” The name “Stillman,” for example, can be perceived as “a still 
man,” thus imbued with inertia, obsolescence, or death; conversely, the name may 
connote the phrase, “still a man,” implying a kind of humanitarian optimism or resilience 
in the face of pervasive social decay. And there are two Stillmans to consider: each is 
“still,” trapped in linguistic nebulae, but are their stillnesses identical or oppositional?
The narrative system, then, is altered by an external Maxwell’s Demon, the 
reader, whose particular perspectives inform the meaning of the narrative. But these 
perspectives are themselves governed, to some extent, by the cues presented by the text. 
Quinn must arbitrarily decide which Stillman to follow at the train station, but, during his 
conversations with Stillman, Sr., Quinn’s thoughts and behavior are influenced by those 
of Stillman; similarly, one who “detects” City o f  Glass is implicitly coerced into handling
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information in the same way that Quinn does. The reader cleaves to the principles and 
actions o f his object. There is, as stated by a line Quinn recalls from Poe, “[a]n 
identification of the reasoner’s intellect with that of his opponent” (40). And just as Poe's 
Legrand decodes Captain Kidd's cryptographs by imagining the “crude intellect o f the 
sailor” (639), Quinn's method is influenced by Stillman’s scriptophilia, and he “turn[s] to 
a clean page of the red notebook and sketche[s] a little map of the area Stillman had 
walked in'’ (80).
It seemed to him he was looking for a sign. He was ransacking the chaos of 
Stillman’s movements for some glimmer of cogency. This implied only one 
thing: that he continued to disbelieve the arbitrariness o f Stillman's actions. 
He wanted there to be a sense to them, no matter how obscure. (83)
Quinn’s mapping exercise seems to reveal a pattern— each day’s ramble generates a 
letter, and the days seem to spell “TOWER OF BABEL.” But Quinn, “clinging to the 
semblance of objectivity” (84), may just be “looking for pictures in the clouds” (85). 
After all, far from clear-cut, the drawings are “complicated by numerous irregularities, 
approximations, and ornate embellishments,” with letters “precariously tilted on a 
perverse single point, like an upside-down pyramid” (85). Quinn tries “to look as if he 
had not been anticipating a letter of the alphabet” (84), but, because o f the essentially 
linguistic aspect o f the case, Quinn’s interpretations of these “irregularities'’ are 
inevitably weighted towards language. White’s conception o f historical emplotment is 
instructive here:
[One] way we make sense of a set of events which appears strange, enigmatic 
or mysterious in its immediate manifestation is to encode the set in terms of 
culturally provided categories, such as metaphysical concepts, religious
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beliefs or story forms. The effect o f such encodations is to familiarize the 
unfamiliar. (10)
In City o f  Glass, the “culturally provided category” is fiction, or more specifically, 
language. This is not, however, to negate the possibility that Stillman does intentionally 
trace out letters with his urban promenades; after all, in Poe's “The Gold Bug,"
LeGrand’s decoding measures do yield results. But like Maxwell's Demon, Quinn’s 
methodology and his preconceptions—the way in which he perceives and organizes his 
data— exert pressure on the mystery before him. Quinn “emplots” the data. And this 
emplotment in turn modifies the development of the case: believing that only “the last 
two letters remained” (87), he shifts his entire detective approach and ventures to meet 
Stillman in person.
Quinn’s pictorial representations, though possibly misleading, establish an 
investigative paradigm by which the various Maxwell’s Demons o f City o f  Glass interpret 
information. The narrator, for one, admits that Quinn’s red notebook was “difficult to 
decipher” but insists that he “refrained from any interpretation” (158). One wonders about 
the veracity of this claim, given assertions like: “In his dream, which he later forgot, 
[Quinn] found himself in the town dump of his childhood, sifting through a mountain of 
rubbish” (87). But even without these mystifying statements, the effects of Quinn’s 
detective strategies upon those of the narrator are evident in the way in which information 
is conveyed. When faced with Stillman’s “impenetrability” (80), Quinn, quite randomly, 
looks to his subject’s route for answers; when faced with an impenetrable Quinn, who 
“no longer had an opinion” (125) and “knew that he knew nothing” (124), the narrator 
lays out the stark, geographical coordinates of his subject. Quinn “walked down 
Broadway to 72nd Street, turned east to Central Park West, and followed it to 59th Street
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and the statue of Columbus'’ (127). This is the beginning of a long and scrupulously 
precise account of Quinn's course through the streets and avenues of the city. Essentially 
a list of directions, the passage is notably devoid of other descriptive or psychological 
commentary. We are told only when and where Quinn "‘veers left and progresse[s] further 
downtown,” “continue[s] south for a mile,” “turn[s] right on Houston Street,” and so on 
(127). The passage is remarkable, in part, because it offers sufficient detail of Quinn’s 
course that— as Quinn does with Stillman's meandering— whosoever regards the text can 
envision Quinn’s movements pictographically. One might, instructed by Quinn’s 
evaluative method, take it upon oneself to plot this course out on a map of Manhattan. 
When thus plotted, an eerily suggestive image emerges: Quinn’s route “draws” an 
elongated pseudo-rectangle, a tower of sorts, rooted in Central Park with its utmost point 
at the Staten Island Ferry. The “TOWER OF BABEL” that Quinn ciphers from Stillman’s 
steps is reiterated in Quinn’s depiction, but only, perhaps, because the investigative 
approach Quinn uses to arrive at Stillman’s “message” has been once again employed by 
both narrator and reader.
The methodological contagion shown here illustrates how interpretation is itself 
another force which alters dynamic systems under investigation. Compelled by various 
insidious forces, Quinn applies a specific method of analysis, and this method emerges 
again and again in various incarnations. But just as an interpretive system is influenced 
by the codes of other interpretive systems, so too does the material under observation 
resist the codes and orders being used to understand it. If  you draw Quinn’s course on a 
map of Manhattan, for example, you will end up with a figure that resembles an inverted 
tower. This, perhaps, makes narrative sense since Stillman’s path forms an image 
“precariously tilted on a perverse single point, like an upside-down pyramid” (85). But in
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keeping with Quinn, who tries “to look as if he had not been anticipating a letter of the 
alphabet” (84), so too must one who assesses the diagram of Quinn’s course be aware of 
his or her own detective conditioning. Quinn’s drawing is not, after all, a perfect 
rectangle. Within the narrator’s account of Quinn's steps, chaotic eruptions occur. Along 
his route, Quinn “[circles] haphazardly for a few blocks,” while at one point he “stop[s] 
momentarily to watch a juggler perform on a slack rope stretched between a light pole 
and a tree trunk'’ (127). While Quinn searches for a “glimmer of cogency” (83) in 
Stillman’s maneuvering, the reader cannot ignore the twists and turns in Quinn's urban 
trek. Other designs, apart from the tower depiction, emerge: Quinn “ [swings] around to 
Varick S treet. . . number 6, where he used to live, and then regain[s] his southern course" 
(127) and later, at the World Trade Center, he “enter[s] one of the fast-food places on the 
ground floor and leisurely consume[s] a sandwich” (128). It would be easy to walk in a 
strict rectangle in Manhattan, but Quinn’s path is broken by unpredictable swerves.
The promenades and their interpretations compose the complex system, the 
manifold variables involved in (what should ostensibly be) simple perception and 
analysis. Quinn derives information from the terrain he covers, from the semblance of 
things around him, and from the way in which he and his subject negotiate the city. The 
walks express the way in which an observer impinges upon the system she considers, and 
how that impingement affects subsequent employment of similar methods. Inasmuch as 
they “reveal meaning” in the form of approximate hieroglyphics, the promenades reveal 
the inherently approximate quality of truth or supposedly understandable systems. 
Random disruptions and subjective motivation persist beneath the semblance of order and 
design. As Slethaug says, “the mappable can become a means of introducing the 
unmappable, and apparent attractors can reveal inconsistencies, gaps and absences” (161).
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Quinn's account of “the things he had seen while walking” (128) reveal the disorder 
within the fixed grid of the city: “There is the woman with the Halloween mask on her 
face. There is the man in a business suit with bare feet and a football helmet on his head” 
(131). People are haphazardly dressed in holiday or political gear—the American flag, 
presidential campaign buttons: random and out-of-place. Possibly the most evocative 
figure of concomitant order and disorder is the man “who goes everywhere with a set of 
drumsticks, pounding the pavement with them in a reckless, nonsensical rhythm, stooped 
awkwardly as he advances along the street, beating and beating away at the cement”
(131). Here, the rhythmic regimentation of drumming becomes erratic, signifying the 
human disorder that swells within the city’s concrete delineation. Finally, Quinn cedes to 
the same, taking up residence in an alley, believing (as the insane drummer might) that 
his continued surveillance of Stillman— who is long gone— is of vital importance. In 
order to break from the regimentation of the system he studies, Quinn has to exile himself 
from the system altogether.
[The analyst's] task is to make out what has been 
forgotten from the traces which it has left behind or, 
more correctly, to construct it.
- Sigmund Freud.
“Constructions in Analysis,” 24
In Austef s depiction of observation, pace the claims of improbabilities science, the one 
who observes is necessarily implicated in the object or processes under observation. This 
subject/object overlap problematizes the hierarchical distinction between the observer and 
the observed, where both agents are, finally, positioned within the same field. What 
begins as a scientific idea— Heisenbergian uncertainty— comes to assume psychological 
significance. Although conventional psychoanalysis acknowledges the inevitability of 
transference and counter-transference, it is left to the “good analyst" to sort through the 
projections and fantasies. Partial implication, however, becomes complete involvement 
when the observer (unwittingly or in a loop of moebial indeterminacy) becomes (or 
realizes that he has always been) the observed. Ail three novellas in The New’ York 
Trilogy involve these complex or twisted scenarios of observation. Midway through 
Ghosts, the narrator explains that “spying out at Black across the street, it is as though 
Blue were looking into a mirror, and that instead of merely watching another, he finds 
that he is also watching himself* (172). In City o f  Glass, Quinn eventually realizes that 
even as he surveys Peter Stillman. Stillman is observing Quinn— and that Stillman “had 
known he would be followed, had known his movements would be recorded, had known 
his message would be deciphered" (86). And in The Locked Room, the protagonist 
realizes that even as he builds a trail of clues leading to Fanshawe. Fanshawe is watching 
him. As Fanshawe explains near the end of the novella, “I turned everything around. Fie
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thought he was following me, but in fact I was following him. . . .  I led him along, 
making it impossible for him not to find me. But I was watching the whole time, and 
when the moment came, I set him up, and he walked right into my trap" (362). Whatever 
pretences these characters adopt for observing other people, it is watching itself that 
matters to Auster—the way in which watching can function as a means of contagion. 
Thus does Quinn consider, toward the opening of City o f  Glass, the tripartite meaning of 
the term “private eye”:
Private eye. The term held a triple meaning for Quinn. Not only was it the 
letter “I,” standing for “investigator,” it was “I” in the upper case, the tiny 
life-bud buried in the body of the breathing self. At the same time, it was also 
the physical eye o f the writer, the eye of the man who looks out from himself 
into the world and demands that the world reveal itself to him. (9-10) 
Observing others in City o f  Glass becomes synonymous with observing the self. In his 
essay on DeLillo's Ratner’s Star—a novel about scientific investigation, whose 
characters seem as mathematically defined as their theories— David Cowart points out 
that “no matter how frequently scientists remind themselves o f Godel’s theorem (that all 
systems ultimately falter in the ultimate lability of their postulates), they merely struggle, 
Laocoons of the Enlightenment, in the toils of subjectivity” (124). In other words, no 
matter how sophisticated and self-aware the investigation (the “eye”), the object of 
scrutiny is always influenced by the investigator's self (the “I”). But how does this 
dynamic play out when— as is the case throughout The New York Trilogy—the 
investigator becomes the investigated, and the observer the observed? Quinn, for 
example, begins to assume properties of the objects and processes he examines and the 
persons he surveys. He is revealed to be a node where multiple forces intersect, a
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Deleuzo-Guattarian “desiring-machine,” whose identity is in continual flux and 
contingent upon external as well as internal factors. Brian Massumi provides an 
instructive gloss on the concept of “subjectification” as it is presented in Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia:
There is no interiority in the sense of a closed, self-reflexive system. There is 
only multileveled infolding of an aleatory outside, with which the infolding 
remains in contact (as a dissipative structure). Reactive forces do impose 
“se lf’-reflection on the infolding at a certain level. On that level, a more rigid 
boundary takes shape between “self’ and “other,” but the cordoning off is 
never complete. The self remains susceptible to identity crises brought on by 
confusions between “inside” and “outside.” A membranous porosity subsists, 
muted, on other levels, and always threatens to break through.
Subjectification is the constitution, through interlocking passive and active 
syntheses on every stratum, of infoldings of various porosity. (80)
Quinn, whose subjectivity is molded through various encounters with “others,” including 
father and son Stillman, exemplifies this “membranous porosity.”
In “The Library of Babel,” Borges writes that “for every sensible line of 
straightforward statement, there are leagues of senseless cacophonies, verbal jumbles and 
incoherences” (53). Every ostensible line contains all compossible senseless alternatives. 
Raised without exposure to language, the young Peter Stillman speaks in an incoherent 
deluge, where meaning is obfuscated by too many words, too much nonsense, and too 
much contradiction. He describes his boyhood in the dark room of his childhood: 
“Wimble click crumble beloo. Clack clack bedrack. Numb noise, flacklemuch, 
chewmanna” (20). His body, like his voice, is “machine-like, fitful, alternating between
slow and rapid gestures, rigid and yet expressive, as if the operation were out of control, 
not quite corresponding to the will that lay behind it” (17). But from Peter's tangled 
prattle, a pattern emerges: the assertion, “My name is Peter Stillman,” recurs periodically, 
a strange attractor toward which the other words and ideas veer— in attempted 
elaboration— but never actually reach. As with the butterfly-shaped Lorenz’s Attractor, a 
generally recognizable shape appears. Peter’s psychology, accordingly, guides and evades 
his speech but can never be definitively ascertained. Cadaverous and clad in white, Peter 
is “almost transparent,” and at times, “invisible” (18). Though tumultuous, Peter’s speech 
is remarkably perspicacious. Amidst his messy circumlocutions, Peter spews forth the 
odd phrase of clarity. He calls his neologisms “pretty and true” (23), conveys his love for 
“the air and the light” (25), and refers to himself as “the end of everyone, the last man” 
(23). Without the strictures o f verbal decorum or syntax, Peter’s articulations become a 
veritable stream of consciousness, the voice o f “everyone,” expressing the ontological 
confusion that permeates City o f  Glass. Babbling produces the “possibility for escaping 
coercive structures of order” (Hayles 265), and is thus, as DeLillo maintains, a “purer 
form of speech” (Slethaug 58). Peter’s father, conversely, tries to generate a “precise” 
language to represent shattered things, “from the chipped to the smashed, from the dented 
to the squashed, from the pulverized to the putrid” (94). Stillman, Sr., takes it upon 
himself to put a fragmented world “back together again” (91). But the old man’s 
extrapolations— his imposition of order and meaning upon language and events— do 
more to confuse than clarify: he takes, for example, George Washington’s chopping of 
the cherry tree to reveal “an essential truth. Namely, that money doesn't grow on trees” 
(103). Stillman, Sr., creates meaning by graphing pre-established systems of his own 
construction onto the material world. In White’s terminology, Stillman, Sr., “emplots”
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(10) significance, whereas his son's meaning unintentionally emerges from the chaotic 
ramblings that characterize his expression.
Quinn operates somewhere between the Stillman poles of regimented and 
unbridled expression. He is alternately laconic and garrulous. Ironically, Quinn is at his 
most verbose when he is discussing a Mets baseball game, a supremely structured 
scenario. He states which player “can't keep his mind on the game” and which should be 
“shipped back to Cincinnati by express mail” (44). The regiments of baseball here 
facilitate expression; the routine plays and patterns of the game supply concrete objects 
toward which Quinn directs strategic opinions. Later, however, similar rigidity obstructs 
speech: a busy signal— a strict, metronomic sound— prevents him from speaking to 
Virginia Stillman. The busy signal is incessant, and, by stages, Quinn is forced to turn off 
the baseball game on television so that he may write without distraction in his red 
notebook. Quinn vacillates between linguistic freedom and inertia. As the case spirals out 
of control, he tries to assure himself of the facts, as one might do in order reaffirm one's 
touch with reality: “This is New York, and tomorrow will be June third” (124). Like Peter 
Stillman, too, Quinn intermittently acknowledges his identity, writing his initials in the 
red notebook and the imperative: “remember who I am” (49). Fluctuations between fluid 
and stultified expression persist until, finally, the busy signal becomes “a counterpoint to 
his steps, a metronome beating steadily inside the random noises of the city” (106).
Thus we have the irresolvable tension between what seems and what is, what is 
perceived and what is imposed. The intermingling of order and disorder is embodied 
finally in a musician whom Quinn encounters on his route through Manhattan, a 
clarinetist playing in sync with two wind-up, percussionist monkeys:
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With one [monkey] shaking and the other banging, beating out weird and 
precise syncopation, the man would improvise endless tiny variations on his 
instrument, his body swaying stiffly back and forth, energetically miming the 
monkeys' rhythm. He played jauntily and with flair, crisp and looping figures 
in the minor mode, as if glad to be there with his mechanical friends, enclosed 
in the universe he had created, never once looking up. (130)
The monkeys are both primitive and technological forces. They evince an innate tendency 
toward structure, but one that requires construction or mechanism to ensure its 
perpetuation. The monkeys’ perpendicular “shaking"’ and “banging” create an axis upon 
which the musician whimsically plots his “looping figures." The players are themselves 
in a looping system, where the monkeys’ syncopated patterns determine the parameters of 
the man’s behavior, his “swaying stiffly back and forth” and weaving his music to fit 
their dominant rhythm. But this constricting system is also of the musician's contrivance, 
a “universe he had created.” The ensemble is like Barthes’ onion, a vision of narrative: 
a construction of layers (or levels, or systems) whose body contains, finally 
no heart, no kernel, no secret, no irreducible principle, nothing except the 
infinity of its own envelopes— which envelop nothing other than the unity o f 
its surfaces. (10)
The artificial monkeys— signs, simulations of living creatures— chart out the space for 
improvisation wherein the “glad,” jaunty player, like a writer within the strictures of 
language and genre, finds jouissance. The “genius” (130) Quinn perceives is the 




American Rhizomes: Don DeLillo’s 
Underworld and Cosmopolis
The writer wants to see inside the human works, down 
to dreams and routine rambling thoughts, in order to 
locate the neural strands that link him to men and 
women that shape history.
- Don DeLillo,
“The Power of History,” 61
Any event is a fog of a million droplets.
- Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari,
A Thousand Plateaus, 63
Much of Don DeLillo's fiction works to express the ineluctable connections that exist 
among apparently disparate phenomena— persons, objects, cultural processes, and 
historical events. In his polyphonic Underworld (1997), DeLillo disrupts conventional 
notions o f social and political evolution by advancing an atemporal, intertextual anatomy 
of the latter half of the twentieth century in America. DeLillo undertook a similar 
historical de-creation in Libra (1988), where the JFK assassination functions as a node to 
which myriad subjects and destinies are attached. Individual trajectories in these novels 
are never autonomous but participate, rather, in dynamic concert (or contest) with each 
other and greater cultural patterns. DeLillo's latest, relatively short novel, Cosmopolis 
(2003), affirms the impossibility of discrete experience that is elaborated in Underworld, 
but focuses upon a single action— a single day and event— as a means o f undermining the
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very notion of the single: during a would-be linear trip across Manhattan to get a haircut, 
protagonist and corporate tycoon Eric Packer encounters a flurry of obstacles that 
transform his undertaking from simple and solitary to complex and multitudinous. The 
preponderance of tangents, fragments and cycles in Underworld and Cosmopolis, while 
signaling the inevitable distortion of boundaries both theoretical and actual under cyber­
capitalism (public/private, consumer/consumed, national/global), collapses the atomistic 
concept of the individual and simple psychological determinism. What is staged is a 
narrative rhizome, whose pleats and intersections work to disinter those individuals and 
events that a single, “official history'" would bury.
DeLillo has been criticized for the “constructedness" of his prose and the 
personalities he portrays. It is true that the later novels in particular (Mao 11, U ndei^orld  
and Cosmopolis) are conspicuously wrought, foregrounding the physical contours of 
subjects and episodes through jarring shifts in perspective, recurring phrases and parodic 
intermissions. But this heightened awareness o f narrative shape and texture would seem 
appropriate to DeLillo’s subject— a late-capitalist environment that is itself preoccupied 
with structure, form, semblance and simulation.1 A consciousness of narrative and 
subjective construction, furthermore, makes palpable the analogously constructed nature 
of the cultural narratives that would enlist our involvement, such as The Normal, cause- 
and-effect, and, indeed, Oedipus. Although not generally admired for creating “haunting” 
characters with whom we might empathize emotionally, in keeping with his emphasis on 
what seems, DeLillo is renowned for his ability to emulate regional American dialects
1 A s Timothy Parrish states [in response to Margaret Scanlan’s com m ent that in M ao 11, “one m isses . . .  an 
old-fashioned novelistic virtue, the attempt to com m unicate the distinctive accents o f  a culture’’ (246)], 
“[t]he irony that critics repeatedly face, D eL illo 's ability to deconstruct ‘old-fashioned novelistic  v irtues,’ is 
in large part what enables his work to capture the distinctive accents o f  postmodern culture” (697).
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and integrate all manner of colloques and jargons into his baroque textual weaves.1 The 
resulting fictions exemplify a “dialogic imagination,” which is egalitarian in its scope and 
diversity, representing specific discourses “belonging to professions, to genres, languages 
peculiar to particular generations, etc.” (Bahktin xix). An original clash of literary 
sensibilities is achieved, where an acutely “artificial” prose style supports a host of 
distinctly human concerns. Johnston aptly dubs DeLillo’s fiction “machinic”— a term he 
borrows from Deleuze and Guattari, which “applies to the machine in its functional unity 
of discrete but homogenous parts and . . . the organic, which applies to the organism as a 
hierarchical organization of biological organs” (“Machinic Vision” 28). The doubly 
organic and mechanical—the machinic—produces an invigorating hybrid form whose 
“ambiguities,” states Philip Nel, “are both provocative and representative, actively 
shocking and passively matter-of-fact” (725).
The machinic novel, which portrays a “working relationship among the 
heterogeneous elements and relations” (Johnston 28), is rhizomatic in nature: its many 
facets operate simultaneously and interdependently. In Underworld, form befits content, 
and history in all its tenses occurs not in a sequentially unfolding, linear arrangement, but 
all at once, forming a narrative assemblage. The “assemblage,” as Deleuze and Guattari 
explains in A Thousand Plateaus, is an aleatory space:
[An assemblage is a] multiplicity made up of many heterogeneous terms and 
which establishes liaisons, relations between them, across ages, sexes and 
reigns— different natures. Thus, the assemblage’s only unity is a that of co­
functioning: it is a symbiosis, a ‘sympathy’. It is never affiliations that are
1 Even, in the case o f  R a tn e r’s S tar  (1989), inventing plausible d ialects that fuse ultra-specialized scien ces  
with intergalactic nationality.
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important but alliances, alloys; these are not successions, lines of descent, but 
contagions, epidemics, the wind. (84)1 
Such is the structural dominant in both Underworld and Cosmopolis— though, in the 
latter work, “liaisons,” “affiliations” and “symbiosis” occur as inevitable contingencies of 
what initially seems to be a linear (and physical: driving from point A to point B) 
narrative system.2 This is achieved through the chaotic representation of history, which 
problematizes the notion of deterministic— and, indeed, individual— psychic 
development. Stephen Bernstein’s contention about Libra could equally be applied to 
Unden\'orld\ “[the novel] finally makes the same case for history as chaos theory has 
clarified about weather forecasting: the impossibility of grasping the plurality of details 
inherent in initial conditions renders any human attempts at understanding the present 
forecasting the future proportionally deficient” (n.p.).3 His fiction depicts cultural and 
psychological themes, problems, patterns, thus revealing the unassailable connections
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between society, its products, and the individual narratives^embody contextual structures.
1 The “assem blage” formation, as Brian M assumi explains, also applies to the constitution o f  the human 
subject: “The subject is not psychological, it is not contained in one mind. It is in the interactions between  
people. W hich is not to say that it is sim ply interpersonal; it is also in the technology that defined the kinds 
o f  productive work our docility serves. W hich is not to say that it is sim ply socioecon om ic: it is also in the 
raw materials at the basis o f  that technology and in the genes that define the physical and intellectual 
potential o f  the human body-m achine. Which is not to say it is material in any determ inistic way; genes 
result from chance mutation. The subject is a transpersonal abstract m achine . . .” (26).
2 “Where bodies and m achines enter into m achinic relationships,” says Johnston, “D eleuze and Guattari 
distinguish tw o opposed processes: a point o f  instability, where a functional equilibrium  g ives w ay to 
m ovem ents o f  change and becom ing, there is what they call a decoding or deterritorialization; but on the 
opposed face o f  the assem blage, in contrast to these ‘lines o f  flight,’ there are processes o f  stratification, 
involving redundancy and recoding, or reterritorialization” (28).
3 Structural chaotics, Bernstein explains, revise the classic formulation o f  plot in A ristotle’s P o e tic s , where 
a sequence o f  events fo llow s the unity o f  a single “action” and its consequences. Fracturing this unity 
“allow s m om ents to be related to each other in multiple and non-linear w ays . . . [Tjhere are many curved 
lines that pass through points in an order other than linear succession” (n.p.). Bruce B augh ’s comm entary  
on such fracturing in V onnegut’s Slaughterhouse Five is also pertinent to D eL illo 's  U n d erw o rld  and 
C osm opolis: “within the finitude o f  life there lies infinity, since m om ents are traversed not only once and in 
one direction but an infinite number o f  tim es, from innumerable d irections” (51).
In this chapter, I examine how DeLillo’s rhizomatic, dialogical representation o f 
American history attests to the emancipatory potential of a chaotic expression o f the past.
i. Aggregate, perspective, event
A contemporary portrait no longer directs our 
attention to an authoritative lineage, to evocations of 
heritage and tradition alone. Simultaneities intervene, 
extending our point of view outward to an infinite 
number of lines connecting the subject to a whole 
world of comparable instances, complicating the 
temporal flow of meaning, short-circuiting the 
fabulous stringing-out o f ‘one damned thing after 
another’. The new, the novel, must now involve an 
explicitly geographical as well as historical 
configuration and projection.
- Edward Soja, 
Postmodern Geographies, 23
“Pause for a moment, you wretched weakling, and take stock of yourself’ (295): it's  a 
line Nick Shay remembers from The Cloud o f  Unknowing, a medieval tract that is also the 
title of a chapter in Underworld. DeLillo’s novel is itself is a kind of “un-knowing" 
semantic cloud, which, through the diffusion of time and space, dissolves accepted lines 
of historical and psychological causality. It asks that we “pause for moment,” in the midst 
of progressive and cumulative flow, and acknowledge the unknowable schemes that 
emerge from intersections of variable and layered experience. In its explicitly retrograde 
chronology, Undei'world works to remodel cultural conceptions that have taken shape 
under a decisively linear concept of history. It might have been by accident that DeLillo 
came across a 1951 copy of The New York Times, whose front page sets side by side the 
headlines: “Giants Capture Pennant” and “Soviets Explode Atomic Bomb.” But it is of no
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small consequence that the long and heterogeneous novel that ensued covers the latter 
half of the twentieth century. Where the early part of the century saw, as Edward Soja 
notes, a “rejection of environmental causality and all physical or external explanations of 
social processes in the formation of human consciousness” (35), DeLillo insists that 
“everything is connected” (a sentiment recapitulated several times in Underworld)—  
though these connections may not be observable through the usual kinds of inspection. In 
Chaosmosis, Guattari lists some of these less-obvious interconnections: “human inter- 
subjective instances manifested by language; suggestive and identificatory examples from 
theology; institutional interactions of different natures; machinic apparatuses (for 
example, those involving computer technology); [and] incorporeal Universes of 
references such as those relative to music and the plastic arts” (9).1 In Underworld, 
DeLillo condenses these complex relationships in one deceptively simple, small sphere: 
the baseball that circulates regions and decades, a madeleine, cathecting memory and 
desire in each of its temporary owners.2 The ball is a version of the recurring “motifs and 
themes” that John McCarthy maintains “function like strange attractors which provide 
intermittent concerns of ordered significance in the otherwise endless flux o f energy and 
matter” (141).
1 Guattari presents these interconnecting “machines” as part o f  his argument against lineages founded  
solely upon interpersonal relationships: “[l]t's a question o f  being aware o f  the existence o f  m achines o f  
subjectification w hich sim ply d on ’t work within the ‘the faculties o f  the sou l,’ interpersonal relations or 
intra-familial com plexes. Subjectivity does not only produce itself through the psychogenetic stages o f  
psychoanalysis or the ‘m athem es’ o f  the U nconscious, but also in the large-scale socia l m achines o f  
language and the mass m edia— w hich cannot be describeJas human” (9).
2 John Mullan, in his short essay on U nderw orld  in The G uardian . provides som e interesting background  
about this literary type. The “novel o f  circulation,” as Mullan calls it, has its roots in P om pey  the L ittle  
(1751), an “anatomy o f  Georgian absurdities,” which traces the ow nership o f  a lapdog. M ullan refers to 
other literary precedents, including Charles Johnstone’s The A dven tures o f  a G uinea  (1 8 6 0 -5 ), w hich  
fo llow s a gold coin, and, more recently, A nnie Proulx’s A ccordion  C rim es  (1996), w hich tracks, you  
guessed it, an accordion.
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The debate about whether Undeiworld is a postmodernist or a modernist work is, 
on one hand, surprising: questions of category and period seem curiously posed at a 
moment when literary scholarship finally seems comfortable with the polymorphous and 
the indeterminate. On the other hand, though, the impulse to situate Underworld within a 
particular tradition is understandable, coaxed along by a story that ever approaches but 
never fully embraces one or another resolution—utter disarray or final cohesion. 
Modernist writing is often regarded as an effort to bring order to an inchoate universe; in 
his essay, “Imagination and Value,” Wallace Stevens holds that “imagination is the power 
that enables us to perceive^normal in the abnormal, the opposite of chaos in chaos” (153). 
In DeLillo’s novel, we may read a commensurate move to order the chaos (geopolitical, 
interpersonal), particularly in devices like the baseball, which provide a sense of 
continuity to otherwise random events. In addition, UnderM’orld contains modernist 
intertextual cues, such as references to Eliot’s The Waste Land (in the foregrounded waste 
and final word of the novel, “Peace”) and its evocation of Ulysses (in characters like 
Albert Bronzini, a version of Leopold Bloom). And although rife with the signature 
“representational inconsistencies and dilemmas” (Jameson xxii) of postmodernism, 
Underworld is not dominated by the “flatness and depthlessness” of orthodox 
metafiction, parody and pastiche. True, DeLillo’s narrative frequently invokes two- 
dimensional figures and images that are commodity currency, but these are not 
dislocated, sinister signs, dangling like so many Warholian shoes. The baseball and the 
Lucky Strikes “target” icon, for example, are not merely emblems of consumerism, but 
rather they compose part o f the real symbology of experience and memory. Thick, 
hyperbolic descriptions of a novelty condom dispensary and involved diatribes about Jell- 
O are always refracted back to the characters related to them (in these cases, Brian
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Glassic and Matt Shay). Refuse spews ceaselessly into the dumps, but the dumps are 
meaningful beyond themselves, even mythologized as “the national parks of the future" 
(80). Waste becomes part of civilization as would an archeological site: Brian Glassic 
spies in the Gizaesque heaps a teal bikini brief and imagines its former owner, a secretary 
from Queens who “is dark-eyed and reads the tabloids and paints her nails and eats lunch 
out o f molded styrofoam” (185).1 Toppling the capitalist hierarchy of “Things are higher 
than Man” (Fromm 95), DeLillo positions objects of the marketplace in the hands and 
minds of perceiving subjects— and, in this sense, his may be interpreted as a modernist 
effort to unify the oppressively discrete.
Postmodernism, “conversely,” (made tentative by quotation marks because, as 
discussed earlier, this is not a field of clear delineations) would aspire to the disruption of 
order— summed-up in a line from William Burroughs’ The Ticket that Exploded (1962) 
“the first step is to isolate and cut the association lines of the control machine” (217). 
DeLillo says in “The Power of History” that fiction is “the dream release, the suspension 
of reality that history needs to escape its own brutal confinements” (61). In this respect, 
Undemorld  is profoundly postmodernist, with its chronological permutations and 
reiterative moments. The chief “line” needing to be severed— or so goes the postmodern 
refrain— is the temporal one, as Johnston explains:
If modernist art privileges the ecstatic, visionary moment, or frames the 
present moment against the mythic time of archetypal recurrence,
1 Steffen Handke expands this point in his review o f  U nderw orld, stating that “[gjarbage a llow s the 
metaphor o f  process, a constant flow  o f  change and transformation, rather than for a static dualistic 
structure within which tw o diametric opposites are deadlocked. . .  . W hat’s discarded is being picked up 
and reused, channeled once again into the cycle o f  production and consum ption. The decom m issioned  
aircraft in the Arizona desert becom e the canvas for artist Klara Sax, w ho has a team  o f  volunteers paint the 
abandoned machinery, elevating it to a grand spectacle o f  the Cold War’s ‘bone heap and broken too ls'” 
(n.p.); Tony Tanner sim ply states: “The real protagonist in the novel is w aste” (63).
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postmodernist art tends to stall temporality in the endlessness of the present, 
as in Beckett's fiction, or to open it up to a multiplicity o f layered or virtual 
times, as in Borges’ story “The Garden of Forking Paths.” {Information 
Multiplicity 170)
Indeed, Undeiworld undercuts the modernists’ attempt to be outside history, as well as 
their reliance upon pure form, myth, abstraction and other models of closure in the 
construction o f a well-wrought urn. DeLillo dissects history as if it were an organism—  
conducting an autopsy, separating pristine bits of skeleton from broken vessels, pulling 
apart the most resilient tissue to reveal the inflamed tumors within. Thus the many 
historical perversions in his writing, though in part ironic and alienating, are not simply 
the cultural excavation and recycling associated with a self-consciously clever 
postmodernism. They do not signify that which is, according to Baudrillard, our era’s 
peculiar lust for revisionism, or “retrospective apocalypse” {The Illusion o f  the End  22). 
Rather, DeLillo's historical cognizance and recreation tries to re-familiarize and integrate 
items and constructs which, through extensive commoditization, have become (again, to 
cite Fromm) “higher than” us. In The Physics o f  Language (2002), David Cowart refines 
this account, suggesting that Undeiworld effects a “hybridization” of modernism and 
postmodernism by reinscribing elements of the former with values particular to the 
context from which the novel emerges:
Part of the greatness of this novel is the way that, at the end of the nineties, it 
seems a compendium of literary fashion from turn-of-the-century naturalism, 
through modernist and postmodernist reaction, to hybridized millennial 
vision. In other words, it offers elements of naturalism qualified by that 
movement’s successor’s styles: dislocated chronology; abundant, often
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conflicting perspective; intricately motivic construction modeling a near­
paranoid dream of universal connectedness; deconstruction of national and 
religious myth, a self-referring mode of history; and a treatment of language 
that seems to map out contending views on the limits of referentiality. (200) 
Retrospection, the “hybridized millennial vision,” is less a mourning for shattered past or 
cosmetic surgery on an ugly present than it is a convergence of past and present, a 
historiographic “decreation” that, Linda Hutcheon contends, “may problematize the 
conventions of teleological closure or developmental continuity, but that is not to ‘banish* 
them from the scene” (94). DeLillo’s is a studied attempt to address contemporary 
problems by countenancing dislocations within the present and between the present and 
the past—problems like how we might cohabitate with “drudges who do not dream of 
family dead” {Underworld 63), our machines, without becoming machines ourselves. 
What results is not merely an organism splayed-out by an artist-coroner, but machinic 
synthesis of mechanical and organic properties.
If “[l]onging on a large scale is what makes history” (11), then any historiography 
must account for varieties of longing and willfulness. A baseball game makes for an 
apposite scenario to initiate a semifictional retelling of history because it is a place 
wherein multiple longings, perspectives, agendas, and fictions gather to participate in a 
simultaneously public and personal activity. Baseball, Marshall McLuhan shrewdly 
observes, is an “outer model of inner psychological life” (237) and “the elegant abstract 
image of industrial society” (239). An environment where space (rather than time) is the 
dimension of principle importance, the baseball game sets up a psychodynamic model 
that will be played out in the rest of Underworld, where geographical expanses (from
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Pheonix, AZ to Kazakh, USSR) constitute psychological as much as physical terrain. 
Deleuze explains this “spatial” conception of the psyche in Dialogues:
[A]t each moment we are made up of lines which are variable at each instant, 
which may be combined in different ways, packets of lines, longitudes and 
latitudes, tropics and meridians, etc. There are no monofluxes. The analysis of 
the unconscious should be geography rather than history. Which lines appear 
blocked, moribund, closed-in, dead-ended, falling into a black hole or 
exhausted, which ones are active or lively, which allows something to escape 
and draw us along? (102)
Deleuze’s language of delineation— “lines, longitudes and latitudes”—might well 
describe the physical conditions of baseball. On the field, the batter represents at once 
both himself and his team, the individual and the community, in a struggle against an 
enemy force bent on putting both him and his allies “out.” In the stands, amidst intimate 
conversations, DeLillo writes, “the crowd repeats the sorry arc of the baseball, a moaned 
vowel falling softly to earth” (35). A whole system erupts according to the variable 
trajectory of the ball—the individual narratives of pitcher, batter, fielders, and crowd join 
in an abstract, unknowable geometric design. This physical and subjective expansion 
“ [renders] inextricable the public and the historic and the private and the biographical” 
(Hutcheon 94). In DeLillo’s diffuse composition, the historical instance is broken apart, 
shattered into myriad psychic, social and political shards, just as the narrative of the 
game, the possibility of a sequence of discrete moves and plays, is rejected. Like chess, 
baseball is a game of “location, situation and memory” (Underworld 674), operating 
within the tension between regiment and randomness. The diamond insists on a basic, 
unwavering route of progress. “For baseball,” as McLuhan says, “is a game of one-thing-
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at-a-time, fixed positions and visibly delegated specialist jobs . . . with its fragmented 
tasks and staff and line in management organization*’ (239). But the intersecting arc o f the 
ball and the infinity of possible plays repeatedly upset this fixity; once it is hit, “nothing is 
the same’*:
The men are moving, coming out of their crouches, and everything submits to 
the pebble-skip of the ball, to rotations and backspins and airstreams. There 
are drag coefficients. There are trailing vortices. There are things that replay 
unrepeatably, muscle memory and pumping blood and jots of dust, the 
narrative that lives in the spaces of the official play-by-play. (27)
If it is the unpredictable atom, the ball, and its attendant physical properties that 
precipitate and govern action, then the “official play-by-play” is at base a fallacy, or at 
least a gross approximation. The variable “coefficients” and “vortices” extend beyond the 
game by way of the ejected the ball, which permeates the world and the narrative like a 
virus or radioactive fallout. As Andrew Paulus declares, “our wins and losses tend to have 
impact well beyond our borders” (670); similarly, J. Edgar Hoover muses that 
“pathogenic bacteria could be every bit as destructive as megaton bombs. Worse, in a 
way, because the sense of infiltration [is] itself a form of death” (57). The ball, despite its 
tininess, is as powerful as state weaponry—elliptically conveyed by Marvin’s trivia: 
“when they make an atomic bomb, listen to this, they make the radioactive core the same 
size as a baseball” (172). Thus the game is not, as John Duvall suggests, simply an 
“auratic frenzy” (286), which can “eclipse a moment crucial to the construction o f the 
Cold War” (287), but it is itself another incarnation, a fractal recapitulation, o f the distant 
conflict.
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The “Prologue” in Undeiworld sets up historical and psychological models— 
fluxious, complex, dynamic—that will appear on various scales throughout the rest of the 
novel—on various scales and from various subject positions. The complex dynamics 
among positions and forces in this scene recall Guattari's subjective formation in
Chaosmosis:
The various semiotic registers that combine to engender subjectivity do not 
maintain obligatory hierarchical relations fixed for all time. Sometimes, for 
example, economic semiotisation becomes dependent on collective 
psychological factors— look at the sensitivity of the stock exchange to 
fluctuations of opinion. Subjectivity is in fact plural and polyphonic— to use 
Mikhail Bakhtin's expression. It recognizes no dominant or determinant 
instance guiding all other forms according to untvocal causality. (1)
The multiplicity of subjects and history requires that they be studied from multiple 
angles. DeLillo probes thus the deep structures of an event in the same way that Marvin 
Lundy scrutinizes the photographs from the momentous 1951 ball game:
He rephotographed the footage. He enlarged, repositioned, analyzed. He step- 
framed the action to slow it down, to combine several seconds of film into 
one image. It was a work of Talmudic refinement, zooming in and fading out, 
trying to bring a man's face into definition, read a woman's ankle bracelet 
engraved with a name. (177)
Marvin sees the composition of the crowd as a universe of dots, and “once you get inside 
a dot, you gain access to hidden information, you slide inside the smallest event” (177). 
At first, Cotter Martin is that dot, a shadowy and elusive one, that darts among the 
thousands gathered to witness a crucial moment of triumph and defeat. While there is a
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distinctiveness, a marginality to his position—young, black, broke— there is also a sense 
that he is as significant as any chemical element in a compound, an aggregate that is 
composed of “Dodgers scoring runs, a man dancing down an aisle, a goateed black in a 
Bing Crosby shirt” (33), and, extending from the game, a “woman cooking cabbage'’ and 
a “man who wishes he could be done with drink” (32).
This is just a kid with a local yearning but he is part of an assembling crowd, 
anonymous thousands off the buses and trains, people in narrow columns 
tramping over the swing-bridge above the river, and even if they are not a 
migration or revolution, some vast shaking of the soul, they bring with them 
the body heat of a great city and their own small reveries of desperation, the 
unseen something that haunts the day—men in fedoras and sailors on short 
leave, the stray tumble of their thoughts, going to a game. (11)
“[T]he self in DeLillo's [fiction],” writes Civello, “is ineluctably and inextricably a part 
of the universal field or systems universe—whichever way we choose to describe it. He is 
part of an all-encompassing system of mutually interacting system” (123). The 
equalization of the single and the many, unified in diversity and desire dissolves the 
hypothetical binaries of the crowd and the individual, the public and the private— or, at 
least, exposes this binary as a hopelessly simplistic construction. Every event, DeLillo’s 
“Prologue” suggests,is both: and/and rather than either/or. In this we can see a departure 
from DeLillo’s earlier fiction, which tends toward an atomistic depiction of the 
individual. While the characters in Endzone (1972), Players (1977) and Great Jones 
Street (1973) are confined to particular zones of junior football, Wall Street trading, and 
the music industry, Undeiworld disallows the segregation o f the socius. New York City is
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thus both built solid and dispersed vapour, with a ‘"body heat” and stray, tumbling 
thoughts.
That “small reveries of desperation” are commensurate with greater historical 
measures such as “migration and revolution” is carried forth into the configuration of the 
crowd itself, a jumble of commoners and celebrities. This arrangement is reminiscent of 
Doctorow's Ragtime (1996) in its depiction of ex-centric members o f society, 
traditionally excluded from history, existing alongside figures o f notable historical 
import. On Hammerstein’s rooftop garden, Freud eats a cup of custard and later has “one 
o f the fainting fits that had lately plagued him when Jung was around” (33): performing a 
breakout from Murderer's Row, Houdini is flashed by a lewd inmate, but “was to tell no 
one of this strange confrontation” (26). In Undeiworld, historically prominent figures are 
plunged into the middling masses: A drunk and slobbering Jackie Gleason, “sending 
quidbits of meat and bread in many directions, pellets and smithereens, spitball flybys” 
(18), and a puke-spattered Frank Sinatra, in “an awe of muted disgust,” blend seamlessly 
into the confetti decadence of the crowd. Gleason is skipping rehearsal, but he's “in 
character” at the game, hurling insults at awed spectators— whereas Sinatra is made 
uneasy by the attentive crowd and “the way they use him as a reference for everything 
that’s happening” (24). Sinatra's image, his casting as salable goods, is at odds with this 
apparent indifference about his status: he “didn't know he was in this month's Life until 
the page fell out of the sky” (39). Once-removed from his role as a public figure, Sinatra 
thinks about those who work to sell his image, the “people who are supposed to tell him 
these things” (39). He glances at advertisements for Quaker State, RCA Victor and 
General Motors, “the venerated emblems of the burgeoning economy, easier to identify 
than the names of battle fields and dead presidents,” but he is otherw ise ensconced in his
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own humanness, “sunk in deep inertia, a rancid sweat developing, his mouth filled with 
the foretaste of massive inner shiftings" (39). The public icon, whose fame is instrumental 
to the proliferation of marketing regimes, is at bottom dissociated from his integral role in 
capitalist machinery.
In his essay “American Blood,” DeLillo explains that interweaving historical 
figures into the fictional fabric is a means of expanding our conception of ourselves, 
others— in short, “consciousness":
The novelist does not want to tell you things you already know about the 
great, the powerless and the cruel. Fiction slips into the skin of historical 
figures. It gives them sweaty palms and bad colds and urine-stained 
underwear and lines to speak in private and the terror or restless nights. This 
is how consciousness is extended and human truth is seen new. (22)
Thus, DeLillo’s fiction “slips into the skin” of the Hegelian “real historical figures,” 
locating the “private,” sub-epidermal substances that make them human. This probing is 
perhaps most incisive in the representation of Hoover. Hoover is the most “powerful” of 
the celebrity trio at the game (his decisions directly impact public safety in the Cold War 
context) but, comically, and disconcertingly, his levels of “reverie” and “desperation” are 
by far the most intense. Indeed, Hoover’s power and his strength of character seem to be 
inversely proportional. “Hoover is a disinvention,” DeLillo maintains, “real, conjured, 
gambled on, guessed at. Hoover is taut and raging selfhood. Hoover in his impregnability 
is an incitement to the novelist’s perennial effort to detect the hidden nature of things” 
(“The Power of History” 62). Though integral to the political ramifications of the game 
(he alone is informed of Russia's concomitant nuclear testing), Hoover’s presence and.
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specifically, his fraught self-consciousness, invites us to consider the frail humanity 
within the historical enigma:
[Hoover] admires the rough assurance of these men. It seems to flush from 
their pores. They have a size to them, a natural stamina that mocks his own 
bible-school indoctrination even as it draws him to the noise. He’s a self­
perfected American who must respect the saga of the knockabout boy 
emerging from tenement culture, from the backstreets slant with danger. It 
makes for gutsy egos, it makes for appetites. (29)
Hoover’s “self-perfected,” elitist grooming is no competition for the crass, larger-than- 
life Sinatra and Gleason. Constructed and synthesized to be “American,” Hoover will 
never be really American, like his “gutsy,” “tenement culture” compatriots. His political 
largesse shrivels alongside their immense presence and stage-intensity, the “natural 
stamina” that Gleason and Sinatra so effortlessly exude. Hoover will be utterly 
swayable— “drawn to the noise” as far as the game and everything else go— and fickle in 
his support: “Whoever wins,” he says. “That's my team” (29).
These less-than-laudatory depictions of political, television and music 
“celebrities” raise questions about national, collective values, as well as the location of 
power and influence in the culture. As individuals, Hoover, Gleason and Sinatra appear 
repulsive and pathetic— quite apart from the charismatic agents who define popular 
opinion and the country’s destiny. They are the former, but they affect the latter. Away 
from the stature o f the specific individual, then, DeLillo redirects our focus to the 
superstructures that contain/produce them and the microstructures that are the common 
denominators of all people. Gleason’s power is reduced to spew: Hoover is moved to act, 
to flee the scene, when Gleason coughs up “an all-pervading medium of pathogens,
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microbes, floating colonies of spirochetes that fuse and separate and elongate and spiral 
and engulf’ (19). Although we might think, as does Le Corbusier, that “society [is] 
controlled by the enlightened businessman and the architect, both products o f an 
impersonal, universal transhistorical force symbolized by the machine" (Hutcheon 28), 
DeLillo deflates this conception by showing these power-wielders coughing up “floating 
colonies of spirochetes” and running away from each other in disgust. It is not a picture of 
“enlightenment.” DeLillo reveals that our “businessmen and architects” are phlegmmy 
machines—just like ourselves. By infusing the minute, microbial “all-pervading” media 
with “power,” furthermore, DeLillo sets the stage for a novel that posits great force in the 
ostensibly slight or invisible.
The fugal prologue is a microcosm of the polyphonic work that contains it, a 
fractal of the narrative at large. The baseball game balances and intermingles three 
primary loci of perception: the individual subject (say, Cotter Martin), the radio broadcast 
or broadcaster, and the author. No voice in the counterpoint dominates.1 The arrangement 
works not only to set up multiple indeterminate points of view but also, with seeming 
paradox, to detract from the details of the event proper. Look, for instance, at the scene’s 
sequencing, which gradually distorts the action of the ball game. After a break in the text 
and a tie in the score, there is Cotter’s stripped-down viewpoint: “He watches Maglie 
bounce a curve in the dirt” (32). This is followed by the somewhat obtuse, digressive 
position of Russ Hodges: “He hears the announcer from St. Louis on the other side of the 
blanket, it is Harry Caray . . . and Russ thinks of the Japanese term for disembowelment 
and figures he and Harry ought to switch names right about now” (33). The authorial 
voice then intervenes with “[l]ight washing down from the sky,” and an interpretive note
1 One might think, too, o f  the voices as “complementarity”— in Bohr’s sen se— “that the w ave and particle 
pictures” are “complementary descriptions o f  the same reality” (H eisenberg 43).
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that “[everything is changing shape, becoming something else-’ (33). Perception becomes 
progressively abstract and subjective, ranging from the visual, to the aural, to the 
metaphorical. These mutating perspectives integrate the authorial voice within the 
network of other voices it governs.1 As with Libra's Nicholas Branch, ever investigating 
the Kennedy assassination, “the author becomes part of the event itself, his fiction an 
addition to the historical fact” (Civello 123). Russ Hodges says of a pivotal boxing match: 
“When you see a thing like that, a thing that becomes a newsreel, you begin to feel you 
are a carrier of a solemn scrap of history” (16). The implication of the observer/author as 
participant in the system/fiction echoes Auster’s narrative, where Quinn modifies the 
objects and mysteries he observes. The narrator, the observer o f the 1951 baseball game 
similarly asserts a presence through his staccato sequence of remarks: “Pafko moves to 
the wall to play the carom,” “Pafko throws smartly to Cox” (16)— all intermingled with 
paper falling from the stands, the internal heavings of particular viewers, and the general 
heaving of the crowd. Through the blunt descriptions o f single movements on the field, 
the authorial voice positions itself at the scene as the carrier and remodeller of scraps of 
history. What emerges is a novelistic representation of Hayles’s “field theory,” which she 
characterizes in A Cosmic Web: “A field view of reality pictures objects, events, and 
observer as belonging inextricably to the same field; the disposition of each, in this view, 
is influenced— sometimes dramatically, sometimes subtly, but in every instance— by the 
disposition of the others” (9-10).
1 G overns— because the act o f  observing som ething happen makes it happen. S ee H eisenberg's discussion  
o f  A ristotle’s Potential “What happens depends on our way o f  observing it or on the fact that w e observe it 
. . . the term “happens” is restricted to the observation . . . The observation plays a d ecisive role in the event 
and . . .  the reality varies, depending upon whether w e observe it or not” (50 -52 ). The authorial involvem ent 
makes plain that “[t]he observer or theorist, unlike the physicist who stands apart from his experim ent, is 
part o f  the system  that is under investigation” (LeClair 4).
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//'. Time, space and linear diffusion
Perhaps history itself has to be regarded as a chaotic 
formation, in which acceleration puts an end to 
linearity and the turbulence created by acceleration 
deflects history definitively from its end, just as such 
turbulence distances effects from their causes.
- Jean Baudrillard,
The Illusion o f  the End, 37
Like many of DeLillo's novels, Underworld is concerned with the subjugation of the 
individual by the forces of technology, the marketplace, and history. But whereas in Mao 
II ( 1991), artistic agency is compromised and eroded through duplication and 
commodification, Undem'orld depicts art that actively reconfigures systems of 
production and reproduction. Decorated bombers compose a sublime landscape painting. 
Garbage dumps become the ‘‘national parks of the future'’ (289). Where characters in 
novels like Libra and Great Jones Street flounder in confines,1 crippled by professional 
insecurity, rules of employment, socioeconomic marginality, or a ravenous marketplace, 
Underworld places these “men in small rooms” {Libra 183) within a greater scheme, 
offsetting their passive seclusion with men and women of action and desire. The closed 
system is broken apart— as the pennant game is fractured by the homerun ball, a 
projectile that ties peripheral subjectivities into the would-be “closed” system of the 
game. This aleatory rupture, I suggest, defamiliarizes cultural regimes that are so
1 N icholas Branch, Win Everett and Lee Harvey Oswald in Libra, and Bucky W underlick in G rea t Jones  
Street.
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pervasive, so embedded in the routine patterns of our lives that we take them to be 
normal.1
Though conspicuously revisionist in both structure and content, the ultimate focal 
point is the present, an accumulation of detritus both physical and psychic, no more 
fathomable than a New Jersey garbage dump. DeLillo’s project is analogous to 
Benjamin’s interpretation of Paul Klee’s Angelus Novus: a looking back at the wreckage 
of human experience while moving forward through space. The angel of history, as 
Walter Benjamin calls it. “would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has 
been smashed” (257). Similarly, for DeLillo, reviewing the past is not so much an act of 
“collective self-flagellation” (Baudrillard 22), but an attempt to reveal processes that 
approach maximum velocity and to make legible the necessarily jumbled condition o f the 
past. The angel of history may more aptly be called the angel of space: Benjamin explains 
that “where we perceive a chain o f events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps 
piling wreckage upon wreckage” (257). The past is layered, not linear, and it is towards 
expressing this layeredness that DeLillo writes sentient, participating subjects into the 
historical drama so as to prove, as his protagonist Nick Shay puts it, that “we are not
1 A s 1 mentioned in a footnote on page 29, for Foucault, norms are concepts that are constantly used to 
evaluate and control us: they also exclude those who cannot conform to “normal” categories. The N orm al 
thereby ensures that certain defects can flourish without being seen as illnesses. A  com m ent by Spinoza  
here becom es apt: “factually, greediness, ambition and so forth are form s o f  insanity, although one d oes not 
think o f  them as an ‘illn ess’” (E th ics , Proposition 44). Indeed, w e do not consider mercenary and cutthroat 
behavior to be defective because such qualities are evident in the m ost “successfu l” am ong us and adhere to 
and propagate the strictures o f  the Normal. The Normal epitom izes the tricky nature o f  those invisible  
cultural regim es, masterplots, w hose omnipotence is inextricable from their elusiveness; the m ore deeply  
buried the design, the more stable and total the power. Fromm discusses similar principles at work in 
capitalism, “a system w hich has no purpose and goal transcending it, and w hich m akes man its appendix” 
(87). There may, indeed, be “purpose” to the specific coercion o f  capital, but, as with H egelian te leo logy , 
this purpose is not one about w hich w e may have any existential understanding. In the causal grid o f  social 
and econom ic relations, subjects act according to pre-inscribed patterns that have becom e “the norm ,” w hile  
those deviating atoms are sw iftly  expelled from the system like so much toxic w aste. A s N ick  Shay says in 
U nderw orld, corporations use “sm iles and nods, a collective inflection o f  the v o ice ,” in order to “tw ist and 
shape you . .  . without persuasion” (282). The result o f  this set-up, is, o f  course, the necessary attrition o f  
individual agency in appeasem ent o f  the behemothic, invisible hand.
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excluded from our own lives" (82). Dense, fluctuating, and conflicting incidents 
ultimately give credence to subjective experience, not because they transcend the 
structure of a particular historical account, but because these incidents underpin those 
accounts, invisible elements that compose the swirling dynamo propelling mass and 
individual identity.
Rather than signaling the complete disintegration of order, DeLillo’s chaotic 
historiography is a means of refining and complicating national assumptions about the 
past. DeLillo’s historical performance works to replace the exclusive strictures of a so- 
called “official” American half-century with an “inclusive” narrative that acknowledges 
the experiences of disenfranchised racial and socioeconomic groups. Historical chaotics 
invites a revision of canonical history by revealing, as Hayles says, that “what have been 
understood as essential, unvarying components of human experience are not natural facts 
of life but social constructions” (Chaos Bound 265). In dismembering these “unvarying 
constructions,” DeLillo effectively expands and democratizes the history of the Cold War 
and its aftermath in America. The integration of the individual subject into the fabric of 
culture and the past is primarily brought about through the supplanting of historical time, 
a regulated and fixed document, by space, a dimension more conducive to the fluxion that 
defines subjective action. Such a shift in focus undermines those oppressive forces that 
thrive upon linear conceptions of cultural development. “History, like politics.” says 
Lyotard, “seems to have a need of a unique point of perspective, a place of synthesis, a 
head or eye, developing the diversity of movements in the unification of a single volume” 
(164). In Western thought, historical time has been the primary dimension because it is a 
totalizing, “synthesizing” force that lends itself easily to the formation of categories and 
patterns. It follows that whatever social theory is developed under this conception will
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invariably conflate diversity into a single strand, privileging time and viewing space as 
contingent rather than fundamental to human action. Time, as Kristin Ross says,
“excludes and subordinates, while space coordinates and tolerates” (8). We need only 
look to the workers at a local cubical office complex to see the stiff repercussions of a life 
regulated by straight lines, or what David Harvey calls a “structured coherence” (375). By 
employing chaotic structures in narrative form, DeLillo breaks down the serial constructs 
that regulate and control activity like the lines on a baseball diamond. This demolition is 
achieved by the narrative’s generally backwards pattern; the story begins in the present 
and jumps back in textual chunks through the decades. The diametrical flow of events is 
braided or criss-crossed by anachronistic trajectories and isolated vignettes, creating a 
rhizomatic network through which experience permeates.1 The sequentially unfolding 
narrative, Soja suggests, has psychological effects, predisposing the reader to think 
historically; such temporal thinking, “one damned thing after another,” is the basic 
apparatus of hegemonic systems, invoking always the threat of suffering or the promise 
of reward to follow. Soja argues, and DeLillo’s work confirms, that “ [w]e can no longer 
depend on a story-line marching straight forward in plot and denouement, for too much is 
happening against the grain of time, too much is continually traversing the story-line 
laterally” (23). We can no longer depend upon verisimilitude and factuality in historical 
fiction; in celebration of his own novel’s inaccuracies, DeLillo describes in detail a shot- 
by-shot account of an imaginary Eisenstein film, Unteiwelt, a science-fiction horror 
which bears unnerving resemblance to the grotesqueries of nuclear warfare. Near the end 
of the book, DeLillo unites Sister Edgar with J. Edgar Hoover as hermaphroditic
1 This narrative construct is similar to Edward Soja’s P ostm odern  G eograph ies  (1989 ), w hich begins with a 
coalescent “Preface and Postscript”; this com bination, Soja says, signals an “intention to tamper with 
familiar m odalities o f  tim e, to shake up the formal flow  o f  linear text to allow  other, m ore ‘ lateral’ 
connections to be m ade” (1).
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counterparts in an implausible cyber-dream sequence. As if enacting the governing 
principle of narrative, subjectivity and history, DeLillo tosses together various media and 
perspectives, mixing film footage, photographs, news reportage, and omniscient narration 
to create a multidimensional—at times, impossibly paradoxical—aggregate of 
experience. DeLillo’s chaotic representation of the past, its subjects and artifacts—  
ruptured, turbulent arrangements—may be more “realistic” an historical account than a 
single, “official” historiography. “Our experience of the world.” as Foucault averred in a 
lecture on heterotopias, “is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a 
network that connects points and intersects with its own skein” (“O f Other Spaces” 22).
In The Physics o f  Language, David Cowart writes that “[t]he novel’s shifts in 
viewpoint, like its dislocations of temporality, (seen in the scrambling of chronology as 
well as the mixing of present-tense and past-tense narration), hint at the self s lability, 
especially via-a-vis memory, which ranges forward and backward in time, at once 
registering and qualifying the individual’s alienation” (200). The manslaughter/suicide 
scene between Nick and George Manza illustrates the depth that such chronological 
“scrambling” achieves. Time is distorted: “In the extended interval o f the trigger pull, the 
long quarter second, with the action of the trigger sluggish and rough, Nick saw into the 
smile on the other man’s face” (780). Nick sees into the smile, effectively piercing the 
veil of countenance and accessing the subjective intention behind it. The dispensing of 
temporal strictures allows for further, more inherently spatial maneuvering. It is not 
clearly articulated what is “seen” behind the smile of one who has tricked a teenaged boy 
into blowing his head off. Nor is it detailed what particular reaction this blunder incites in 
Nick. Rather, the fallout of the shooting is imparted by textual expansion, where the terms 
and motions of the act repeat themselves, continually set up against one another in
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slightly variable shades. Each bolt of text, arranged in single-sentence paragraphs, 
emulates the firing of the gun— as well as the synaptic misfirings of the stunned observer.
He felt the trigger pull and then the gun went off and he was left there 
thinking weakly he didn’t do it.
But first he pointed the gun at the man’s head and asked if it was 
loaded. (780)
While the first sentence expresses a passivity on the part of the shooter, the second 
sentence highlights the subject’s deliberate involvement in the act. The question of 
culpability is tossed around from one textual bullet to the next. Several times, there is a 
flashing disclaimer, “And the way the man said no when he asked if it was loaded.” 
Conversely, the sequence of the motion and the perception is inverted, as in the 
following:
Then the noise busted through the room and he stood there thinking 
weakly he didn’t do it.
But first he force-squeezed the trigger and saw into the smile and it 
seemed to have the spirit of a dare. (780)
This reiteration obstructs the linear progression of the scene just as a skipping record halts 
musical momentum. The first words of most statements propose a cycle wherein the 
subject (“He”) is stymied by both cognitive (“But”) and temporal (“Then”) obstacles. But, 
as with hip-hop’s repetitious tripping of the needle atop vinyl, the clogging and stagnancy 
evident in this depiction create space for a new discourse that operates within the expansion 
of a single point in time.
DeLillo uses this jumbled, revolving narrative strategy to represent critical 
moments that cannot easily be reduced to a single description. For Nick, the reasons for
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and meanings of the shooting are unquantifiable, and thus the manner in which the 
incident is expressed is appropriately disjointed and indefinite. DeLillo employs a similar 
strategy in Libra, where the shooting of John F. Kennedy—its plethoric attendant 
meanings on personal, national, political and philosophical levels— can hardly be 
synthesized in a straightforward description. The president is shot by Oswald, by ex-CIA 
conspirators, and by Zapruder. He’s shot repetitively in Oswald’s imagination, on 
television, and in DeLillo’s own recursive textual bullets. The shots are rehearsed, 
performed and replayed psychologically, electronically, and literally. Libra portrays and, 
more poignantly, reconfigures the presidential assassination by diffusing the single 
incident to include its myriad precursors, facets, and implications. As with Nick’s, the 
description of Oswald’s shot is characterized by temporal dismemberment, spatial 
expansion, repetition, and fluctuating perspective. First there is the initial description of 
gunman and target:
Through the scope he saw the car metal shine.
He fired through an opening in the leaf cover.
When the car was in the clear again, the President began to react.
Lee turned up the handle, drew the bolt back.
The president reacted, arms coming up, elbows high and wide.
There were pigeons, suddenly, everywhere, cracking down from the 
eaves and beating west.
The report sounded over the plaza, flat and clear. (396)
This play-by-play account of the event, the precision of the “flat and clear” report, is 
reiterated and revised in the pages that follow. What seems to be a fixed sequence is
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repeated, reconceived and obscured as the instant percolates through various points of 
view:
On the grass a woman saw the limousine emerge from behind a freeway sign 
with the President clutching at his throat. She heard a sharp noise, like a 
backfiring gun, and realized it was the second noise she’s heard. She thought 
she saw a man throw a boy to the ground and fall on top o f him. She didn't 
really hear the first noise until she heard the second. (397)
In this passage, time folds back upon itself. The woman hears the second shot before the 
first. And then further variations on the theme follow:
A man threw his kid to the ground and fell on him. That’s a vet. 
Hargis had time to think.
He [Oswald] was already talking to someone about this. He had a 
picture, he saw himself telling the whole story to someone, a man with a 
rugged Texas face, but friendly, but understanding.
“By crafting sentences that unsettle our subject position, offering unexpected 
juxtapositions that make us pause to try to reassemble disparate images,” comments Nel, 
“DeLillo’s language interrupts the readers and asks us to reconsider what we had thought 
was true” (746). Components of the assassination revolve perpetually, subverting the 
historical mandate for a fixed sequence of events. The kid is thrown to the ground again 
and again. Oswald converses with an interlocutor in the future. Along with temporal 
constrictions, spatial codes and points of view are folded and compromised, making 
evident the many layers that compose the incident. The narrator says, “There was a 
woman taking a picture and another woman about twenty feet behind her taking the same 
picture, only with the first woman in it.” Even the narrator’s position is in flux, at one
I l l
point invading the minds of the spectators, and at another point occupying space among 
the spectators: the speaker says, “[sjomeone with a movie camera stood on the abutment 
over there, aiming this w ay/’ In his essay, “American Blood,” DeLillo describes his 
rendering of the assassination as unraveling a “sense of coherent reality we all share":
There are jump cuts, blank spaces, an instant in which information leaps from 
one energy level to another. Dallas is a panorama of such things, a natural 
disaster at the heartland of the real, the comprehensible, the plausible. The 
lines that extend from the compressed event have shown such elaborate twists 
and convolutions that we are almost forced to question the basic suppositions 
we make about the world of light and shadow, solid objects and ordinary 
sounds, and to wonder further about our ability to measure such things, to 
determine weight, mass and direction, to see things as they are, recall them 
clearly, explain to waiting faces what happened. (22)
Johnston explains that this “puts into practice a different understanding of the event, one 
that will finally allow us to begin to read the Kennedy assassination less, however, as an 
aesthetic or epistemological break than as a multidimensional, unrepresentable 
information multiplicity whose every manifestation is entangled with conflicting versions 
and contaminated physical evidence” {Information Multiplicity 187).
This perverse narrative sequencing—or, more precisely, de-sequencing— is a 
formal attempt to provide alternative perspectives and interpretations of both the single, 
fixed act and what is considered to be the orderly, causal flow of events. The text comes 
to formally resemble a piece of garborator-twisted string depicted in White Noise:
There was a long piece of twine that contained a series of knots and loops. It 
seemed at first a random construction. Looking more closely I thought I
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detected a complex relationship between the size o f the loops, the degree of 
the knots (single or double) and the intervals between knots with loops and 
freestanding knots. (259)
In scrutinizing the looping intervals, DeLillo asks, in the wwds of Bronzini,“[h]ow deep 
is time?'’ ( I l l )  and what would w7e “learn by going deeper into structures beneath the 
standard model, down under the quantum, a million times smaller than the old Greek 
atom’’ (222)? DeLillo thus introduces tensions, dislocations and associations that exist 
despite the long periods that separate them, as if the straight line of time had been looped 
and knotted prior to its inspection.
Hi. Psychochaotics I
I long for the days of disorder. I want them back, the 
days when I was alive on the earth. Rippling in the 
quick of my skin, heedless and real. I was dumb­
muscled and angry and real. This is what I long for, the 
breach of peace, the days of disarray when I walked 
real streets and did things slap-bang and felt angry and 
ready all the time, a danger to others and a distant 
mystery to myself.
- Nick Shay in Undei'world, 810
The historically destabilizing intersections of the solo and the choral reproduce as 
Underworld unfolds. Psychological connections among characters expand likewise, 
further compromising linear ideas of history and experience. After the prologue, Cotter is 
usurped, or “doubled,” by Nick Shay as the focal point in the narrative. Nick and Cotter 
respectively begin and end the chapter called “Long Tall Sally,” which is itself a bundle 
of episodic splinters, tied together by the prevailing notion of a search. The section begins
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with Nick in the sterility of a rented Lexus, zooming through the desert (with a vague 
purpose of retracing some lost romantic attachment), and ends with Manx Martin 
desperately and greedily swiping his son’s trophy ball. The two scenarios, though 
geographically and temporally disparate, are positioned in the narrative as the alpha and 
omega of an obscure loop, outside time. Their association suggests that, as Nick says,
“All mysteries of the family reach their culmination in the final passion o f abandonment’' 
(86). And while Marvin traces the genealogy of the home-run ball, the concrete link 
between Nick and Cotter, Nick, a pacified waste manager, living “like someone in a 
witness protection program” (66), is ever retracing the pivotal and banal moments that 
have led up to his Phoenix existence. It is, perhaps, a search inspired by Dr. Lindbald, 
Nick’s juvenile psychotherapist, who tells him that he has a responsibility to decode his 
own history— that he is “required to try to make sense of it” (152). But it is the inherently 
indeterminate nature, the blurry and unsystematic condition of his past that makes it seem 
irreducible to explanation. Nick reflects:
[I]t was hard for me to imagine that all the scuffle and boredom of those 
years, the criss-cross boredom and good times and the flare-ups and sameshit 
nights— I didn’t understand how the streaky blur in my nighttime mind could 
have some kind of form or coherence. Maybe there was a history in her files 
but the thing I felt about myself was that I’d leaned against a wall in a narrow 
street serving out some years of mostly aimless waiting. (511)
Indeed, there is a difference between a life lived and the one recorded, dissected and 
analyzed. The patterns and connections, if they do exist, require a mediating perspective 
in order to make any kind of sense; they cannot simply sit in someone’s “files” (another 
official text generated external to the subject). It takes Nick’s wife Marian, for instance,
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to point out that Nick, clutching the baseball in deep reverie and remorse, looks “like 
Hamlet gazing at Yorick's skulk’ (132).
That Nick on some level associates the ball with the most traumatic event o f his 
life—his shooting of George Manza—is suggested by the subtle shifts, the non sequitur, 
fragmentary thought. Nick squeezes the ball in his hand and the thought flickers: “I hefted 
the weapon and pointed it” (132). The juxtaposition of the squeeze and the thought 
connects Nick’s expensive acquisition—a symbol of victory to counteract, perhaps, his 
great failure—with his role as a killer (though the shooting has not yet been revealed in 
the narrative). The convergence reveals not only the unpredictable nature of 
psychological functioning, but also the way in which experience is reiterated. Similarly, a 
description of the young Nick, “the older son with his distance and dimmed moods and 
undimmed rage, up on the roof in the evening sleet to smoke a cigarette,” is poignantly 
postured against a strand of his “current” thought: “I look at the Lucky Strikes logotype 
and I think target” (122). The “undimmed rage” is connected to his father’s favourite 
brand of smokes, a brand decorated with a “target,” an abstract focal point o f the rage that 
would later focus more concretely on George’s head. It is a narrative tactic that embodies 
the same type o f riddling that Dr. Lindbald uses in her reconstruction of N ick’s personal 
history; she assembles the impossible scenery, stating that Nick's “father was the third 
person in the room the day [he] shot George Manza” (512)— an impossibility that may 
nevertheless be true.1
1 “One can never, it seem s,” says Cowart, “ leave behind the loss o f  a father, the act o f  ‘crim inal negligence"  
that suffers the fate o f  the child touched, in his brother M att’s fantasy . . .  to becom e ‘it forever’ (717). 
N ick ’s murder o f  G eorge is the slaying o f  a double, the se lf  that by rights N ick (a drop-out at sixteen) was 
destined to be” (190).
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Customary orders of representation will not suffice in rendering the movements of 
the mind because, as Deleuze and Guattari explain in Anti-Oedipus, these are the 
representative forms that sustain the “iron collar of Oedipus,” and other masternarratives.
Wouldn't it be better to schizophrenize—to schizophrenize the domain of the 
unconscious as well as the sociohisio rtcal domain, so as to shatter the iron 
collar of Oedipus and rediscover everywhere the force o f desiring production; 
to renew, on the level of the Real, the tie between the analytic machine, 
desire, and production? For the unconscious itself is no more structural than 
personal, it does not symbolize anymore than it imagines or represents; it 
engineers, it is machinic. Neither imaginary nor symbolic, it is the Real itself, 
the “impossible real” and its production. (53)
So we see in Underworld characters physically “working through” psychological 
issues— engineering rather than representing the unconscious. The links between tactile, 
physical structures and psychological movements are conveyed, for example, when Nick 
describes the process of breaking down household garbage for the recycling bin:
At home we wanted clean safe healthy garbage. We rinsed out old bottles and 
put them in proper bins. We faithfully removed the crinkly paper from our 
cereal boxes. It was like preparing a Pharaoh for his death and burial. We 
wanted to do the small things right. (119)
Accounting for “the small things”—the painstaking separation and compartmentalization 
of one’s self and one's past— is here translated into the diligent sorting of everyday 
refuse. But the garbage is anthropomorphized (“clean safe healthy”) and ritualized 
(“preparing a Pharaoh for death and burial”). Garbage, here, may be what Eliot called an 
“objective correlative” of Nick’s psychological experience; who is the Pharaoh if not the
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“ruler,” the king, the father? This notion is supported by what follows the above passage, 
a thought seemingly out of sync with the one that precedes it: “He never committed a 
figure to paper. He had a head for numbers, a memory for numbers” (119). Breaking 
apart and reorganizing the garbage becomes a taking of psychic inventory, the excavated 
father becoming the “crinkly paper” in Nick's psychic “cereal box.” The poignancy of the 
paternal abandonment is accented not only by the anomalous context o f the thought but 
also the by punitive shades of the language: the father had a “head for numbers'’ (for 
gambling) and he “never committed” (to the family). Nick’s issues with his father, 
momentarily disinterred while dismembering refuse, engender a new but related self- 
reflective strain of thought: Nick recalls how “[i]n the bronze tower I looked out at the 
umber hills and felt assured and well defended, safe in my office box and my crisp white 
shirt and connected to things that made me stronger” (119). Nick’s position in the “bronze 
tower” and “crisp white shirt” is one of security and solidity (“assured and well defended, 
safe”), in diametrical opposition to his father’s recklessness. The cognitive process 
depicted here—the movement from waste to father to self—affirms Deleuze’s contention 
that “[t]he individual identity finds its psychic image neither in the organization of the 
self nor in the determination of the species of the I, but rather in the fracturized I and the 
dissolved se lf’ (Difference and Repetition 259). The peripatetic thought, though divergent 
from a logical consideration of the subject’s trauma, identifies essential, buried operations 
and relations that linear, causal connections would not present.
The psychic dimension in DeLillo’s characters is suggested rather than described; 
it is enacted physically, emerging from an assortment of fragments and elliptical cycles of 
thought. The “mommy-daddy-me” of Freud is present, but it is not omnipresent. To be so 
would signify a psychic formula completely at odds with DeLillo’s resolutely complex
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and multifarious social and psychological ethos. Nick's internal life is variously informed 
by many “agents of collectivity,” to evoke Deleuze and Guattari:
[T]he father and the mother exist only as fragments, and are never organized 
into a figure or a structure able both to represent the unconscious and to 
represent in it the various agents of collectivity; rather, they always shatter 
into fragments that come into contact with these agents, meet them face to 
face, square off with them, or settle the differences with them in hand-to-hand 
combat. (97)
The unconscious is an overdetermined battleground where myriad fragments— including 
but not limited to the father and the mother— collide and collapse together. DeLillo 
effects this complex dynamicism by planting dissonant thoughts side-by-side on the page, 
simulating the diversity of factors at work upon the subject— including the subject 
himself. Nick, a version of LeClair’s “systems man,” “is more a locus o f communication 
of energy in a reciprocal relationship with his environment than an entity exerting force 
and dictating linear cause-effect sequences” (10). When Nick is in his hotel, “waiting for 
room service to show up with his brandy” (208), the television is re-broadcasting the 
Texas Highway Killer shootings. Nothing is “happening” and yet a dense jumble of 
impressions and anxieties erupt from fleeting convergences of memory, anticipation and 
peripheral stimuli in the room. Nick thinks of the taxi driver who “told [him] about the 
murders of gypsy drivers, a regular event lately, a game of chance you play every night” 
(209), and the narrator simply intones, “Nick did not like cats”— cats being one o f Nick’s 
mother’s arguments against relocating from New York to Phoenix. One statement springs 
organically from another, implying an underlying logic that is too complex to decipher 
but, nevertheless, functions. The driver’s voice, again recollected— “[ejither they rob you
and kill you or they rob you and let you live"— is counterbalanced by Nick's assertion of 
personal stability, “I live a quiet life in an unassuming house in a suburb o f Phoenix." The 
violence on the television and in the driver's complaints prompts in Nick further thoughts 
about his mother, whom he’s anxious to deposit in his protective domestic ziplock: “Once 
he got her to say yes, they’d be able to spend untrammeled time remembering together." 
There is then recursion to the cabby whom, Nick assures himself, “ [h]e’d tipped . . . 
nicely.” Finally, Nick “look[s] at the TV screen, where the tape was nearing the point 
when the driver waves, the crisp wave from the top of the steering wheel, and he wait[s] 
for room service to knock on his door.” From Nick’s ruptured thoughts, the mother 
surfaces but always in relation to a context (that is also of the past, made present through 
recollection) that informs her surfacing, as much as she reciprocally informs the context. 
By representing a psychic process that posits multiple variables in symbiotic interaction, 
DeLillo performs Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalytic deposition of a reigning 
“mommy-daddy-me,” where “the family is never a microcosm in the sense o f an 
autonomous figure, even when inscribed in a larger circle that it is said to mediate and 
express” {Anti-Oedipus 97). The “larger circle” and its constituent elements function 
rhizomatically, rendering Oedipus a contingent rather than autonomous factor in 
subjective interiority.
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In my work, film and television are often linked to 
disaster. Because this is one of the energies that 
charges the culture. . . . And they play the tape again 
and again and again and again. This is the world 
narrative, so they play it until everyone in the world 
has seen it.
- DeLillo, The Paris Review\  302
A collage of film, photographs, news reportage, third- and first-person observation. 
Underworld, forms a quasi-hypertextual space through which ideas and events circulate 
independent of the linear constraints of time, history and Oedipus. Thomas Carmichael 
says in his discussion of intertextuality in Mao II (a novel that begins with a picture o f a 
mass Moonie wedding), the photograph “invites us to consider . . . the nexus that fully 
characterizes the field of postmodern intertextuality” (215). More than this, however, for 
DeLillo the visual image is a node where “random energies . . . approach a common 
point*' (Underw orld 157), where a range of perceptions and experiences converge to form 
a subjective aggregate. Not just “texts'" are cathected here but thoughts and selves. The 
photograph both works upon and is worked upon by the various people who behold it. 
Looking at a picture of her younger self at Truman Capote’s Black & White Ball, for 
example, prompts Klara to consider her current work in the desert in relation to her past 
exploits among war-makers:
What is it about this picture that makes it so hard for me to remember myself? 
. . . Surrounded by famous people and powerful people, men in the 
administration who were running the war. and I want to paint it over . . . 
[Mjaybe this is what I'm  doing. 1 don’t know, it's a work in progress. (79)
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While in Mao //, the photograph dulls its subject, rendering him or her or it “flat as 
birdshit on a Buick” (54)—the Benjaminian “aura” depleted by so much reproduction— 
and the artist-photographer becomes a kind of terrorist who “shoots and shoots and 
shoots” (54), in Underworld, the photograph serves as catalyst for subjective reflection, 
discharging all things attached to the image from a fixed time and place. Klara’s thoughts, 
furthermore, are not the end o f the interconnections; rather, they become strands in the 
greater web of associations. The event depicted by the photograph is kneaded back into 
the fabric of the text and the consciousness of other subjects: Capote's ball is later 
recounted by star-struck Hoover, who remembers Klara as “a middling painter called 
whatever she's called. Sax or Wax or something” (574). The meanings inscribed within 
the photograph are drawn out by each person who beholds the image;1 their participation, 
in turn—their thoughts and memories— add dimension to the event represented in the 
photograph, thereby creating a matrix, or an intersection of lines which form a node.
Among the debris fluttering over the crowd at the 1951 ball game are the pages of 
Life magazine. In contrast with its name, the magazine connects the morbidity of two 
realms, despite their temporal dislocation. Bruegel's The Triumph o f  Death, “a landscape 
of visionary havoc and ruin” (41), falls upon Hoover’s shoulder; he is fascinated by its 
“cankers, lesions and rotting bodies so long as his connection to the source is strictly 
pictorial” (50). But, of course, it is not. Something of the ball game is recapitulated in the 
image, the camivalesque atmosphere of the fans, “sinners,” “all around [Edgar] 
cheering,” but it also abounds in the “black and white” o f Capote's ball, which, we later 
learn, is attended by a medieval gamut of monks and executioners, “skeleton men and
1 The “jostled  footage” o f  the Zapruder film , to cite another exam ple, is perceived by an audience that has 
to “contend with the impact” (488). And M ick Jagger in Cocksucker Blues m akes Klara think how  
“everything that everyone has eaten in the last ten years has gone into that m outh” (382).
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raven women'’ (576) who form “a death rank on the dance floor" (576). But Bruegel's 
painting offers as well an eerie parallel between the ball game and the effects of a 
simultaneous Russian nuclear test— a correlation that would later form the dual 
newspaper headline.1 To Hoover, entranced by the painting as it flutters past his eyes, the 
connection is all too clear:
The meatblood colors and massed bodies, this is a census-taking of awful 
ways to die. He looks at the flaring sky in the deep distance out beyond the 
headlands on the left-hand page— Death elsewhere, Conflagration in many 
places, Terror universal, the crows, the ravens in silent glide, the raven 
perched on the white nag’s rump, black and white forever, and he thinks of a 
lonely tower standing in the Kazakh Test Site, the tower armed with the 
bomb. (50)
Hoover’s personal terror, progresses through the painting, becomes "‘Terror universal.’’ 
Later in Underworld* the reality of that terror is refracted back, where scenes of nuclear 
holocaust are described in the language of Bruegel’s Death and Conflagration. Nick and 
Brian are escorted through the Kazakh Test Site by Viktor Maltsev of the Tchaika 
company. They tour the Museum of Mishaps that catalogues and archives the residual 
effects of the 1951 nuclear test, a contemporary incarnation of Bruegel’s “meatblood 
colors and massed bodies.’'
It is the boy with the skin w here his eyes ought to be, a bolus of spongy flesh, 
oddly like a mushroom cap, springing from each brow. It is the bald-headed 
children standing along a wall in their underwear, waiting to be examined. It
1 “The homerun that w on the gam e,” says D eL illo , that w as “soon to be known as the ‘shot heard around 
the w orld’ had found its aw ful counterpoint. A Russian mushroom  cloud” (“The Power o f  H istory” 63).
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is the man with the growth beneath his chin, a thing with a life of its own, 
embryonic and pulsing. (800)
The very mushroomy and “embryonic" autonomy of their deformed tissue embodies the 
shape of the explosion that ravaged them, reaffirming that processes, fractal-like, repeat 
infinitely down the chain of scale. And across historical and geographical spans: as it 
does at the pennant game of the “Prologue," the debris of the western marketplace 
permeates the ravaged humanity of the Test Site in the novel’s final chapter, “Das 
Kapital.” Nick sees “the dwarf girl who w^ears a t-shirt advertising a Gay and Lesbian 
festival in Hamburg, Germany, bottom edge dragging on the floo r’ (800), and fetuses 
“preserved in Heinz pickle jars’’ (799). The brands and slogans are morbid proof that the 
bomb with its “Many buzzing neutrons [and] very little blast [is] the perfect capitalist 
tool” (790). Its perfection is, as Viktor says, that the bomb will “[k]ill people, [but] spare 
property.”
The video footage of the so-called Texas Highway Killer is another such node, 
whose meanings emanate from the brutal crime: “It shows a man driving a car. It is the 
simplest sort of family video. You see a man at the wheel o f a medium Dodge” (155). But 
even within this simple description, the psychodynamic fallout is signaled by the subtle 
transferal of perspective: the video, the “It” which “shows,” mutates into the “You" who 
“sees.” The image of the exploding head “is the jostled part of your mind, the film that 
runs through your hotel brain under all the thoughts you know you’re thinking” (156) and 
works “to make a channeled path through time, to give things a shape and a destiny” 
(157). In Chaosmosis, Guattari speaks of how watching television produces in the subject 
this “polyphonic multiplicity”:
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[W]hen I watch television, I exist at the intersection: 1. o f a perceptual 
fascination provoked by the screen's luminous animation which borders on 
the hypnotic, 2. of a captive relation with the narrative content of the 
program, associated with a lateral awareness of surrounding events (water 
boiling on the stove, a child’s cry, the telephone . . .). 3. o f a world of 
fantasms occupying my daydreams. My feeling of personal identity is thus 
pulled in different directions, How can I maintain a relative sense of unicity, 
despite the diversity of components of subjectification that pass through me? 
(16)
Guattari’s description of the televisual experience— his evocation of the many forces
acting upon the subject (narrative content, peripheral stimuli, unconscious phantasms)—
corresponds to the one DeLillo imputes in treatment of the Texas Highway Killer footage:
“There’s something here that speaks to you directly, saying terrible things about forces
beyond your control, lines of intersection that cut through history and logic and every
reasonable layer of human expectation*’ (157). The killing, because it is random (and in
that sense “democratic”) is “a crime designed for taping and immediate playing” (159).1
Indeed, the shooting is “replayed*’ in various instances throughout DeLillo’s text,
indicating as much about those who watch it, or ignore it, as it does about the crime itself.
Matty, for one, watches the news report incessantly and is “not able to look at the tape
without wanting to call out to Janet” (217) each time they air the exploding head. Nick.
however, does not pay attention to it; he knows first hand what it's  like to shoot a man
1 A s D eL illo  remarks in his article, “ In the Ruins o f  the Future” : “The events o f  Septem ber 11 w ere covered  
unstintingly. . . . The event dominated the medium. It was bright and totalizing and som e o f  us said it was 
unreal” (n.p.). But the thrill o f  calam ity passes soon enough, replaced by fresh calam ities: referring to the 
G ulf War, D eL illo  reminds us that “after the first euphoric days, coverage becam e lim ited. The rush o f  
watching all that eerie green night-vision footage, shot from fighter jets in com bat, had been so intense that 
it becam e hard to honor the fact that the war w as still going on, untelevised . A layer o f  consciousness had 
been stripped aw ay.”
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and doesn't need a video to tell him. N ick's son, whose personal computer “had a 
multimedia function that allowed him to look at a copy of the famous videotape showing 
a driver being shot” (118), displays the endgame that results from this combination of 
innocence and technology. The multiplicity of narratives that the computer provides, later 
picked up in the novel’s culminating description of the world wide web, epitomizes the 
liberties afforded by technological mediation. With the computer, the acts of the Texas 
Highway Killer are drawn out of obscurity, and Jeff, a completely dislocated subject, can 
effectively plunge into and manipulate the details of the shooting: “Jeff became absorbed 
in these images, devising routines and programs, using filtering techniques to remove 
background texture. He was looking for lost information” (118). Rather than simply 
receiving the information on the screen, Jeff, enabled by his computer system, scrutinizes 
and manipulates the images so as to find something hidden in the blur o f pixels. DeLillo 
tells the Paris Review :
W e’ve reached the point where things exist so they can be filmed and played 
and replayed. . . . Think about the images that are most often repeated. The 
Rodney King video tape or the Challenger disaster or Ruby shooting Oswald. 
These are the images that connect us the way Betty Grable used to connect us 
in her swimsuit, looking back at us over her shoulder in that famous pinup. 
(302)
Embedded in these comments, the analogue between the Challenger disaster and a Betty 
Grable pinup, is television's peculiar capacity to draw together the erotic and the terrible. 
This capacity is played out in DeLillo’s depiction of the Highway Killer himself, who 
becomes yet another subjective strand emanating from the videotaped killing. He turns 
out to be a grocery clerk named Richard. His life is markedly banal, spent diligently
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administering Nitrospan to his father and occasionally eating “a muffin standing up, a 
hand cupped under his chin to catch the crumbs’’ (272). He has a crush on his friend’s 
wife and leaves milk out for a stray cat. Though there is nothing to explain Richard’s 
murderous tendencies, glimpses into the workings o f his mind reveal acute dislocation 
caused by a lack o f social interaction. Again it is the visual representation of the 
killings—the video footage and the green eyes of the anchorwoman—that provides the 
evidence of this dislocation: “He watched her over there and talked to her over here. . . . 
He talked to her on the phone and made eye contact with the TV. This was the waking of 
the knowledge that he was real. . . .  He needed her to keep him whole” (270). This 
mediated self-realization recalls Oswald who, in Libra, could “see himself shot as the 
camera caught it” and glimpses, as if through Ruby and the millions in their living rooms, 
“the twisted picture of his face on TV” (440). Richard too becomes animated, becomes 
real when he is on television— his voice, at least, talking with the anchorwoman: “he was 
actually chatting now, confident, getting the feel of the medium, the format” (270).
In Eisenstein’s “lost” film, Untewelt, DeLillo creates yet another rhizomatic 
node, this time conspicuously linked to UnderM'orld itself. Could not this, a description of 
film, be a description o f the novel that contains it?: “The plot was hard to follow. There 
was no plot. Just loneliness, barrenness, men hunted and ray-gunned” (431). Still, the 
deep focus in each segment of film, its emphasis on space and physical detail, illuminates 
those variables that permeate the novel as a whole.
Overcomposed close-ups, momentous gesturing, actors trailing their 
immense blended shadows, and there was something to study in every frame, 
in every camera placement, the shapes and planes and then the juxtaposition
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shots, the sense of rhythmic contradiction, it was all spaces and volumes, it 
was tempo, mass and stress . . . (429)
DeLillo's descriptive dilations—the Deminings’ Jell-O (513), Condomology (109), the 
garbage dump (185)— are similarly “overcomposed.’* The “rhythmic contradiction’* of 
George’s shooting is a matter o f “tempo, mass and stress.” The action depicted in 
Unterwelt is a grotesque version of events of the novel, a compossible shooting that, 
unlike George’s, did not (in this particular universe) happen:
The mad scientist aims his gun.
A figure stands against a wall, his body going white.
The scientist shows a tight smile.
The victim is transfigured, pain-racked, his lower lip dribbling off his 
face, a growth appearing at the side of his neck, a radiant time-lapse 
melanoma. (431)
The sly smile of George is transferred into the tight smile o f the scientist. A sci-fi version 
of Nick’s rifle brings about a “transfiguration*’ more obscene than death, rendering the 
victim a cancerous blob of radioactivity.
The psychodynamic functions of technological media culminates in the two final 
episodes of the book, both of which are built upon peculiar “intersections*’ that verge 
upon the sublime. There is, first, the awe and fear engendered by the appearance of the 
murdered child Esmerelda’s face upon a Manhattan billboard. Hundreds gather and “stare 
stupidly at the juice” (821). Esmerelda’s image, like the literary works in Borges’ library, 
emerges randomly, a fleeting collision of disparate energies. It appears “when the train 
lights hit the dimmest part of the billboard . . . under the rainbow of bounteous juice and 
above the little suburban lake and there is a sense of someone living in the image, an
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animating spirit’' (882). Like the taped murders on the Texas highway, the image of the 
child cathects an array of disparate impulses, “the sound of the crowd . . .  a gasp that 
shoots into sobs and moans and the cry of some unnamable pain of elation’' (821). The 
visionary moment, facilitated by the collision of multiple media is, in the last pages o f the 
novel, again performed in another machinic context; the World Wide Web, with its 
“billion distant net nodes” (825), is a rhizome par excellence: “a new kind of shared 
space or habitat, an ecology that is neither completely artificial nor natural, the Internet 
may be both the harbinger and testing ground of a new kind of environment in which 
technology continues evolution by other means” (Johnston “Are Rhizomes Scale-Free?” 
69). “Everything is connected,” in the internet, where “[a]ll human knowledge [is] 
gathered and linked, hyperlinked, this site leading to that, this fact referenced to that, a 
keystroke, a mouse-click, a password— world without end, amen” {Underworld 825). 
DeLillo presents a final imagining of chaos, fusing in cyberspace Sister Edgar with J. 
Edgar Hoover—twins symmetrical in name, yet asymmetrical in practically every other 
respect. Their pairing as “Sister and Brother” (826) is “a way of seeing the other side,'’ 
and epitomizes the elliptical connections that DeLillo is requesting we recognize. 
Ultimately, the text incorporates the reader into the relational network, gelling together 
second- and third-person narrative in the sentence: “When you decide to visit the H-bomb 
home page she begins to understand” (825). This convergence o f subjectivities, signifies 




Philosophy is written in that vast book which stands 
forever open before our eyes, I mean the universe; but 
it cannot be read until we have learned the language 
and become familiar with the characters in which it 
was written. It is written in mathematical language, 
and the letters are triangles, circles and other geometric 
figures, without which means it is humanly impossible 
to comprehend a single word.
- Galileo, The Assayer, 1623
In Cosmopolis, billionaire Eric Packer crosses Manhattan in his limousine to get himself a 
haircut. This “simple” exercise is made enormously complex as Packer is diverted by 
violent anti-globalization protests, traffic gridlock resulting from a presidential visit and a 
celebrity funeral, erratic stock market shifts, marital disintegration, and the death threats 
o f a disgruntled former employee. The novel thus presents the inevitable intersections of 
multiple, co-existing lines— of selves, systems, and the concrete formations of urban life. 
These intersections, or collisions, distort Packer's would-be linear, orderly cross-town 
drive and, by metaphorical extension, perform the attrition of hegemonies that Viktor 
Maltsev describes in Underworld: “[tyrannies] fade and wane, states disintegrate, 
assembly lines shorten their runs and interact with lines in other countries” (786). In this 
sense, Cosmopolis scrutinizes closely one thread of the many that comprise the baroque 
weave of Underworld. Capital, continues Viktor, “burns off the nuance in a culture”
(785)— and Cosmopolis goes some way to reinstate this nuance.
It is somewhat ironic, then that Cosmopolis has been criticized for its sterility and 
lack o f nuance: New York Times book reviewer Michiko Kakutani deems the novel “a 
major dud, as lugubrious and heavy-handed as a bad Wim Wenders film” (E10) and
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Laura Miller of Salon Magazine calls it “a deeply silly book” (n.p.). It may be true that in 
Cosmopolis, as John Updike says, “implausibility reigns unchecked” (103) and that, to 
quote William Corbett, “DeLillo doesn't waste a moment caring whether his readers find 
comfort or solace in his tale” (n.p.)- But these criticisms, I think, miss the point. We are 
not meant to draw solace from these pages. As its title implies— cosmo. a term originating 
from Pythagoras, means “order”—the novel steps aside, for a time, the social, ethical and 
ontological complexities of psychological realism, and instead plots out the forms, 
structures, and orders of the lives and spaces we inhabit, so as to consider contemporary 
ideological conflicts from a point of disconnected clarity. DeLillo requests that we 
reconsider our categories— our national, moral and ontological definitions— and not that 
we simply buy into the ones he presents through Packer, “a repulsive character' whose 
existence it is surely the author’s desire to excoriate” (Conte “Blood Sport” n.p.). Such a 
reconsideration is made all the more imperative following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, an 
event that pre-dated the publication of Cosmopolis by only a few months. While the Cold 
War is substantively invoked in Undeiworld, the “war on terrorism” is more a haunting 
than an historical intertext of Cosmopolis.1
Among the criticisms of Cosmopolis is the conspicuously “theoretical” quality of 
its characters. John Powers in LA Weekly laments that “so skimmed of recognizable 
human feeling, his characters feel freeze-dried” (n.p.); Miller similarly bemoans 
DeLillo’s “superficial and cartoonish grasp of how people who work with technology 
think and work” (n.p.). Yes, there is the bodyguard, Torval, “whose head seemed
1 In his commentary on the events o f  9/11, “In the Ruins o f  the Future,” D eL illo  evok es this “haunting” 
potential o f  the attacks: “W e m ay find that the ruin o f  the tow ers is im plicit in other things. The new  
PalmPilot at fingertip’s reach, the stretch lim ousine parked outside the hotel, the m idtown skyscraper under 
construction, carrying the nam e o f  an investment bank— all haunted in a w ay by what has happened, less 
assured in their authority, in the prerogatives they offer” (39).
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removable for maintenance'’ (Cosmopolis 11); the bionic Kendra Hays, “'a woman of 
straps and belts"; and Vija Kinski, Packer's head of theory, whose abstract pontifications 
seem eerily academic at a moment when protesters are urinating upon the limousine in 
which she sits. Most unsatisfying, critics have argued, is the caricaturish depiction of its 
central figure, Eric Packer, to whom reviewers have variously referred as a cartoon 
nihilist, a comic-strip capitalist-pig. an idea, a satirist's smudge and “no more human, 
artistically, than his limousine.” Conte recommends in a review of Cosmopolis, “[the] 
reader must set aside the simple need for a ‘pleasurable read’ and recognize why the 
novelist has brought him or her to this harrowing, if short, trip” (n.p.). These so-called 
analyses, furthermore, are simply parroting what is already made more than evident in the 
novel itself, where “every act [Packer] performed was self-haunted and synthetic” (6). 
Indeed, Packer is described in decidedly synthetic and mechanistic terms— akin to Quinn 
in Auster’s City o f  Glass. Packer, for example, doesn't sleep but works out at night, 
“pulling weighted metal sleds, doing curls and bench presses in stoic repetition'’ (6); 
through “the live video feed from his website” (151). one sees that Packer’s “bathroom 
mirror had a readout telling him his temperature and blood pressure at that moment, his 
height, weight, heart rate, pulse, pending medication” (153); he favors the geometric 
paintings of Rothko and reads science and poetry concurrently, always approaching 
aesthetics from a deductive, quantitative angle; and even Packer's thoughts proceed with 
the linear elegance of a progressive geometric series: “He did not know what he wanted. 
And then he did. He wanted to get a haircut” (7).
The haircut is itself emblematic of the compulsion toward order and control that 
drives Eric Packer. Hair— relentlessly advancing (or receding as the case may be), 
organic, unwieldy— is an exemplary amorphous site to which Packer would subject
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various procedures of alignment, proportion and containment. “This was his method," we 
are told, “to attain mastery over ideas and people"— an objective he works toward though 
his uncanny talent for recognizing the deep structures regulating economic and social 
phenomena. “There's an order,” he tells Kinski, “at some deep level. A pattern that wants 
to be seen.” “Then see it” (68), she replies. So Packer tries to: in Times Square, he 
scrutinizes “numbers gliding horizontally and bar charts pumping up and down. He knew 
there was something no one had detected, a pattern latent in nature itself, a leap of 
pictorial language that went beyond the standard models of technical analysis” (63). He 
watches the frenzied perturbations in the streets, hoping to decipher the hidden principles 
at work behind the chaos. Packer even schematizes his own existence in this way, as 
evinced by the mural on his limousine's ceiling which depicts the planetary arrangement 
on the day, hour, and second of his birth.
But for all the order and symmetry emergent from or projected onto the physical 
world and its inhabitants, the random and the unaccountable—the uncountable— 
repeatedly assert themselves, undermining the systems and equations that sustain Packer 
and the capitalistic structures he metonymically represents. If the limousine is headed 
toward a single objective, a specific geographical point—the particular barber on East 
10th where Packer wants to receive his haircut (and has routinely done since boyhood)— 
this one course of motion is perpetually stymied by an array of unforeseeable (often 
ridiculous) obstacles and distractions: an assault by the notorious pastry assailant, a street 
lined with naked bodies for a film shoot, men entering restaurants hurling rats, etc, etc. 
While Packer “wanted to trust the power of predetermined events” (147), Kinski censures 
his confidence in a “sensible te x t. . . that wants you to believe there are foreseeable 
trends and forces. When in fact,” she says, “it’s all random phenomena. You apply
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mathematics and other disciplines, yes. But in the end you're dealing with a system that's 
out of control. Hysteria at high speeds, day to day, minute to minute'' (85). The cross­
town journey thus becomes progressively “asymmetrical," a skewed, unbalanced form 
that recurs on many levels: the limo driver's one disfigured eye, Packer's half-haircut and 
lopsided prostate. What is initially conceived as balanced, definite and orderly is 
ultimately revealed to be complex, unpredictable and variegated. The asymmetrical 
shape, however, must be understood not as the absence of proportion, but an introduction 
of diversity, what Packer calls a “counterforce to balance and calm, the riddling little 
twist, subatomic, that made creation happen" (52). Creation happens, as does beauty: 
Packer's Rothkos are “color-field and geometric,” perhaps, but they are also “knife-slabs 
of mucoid color" (8); and, Packer thinks, “[t]he one virtue of [a skyscraper's] surface was 
to skim and bend the river light and mime the tides of the open sky" (9).
If Cosmopolis can be read as a narrative of shapes— of lines that “skim and 
bend”—then what insight, if any, can the novel bring to the events of September 11, 2001 
when the twin (i.e., symmetrical) towers— the most distinctive of “New York shapes''— 
were demolished by airplanes, swerved from their course by terrorist anti-logic? DeLillo 
had almost completed writing Cosmopolis when this attack occurred and he claims that 
neither this, nor any of his novels, predict or respond to specific historical events but that 
they are, rather, “generated by the unconscious."1 One has to wonder, though, to what 
extent the unconscious is informed by the context in which'^exists. DeLillo himself seems 
to vacillate on this point: in one interview with John Barron, he says that the attacks 
didn't directly affect the novel except that they delayed its completion by about two
1 Uncanny prescience has also been ascribed to D eL illo 's U n derw orld , w hose dust jacket show s a 
silhouetted bird sw ooping om inously near the W orld Trade Center, and M ao II, in w hich terrorism and the 
M iddle East figure prominently.
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months; in a later interview with Peter Henning, DeLillo asserts, “my book dealt with the 
events of September 11 on a deeper level.” But what is this deeper level? On its surface, 
Cosmopolis does portray something analogous to a 9-11 scenario, in its depiction of an 
enormous event— in this case, a crashing financial market— and western assumptions of 
its invincibility that led up to it. Furthermore, it's impossible to read DeLillo’s 
descriptions of city towers whose “banality . . . reveals itself over time as being truly 
brutal” (8) without thinking 9-11:
The bank towers loomed just beyond the avenue. They were covert structures 
for all their size, hard to see, so common and monotonic, tall, sheer, abstract, 
with standard setbacks, and block-long and interchangeable, and [Packer] had 
to concentrate to see them. They looked empty from here. He liked that idea. 
They were made to be the last tall things, made empty, designed to hasten the 
future. They were the end of the outside world. They weren't here, exactly. 
They were in the future, a time beyond geography and touchable money and 
the people who stack and count it. (36)
Even as Packer looks upon them, the towers are as translucent and hypothetical as ghosts. 
Already gone, the language suggests, or waiting to be built. Most poignant, in light of 
events that must color any reading (and writing) of the passage, is the sense of human 
absence: the towers “looked empty,” were “made empty,” and exist somewhere other 
than where people reside. While the elegiac tenor of these terms evokes the real, human 
losses of 9-11, the vacancy and intangibility here attests to the relative insignificance of 
the towers per se; the image of falling towers, played and re-played on television during 
the days following the WTC attack, is an image of a symptom and not the underlying 
defects that would bring about such destruction. The towers in DeLillo’s text are “hard to
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see'’ because, perhaps, they are not the things that need to be looked at. Both their 
appearance and disappearance are reflections of particular belief systems— systems that, I 
think, compose the “deeper level" to which DeLillo refers. If Cosmopolis contains any 
“response"’ to 9-11, it would seem to be an admonishment of essentialist thought, which, 
when translated into action, becomes hideously definitive—the events of 9-11 being but 
one example of this.
Packer's unwavering drive toward order and control is one incarnation of such 
essentialism. but so too is the resolute “out-of-controlness” o f Packer’s enemy, Richard 
Sheets, who goes by the name Benno Levin (a name DeLillo apparently derived from the 
past two presidents of Yale University, Benno Schmidt and Richard Levin). A former 
employee way down in the innumerable ranks of Packer’s empire, Levin claims he 
“became a minor technical element in a firm, a technical fact” (60). Levin tells Packer: 
“You have to die for how you think and act’’ (202). A “terrorist” figure in the 9-11 
analogy of Cosmopolis, the pathetic and disenfranchised Levin represents the 
asymmetrical potential that symmetrical structures invariably contain. Levin knocks 
down the walls in the condemned building where he resides, declaring “I don’t want to 
live in a little set of quads.” Packer lives in forty-two rooms on the top floor of a 
skyscraper (forty-two, a number of symmetries) and Levin builds his home from 
whatever he finds on local sidewalks, lamenting, “What people discard could make a 
nation” (57). And while Packer is daily examined by one of his two personal physicians, 
Levin diagnoses himself with what he calls “global strains o f illness"’ (152) like “cultural 
panic” and “soul loss,” which he claims to have caught on the internet. Levin’s thoughts 
and utterances, repetitive and illogical, are disordered to a level approaching psychosis: 
he speaks of his “agitated behavior and confusion. . . delirious gusts,"' the “voices” he
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hears in third person, and an ego “bursting with importance, which has major defeats and 
triumphs all the time" (61).
The dialogue that ensues between Levin and Packer is the verbal equivalent of 
trying to superimpose a scalene triangle onto an equilateral one, in vain anticipation that 
they will eventually align. But because we do not empathize with these characters, and 
have been discouraged to do so by the “freeze-dried," “cartoonish" accounts o f the 
preceding two hundred pages, we are able to consider their exchange as a moment where 
absolute, polar ideologies are pitted against one another. As in Socratic discourse, 
thoughts and ideas are here laid bare, not obscured by the nuances and specificities of 
emotion, personhood, etc. Levin’s rationale for committing murder is as dangerously 
abstract and essentialist as Packer’s conviction in the inherent orderliness of things:
It’s banks and car parks. It’s airline tickets in their computers. It’s people 
signing the merchant copy. It’s people taking the merchant copy out of the 
leather folder and signing it and separating the merchant copy from the 
customer copy and putting their credit card in their wallet. This alone could 
do it. (195)
Levin attributes his rage to the fact o f  these economic operations and products— and. 
indeed, they do connote oppressive greed and banality in the way that Levin describes 
them. His comments echo those of Detwiler, the garbage guru in Underu’orld: “Consume 
or die. That’s the mandate of the culture" (287).1 But the grave logical error occurs when 
Levin shunts his anger from operations and products onto the population at large: “It’s 
women’s shoes. It’s all the names they have for shoes. It’s all those people in the park
1 Even the baseball, at once a catalyst for social coalescence and action, is, finally, a com m odity with value 
attached to it— a value contingent upon time and the forces o f  inflation— worth to Manx “thirty-two dollars 
and change” (655) and to N ick, decades later, “thirty-four thousand five hundred dollars” (132).
136
behind the library, talking in the sun” (196). Shoes and people: equivalent agents, equal 
and homogenous cranks in the capitalist machine? Levin’s is an “asymmetrical" 
grouping— elliptical and inscrutable justification for a violent response to the systems, 
then people, then person whom/which he claims has rendered him a “helpless robot” 
(195). Packer's refutations, however, convey a commensurate (and flawed) reduction; he 
tells Levin:
No. Your crime has no conscience. You haven't been driven to do it by some 
oppressive force. . . You’re not against the rich. Nobody’s against the rich. 
Everybody's ten seconds away from being rich. No. Your crime is in your 
head. Another fool shooting up a diner because because. (196)
Citing an absent “conscience” is pretty rich, coming from a man who has, among other 
things, lately squandered his wife's estate on a whim. As is Packer’s insistence upon 
concrete and “real” justification for action— “Violence is meant to be real, based on real 
motives” (193)— when he spent the day watching the “real” world unravel from the 
remote and luxurious interior of his limousine (except, of course, for the odd sexual or 
gastronomical foray). Both Packer and Levin, in presenting their opposing, rigid and 
essentialist moral perspectives, reveal the essential inconsistencies that make these 
perspectives untenable at best, and at worst perilous.
When Miller calls the dialogue in Cosmopolis “sub-Mamet” (n.p.) and Kakutani 
finds it to be a “f la t . . . experimentation in concentration and reduction” (E10), they are, 
in fact, quite on the mark. The dialogue needs to be sub-Mamet and terse. It needs to be, 
as Sven Philips says in the electronic book review;, “strangely disconnected and 
disconnecting” (n.p.) in order to reflect current disconnected and disconnect*^ 
attitudes. What finally emerges from the collision of Packer's drive for order and Levin's
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violent resistance to it is inertia and impasse. Each approach, each shape, is rigid, 
absolute, and consequently each cancels out the other. Packer tries to be an autonomous 
system unto himself, convinced that “[w]hen he died, he would not end. The world would 
end’' (6). Packer is not, in his solipsistic estimation, at the center of the world, but he is 
the world itself. Levin, is correspondingly without a self, claiming “ [t]here's nothing in 
the world but other people'’ (187); he wants to kill Packer to “count for something in [his] 
own life'’ (187). Neither Packer nor Levin need to be understood as “real," but as 
extensions, rather, of the polarized world they inhabit. The cartoonism of Cosmopolis, 
then, is not an effacement of humanity but a characterization o f a contemporary 
environment where variations and gradients are conflated into one or another systematic 
regime, into one or another non-malleable shape. The novel thus offers a critique of 
absolutist thought—thought whose manifestation as actions can be equally absolute.
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Chapter 3
“Yet Another Example of the Porousness of Certain Borders":
Recursion and Realism in David Foster Wallace's Infinite Jest
What fluctuates is order and disorder. What fluctuates 
is their vicinity and common border, their relationship 
and mutual penetration.
Michel Serres, “Dream," 33
“All writers,’'' states Alain Robbe-Grillet in For a New Novel, “believe they're realists. 
None ever calls himself abstract, illusionistic, chimerical, fantastic, falsitical. . . .  [I]t is 
the real world which interests them; each one attempts as best as he can to create ‘the 
real’” (176). In the recent literary avant-garde, this realist drive has gained considerable 
momentum: the conventions of “high” postmodernism (i.e. self-reflexivity, irony, parody 
and pastiche) are being replaced by tropes and modes which countenance and express—  
rather than flee from, mock or negate— sites of sociopolitical contestation and stagnation. 
David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest reflects this transition from a conspicuously 
metafictional, irony-driven sensibility to a deliberate attempt to, in his words, “do 
something real American, about what it’s like to live in America around the millennium” 
(McCaferry “Interview” 138). But while what Wallace calls “big-R Realism,” born in a 
nineteenth century Darwinian context, emphasizes linear causality and psychological 
coherence, Wallace’s literary aesthetic foregrounds indeterminacy, recursion and flux. As 
chaos theorists have established in physical, biological and social studies, “complex and 
fluctuating phenomena [are] the rule rather than the exception” (Favre 147). Thus the 
unwieldy and quasi-cyclical structures in Infinite Jest, rather than signifying distortions of
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cultural realities, in fact express the “real" and “porous’' infrastructure of late-capitalist 
culture and post-Freudian psychologies. Wallace’s “chaotic fiction" is thus a kind of 
literary realism, apposite for rendering experience in what Joseph Conte calls the 
“postmodern milieu of dispersion*’ (Design and Debris 12). As it is in the works I have 
discussed in the preceding two chapters, the “dispersion” here is psychological, as well as 
cultural and material. In what follows, I identify the theoretical and structural resonances 
of chaos theory in Wallace’s fiction and show how these resonances operate to advance a 
“complex dynamics'’ of the psyche— what I have earlier termed “psychochaotics.” Like 
Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalytic program, Wallace’s problematization o f the 
conventional psychic model principally involves a dissolution of the oedipal myth. 
Although I will gesture toward significant instances of this dissolution in a number of 
Wallace’s texts, my analysis emphasizes “anti-oedipal” manifestations in the narrative 
chaotics of Infinite Jest— emerging, in particular, from the reiterative and indeterminate 
operations (and attendant rituals and wastes) at Ennet House and Enfield Academy. Not 
the product of Pynchon-clone “crank-turning” (McCaffery 135), the novel generates a 
mimetic— if multitudinous and turbulent— depiction of contemporary life in America.
Trained in mathematics and philosophy, Wallace possesses what F ran c is  le 
Lionnais calls a “double nationality” (Motte 290) in science and literature.1 Indeed, both 
psychological and narrative structures in Wallace’s fiction are conspicuously systematic 
and quantitative in nature, where characters reveal themselves through syllogistic, 
inductive or otherwise formulaic logic and stories emerge from complicated rhetorical 
ecologies of paratext, puzzles and genre. But while the cross-pollination of scientific and
1 L eLionnais’ term w as first advanced in N ouvelle Revue F ranqais (1 9 7 7 ).W allace's “double nationality” is 
further substantiated by the recent appearance o f  E veryth ing a n d  M ore (2003), the author's historical 
account o f  the mathematical concept o f  infinity.
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literary models might seem to be a means of making aesthetic and social constructs 
amenable to empirical investigation, Wallace's fiction in effect works to dismember 
mythologies of objectivity and resolution. Where the science-inspired Zola and Dreiser 
fashioned novels according to Newtonian principles of causality, proportionality and 
continuity— seeing these as “natural" conditions in systems both material and abstract—  
Wallace’s narrative methods reflect a twentieth-century understanding of relativity, 
incompleteness and complexity. Emerging from a postmodern period that values 
heterogeneity and simultaneity above historical, ideological and psychoanalytic master 
narratives, much fiction of late resists coherent characterization and narrative continuity 
in favor of more malleable or fractured representations. But Infinite Jest is unique within 
chaotic narratives and the postmodern canon because, while the many plots and subjects 
in the novel spiral out from an undetectable point of narrative origin, and cycles of 
addiction, inheritance and political-ideological contestation behave alternately 
deterministically and stochastically, Infinite Jest exudes a thick and gritty realism that 
exceeds the narrative’s status as a technical performance as such. A “chaotic realism." a 
mode which I develop in the fist section of this chapter, emerges from a narrative system 
whose fusion of material and abstract phenomena generates a representational design that 
is as “real” as it is complex. As Guattari writes in Chaosmosis, such an “infinite” 
association of the “actualized” and the “incorporeal” characterizes the many 
interpenetrating borders that constitute every being and society.
Beneath the diversity of beings, no univocal ontological plinth is given, rather 
there is a plane of machinic interfaces. Being crystallizes through an infinity 
of enunciative assemblages associating actualized, discursive components
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(material and indicative Fluxes, machinic Phylums) with non-discursive 
virtual components (incorporeal Universes and existential Territories. (58-9) 
Thus rather than portraying characters simply as systems— through historiographic 
chaotics (as in DeLillo's Undeiworld) or allegories of ontological indeterminacy 
(Auster’s City o f  Glass)— Wallace also positions characters M’ithin systems, evincing the 
interpenetration of social and psychic spheres.
i. Realism, metafiction and “radical realism "
[Narratives do not differ] in form from the structure of 
the “real world’—they are an extension and 
refinement o f the very form and structure of the 
reality they represent.
-David Carr,
“Getting the Story Straight,” 120
For a writer so concerned with the typological status of his own fiction, David Foster 
Wallace has produced a body of work that is remarkably difficult to categorize.1 
Emerging from the author’s divided impulse to be both literary producer and critic, 
Wallace’s fiction embodies more than the oedipal anxieties that are par for the course in 
literary production; anxieties o f influence and tradition are here compounded by an acute 
awareness of the work’s relationship to critical paradigms exercised in academic circles.2 
One suspects that such a resolve to classify one’s own writing signifies either an author’s 
transference with his own work— adding up to little more than an aesthetic and
1 In several interviews and essays, for exam ple in his piece “Fictional Futures and the C onspicuously  
Y oung” (in the R eview  o f  C on tem porary  F iction  issue “Writers on W riting”), W allace describes at length 
the critical approach through w hich he w ould have his fiction be interpreted.
2 W allace's history o f  institutional affiliation probably factors into this awareness; for several years, he was 
a faculty mem ber in the English department at Illinois State University in N orm al, and now teaches creative 
writing at Pomona C ollege, CA.
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philosophical wish list— or a coercive (however unconscious) means of eliciting certain 
kinds of desired critical reception. This heightened self-consciousness can be problematic 
for a literary critic who must balance the author’s self-referential taxonomies against any 
conceptual and philosophical orders identifiable in the texts themselves. Trust the tale, 
and not the teller, etc. But rather than taking Wallace's asserted terms and categories at 
face value, they may be elliptically heeded, taken as indicators o f the work's “pores," the 
theoretically problematic, irresolvable zones of contestation which have been brought to 
the fore by the author’s own insistence upon methodological coherence.
The theoretical tension at the center of Wallace’s work involves a dual 
inclination toward “realism” and self-conscious, ironic, or performative writing, which 
can be loosely termed “metafiction.”1 Indeed, Wallace simultaneously employs and 
derides both literary approaches. In a 1993 interview with McCaffery, Wallace criticizes 
“big-R Realism” because, he says, it “is soothing, familiar and anesthetic [and] . . . drops 
us right into spectation” (138)2. Later in the same interview, he rails against conventional 
postmodern “image-fiction,” the self-conscious and ironic writing of Pynchon-clone 
“crank-turners” (167). Wallace’s own attempts to “countenance and render real aspects of
1 In A lternate  W orlds (1989), John Kuehl defines metafidh'on as texts w hich convey the “ irrelevance o f  the 
individual author and the assumption that literature is collaborative/plagiaristic; the borrowing o f  characters 
from on e’s ow n and others' work; the fictionalization o f  the author w ho appears in the ‘unreal’ domain o f  
the characters, and the actualization o f  characters (often writers) w ho appear in the ‘real’ domain o f  the 
author; the treatment o f  history as fictitious; the inclusion oi^unreliable; the projection o f  linguistic 
heterocosm s or substitute worlds; the tendency to unmask and defam iliarize dead conventions through 
parody; the em ploym ent o f  arbitrary beginnings and multiple endings; the introduction o f  frames and tales- 
within-tales, lending to circularity and regresses a d  infinitum ; and the focus on fiction as process rather than 
product” (62-3). Patricia W augh's definition in M etafiction  is also instructive: “W riting which se lf­
consciously  and system atically draws attention to its status as an artefact in order to pose questions about 
the relationship between fiction and reality. In providing a critique o f  their ow n m ethods o f  construction, 
such writings not only exam ine the fundamental structures o f  narrative fiction, theyalso explore the possible  
fictionality o f  the world outside the literary fictional text” (2).
2 For more on spectation, “anesthesia o f  form” and literature, see W allace’s “£  Unibus Pluram : T elevision  
and U .S . F iction” in A Supposedly  Fun Thing I ’ll  N ever D o A gain  (1997); also, in his essay “Fictional 
Futures and the C onspicuously Y oung,” W allace d ism isses television  as “a narrative art that strives not to 
change or enlighten or broaden or reorien t. . . but merely and alw ays to en gage  and to a p p ea l to” (44).
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real experiences that have previously been excluded from art'’ (140. emphasis mine) as 
well as his heavy-handed formal and linguistic innovations might seem to contradict these 
professed literary indictments. Infinite Jest, a voluminous anatomy of American (cultural, 
psychological, political) “reality” and the irony-ridden formal gymnastics of the short 
fiction in Girl With Curious Hair (1989) and Brief Interviews With Hideous Men (1999) 
indicate that Wallace neither fully rejects nor embraces either realism or metafiction; 
rather, he employs both strategies, generating a third literary mode that is energized by 
this fundamentally unresolved generic constitution. The interpenetration of realist and 
metafictional modes exemplifies the productive complexity that ma^generated by chaotic 
systems, where the seemingly oppositional forces of order and disorder are balanced in 
perpetual and oscillating flux. The conflation of performance (where language is 
deployed towards the acknowledgement of its own artifice, creating a: destabilizing but 
creative kind of disturbance1) and mimeticism (where depicting “the actual” is privileged 
over innovative methods of depiction), though theoretically paradoxical, establishes a 
dialectical aesthetic which distinguishes Wallace from his immediate precursors and 
contemporaries: the verbal antics of postmodern “crank-turning” do not displace a realist 
drive as they do in writings by Mark Leyner, Robert Coover and Donald BarthelmNe- , but 
neither are the intrinsic constructedness and potential for verbal play in Wallace's work 
obfuscated by the realist imperative to “tell if- like it is/was/would be” that governs the 
writing of more mainstream authors like Cormac M, cCarthy, Jonathan Franzen and 
Richard Ford.
1 Or, as Frank C ioffi contends, the performativity o f  Infinite J est may be linked to the n ove l’s “alienation  
effect” or “confusion, frustration, despair [and] disgust” (162 ) that is brought about by its “ever- 
mushrooming heteroglossia; . . .  its vast array o f  associated characters, incidents; . . .  its amorality, its 
immorality, [and] its m oralizing” (169). Tom LeClair gestures to similar performative feats in the w ork's  
“multiple points o f  v iew  both first- and third person; [its] stylistic tour de force in several dialects; [and] a 
swirling associative structure” (“Prodigious F iction” 35).
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What Wallace sees as the anesthetizing effect of so-called “big-R Realism” 
results from its implicit thesis that "‘real” phenomena and processes are identifiable and 
coherent and thus can be delineated by analogously coherent language systems. As 
LeClair says, the structure o f realism “stays close to the subject-verb-object syntax of the 
kernel English sentence and to the causality of linear processes” [The Art o f  Excess 
(1989) 21]— but, I must ask, is a realism wrought according to grammatical linearity an 
authentic or legitimate realism? Like television, whose channels offer an illusory freedom 
of choice but only one “real” option— to watch— classical realism is, according to 
Wallace, “engaging without being demanding” (“Fictional Futures” 44). Realism, in the 
“big-R” tradition, may imply a social or psychological imperative through the 
representation of “real” conditions; realist texts may thus be imbued with the potential to 
instruct and enlighten a readership. But whatever material imparted in a big-R realist 
novel must inevitably be fashioned according to the “real” as it is perceived in the 
author’s particular mind; it must be always-already determined by the specific ideology 
of the writer who conveys qua constructs it. The straight-forward, often temporally linear 
description of characters who (appear to) independently determine their destinies is, then, 
an aesthetic trick— a trick to which contemporary readers, ensconced in a postmodern 
context of involutional irony have decidedly caught on: as Lyotard rather cynically puts 
it, “so-called realist representations can no longer evoke reality except as nostalgia or 
mockery” (74). To suppose that there is a single and definitive reality that may be 
represented in a single text is to erect yet another master narrative, a cultural fiction that 
functions to limit diversity and facilitate social control.
But viewing realism as an inauthentic transcription o f the world that is conceived 
by a particular author is somewhat misleading because it neglects the fact that all
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fiction— and language itself—is fundamentally referential. An element o f "reality" can 
hardly be avoided. But, as Timothy Jacobs states, “effective (and affective) art must 
render things as they are. not in the Realist school of literary representation, but in the 
real experiences of daily human existence” (225). Wallace concurs:
I’ve always thought of myself as a realist. . . . The world I live in consists of 
250 advertisements a day and any number of unbelievably entertaining 
options, most of which are subsidized by corporations that want to sell me 
things. The whole way that the world acts on my nerve endings is bound up 
with stuff that the guys with leather patches on their elbows would consider 
pop or trivial or ephemeral. I use a fair amount of pop stuff in my fiction, but 
what I mean by it is nothing different than what other people mean in writing 
about trees and parks and having to walk to the river to get water a hundred 
years ago. It’s just the texture of the world I live in. (McCaffery 130) 
According to this autoanalysis, it is merely the millennium-specific content, the “pop 
stu ff’ in Wallace’s fiction that distinguishes it from other versions o f realism. It may be 
that televisual frenzies and toxic waste sites are simply updated versions of Zola’s 
charcuteries and Tolstoy’s battlefields, but Wallace’s “realism” extends beyond simple 
reflection and rendition of the visible phenomena of contemporary life by incorporating 
the visceral responses to the ways in which these phenomena act on one’s “nerve 
endings.” The real is known not only by its observable artifacts and structures but also 
through its effects upon a perceiving subject whose physiological and neurological 
responses to the environment suggest as much— or, perhaps, more— about a given context 
as its own physical properties and manifest behavior.
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“The literature of referent, o f ‘psychological glow ',” says Wallace, “has finally 
come under constructive attack . . . and exploded into defraction” (“Fictional Futures”
50). But utter “defraction,” as Wallace sees it, can be as unsatisfying a narrative mode as 
“big-R realism.” The complete shattering or the laying bare of literary conventions 
remains, at base, just like the depictions of the realist author: a hegemonic and restrictive 
means of representation in its own right. In his interview with McCaffery, Wallace 
explains:
We’ve seen that you can break any or all of the rules . . . but we’ve also seen 
the toxicity that anarchy for its own sake can yield. It's  often useful to 
dispense with standard formulas, of course, but it’s just as brave to see what 
can be done within a set o f rules. . . . There’s something about free play 
within an ordered and disciplined system that resonates for readers. And 
there’s something about complete caprice and flux that’s deadening. (149-50) 
The dispensation of literary “rules” may, Wallace suggests, be “useful” as one stage in 
the productive reworking of aesthetic values, but as an end in and of itself, simple 
defraction is an equally hollow narrative strategy. As much as Wallace’s work challenges 
“the literature of referent, o f ‘psychological glow’,” it denounces the artificiality of 
postmodernist “crank-turning.” This denouncement is perhaps most palpable in 
“Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way,” from Girl With Curious Hair. The 
short story, a veritable compendium of self-conscious, 1980s-avant-garde literary 
techniques, exposes the essential emptiness of postmodern metafiction by way of 
parody— a classic postmodernist strategy. Written “in the margins” of John Barth’s Lost 
in the Funhouse (1969), “Westward” applies the strategies of Wallace’s literary 
forerunners (the authorial interjections of Barth, the long sentences of Bartheleme— the
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tropes, in other words of “high-postmodernists”) with a heavy ironic hand, so as to 
produce a kind of wcto-metafiction which not only knows it is an artificial construction, 
but also knoM s that it knows. “Westward” is an attempt to illuminate and push beyond the 
“toxicity” of ironic and anarchic postmodernist writing, but, Wallace says, he ultimately 
“got trapped” the same way “metafiction tried to expose the illusions of pseudo­
unmediated realist fiction that had come before it” (Scott 40).1 Simple parody of targeted 
literary modes, “Westward” finally reveals, is insufficient as a means of generating a new 
and productive literary approach because it merely adds another layer of self- 
referentiality to the one it originally takes to be spurious.
Wallace recognizes his own lapses into this tone but holds that his metafiction is 
“mimetic of a . . .  late twentieth century American experience which is [that] we're 
terribly afraid of one another'5 (Miller n.p.). Resolutely not another “crank-turner,” 
Wallace considers himself to be “a tourguide who is every bit as bound up and 
Americanized and self-conscious and insecure as the reader.” To support this self- 
assessment, Wallace distinguishes between an “autonomous, almost solipsistic self- 
consciousness” and one that is “far more concerned with the perception by others . . . [and 
is] a far more involved, sophisticated acceptance o f human limitation versus ‘I want to 
make a certain kind of impression.’” What is warranted, then— and, I argue, what 
Wallace achieves— is neither a return to realism nor a heightened irony, but an 
amalgamation of the two modes— an amalgamation which mobilizes the tropes and 
ideologies of both literary kinds toward a rendition of experience that partly embraces,
1 Or, as W allace pithily states in “£  Unibus P lu ram ,” “M etafiction, in its ascendant and m ost important 
phases, w as really nothing more than a single-order expansion o f  its ow n great theoretical nem esis,
Realism: if  Realism  called it like it saw it, M etafiction sim ply called it as it saw itse lf seeing it. This High  
cultural postmodern genre, in other words, was deeply informed by the em ergence o f  television  and the 
metastasis o f  self-conscious w atching” (45).
148
partly critiques, realism and metafiction. In his essay “Prodigious Fiction,” LeClair 
frames this self-consciously mimetic style as “radical realism,” the genre propounded by 
the “tall, lexically gifted and etymologically conscious wraith” in Infinite Jest whom 
LeClair takes to be a surrogate for Wallace himself (2). The wraith calls for the portrayal 
of “real life’s real egalitarian babble of figurant crowds, of the animate world’s real 
agora, the babble of crowds every member of which [is] the central and articulate 
protagonist of his own entertainment” {Infinite Jest 836). Realism becomes “radical” 
when, instead of erecting an orderly interpretation of “real agora,” the incoherence and 
disorder of “egalitarian babble” is embraced and enacted by the narrative strategy that 
conveys it. Accordingly, Wallace's fiction offers an anti-confluential, turbulent, 
multitudinous (but nonetheless mimetic) representation of systems and experiences that, 
in turn, disrupt the passivity of a “spectator” qua reader by problematizing the real. Its 
mimeticism exists not on the level of representational “mirroring”—though detailed 
depictions of the material world are a constitutive element— but in the manner by which 
the texture, structure and tone of the narrative assumes the chaotic properties which 
pervade physical and cultural spheres. Brian McHale evinces a similar intuition in 
Postmodernist Fiction when he states that postmodern writing “turns out to be mimetic 
after all, but this imitation of reality is accomplished not so much at the level of its 
content, which is often manifestly un- or anti-realistic, as at the level of form” (38). 
Through its chaotic constitution—manifest on the levels o f both form and content—  
Infinite Jest affirms that the perpetual, fundamental tension between order and disorder is 
precisely where “the real” resides.
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ii. Tennis, drugs, waste
The skeletal, allegorical constitution of City o f  Glass lends it a universality that Infinite 
Jest does not, at least upon first inspection, possess. Unlike A ustef s elegantly minimal 
depiction of progressive convolution, Wallace's text is convolution amplified to its 
maximal degree, scaling greater pagination than most publishing houses would possibly 
allow1. The narrative “nucleus” of Infinite Jest is (at times hideously, absurdly) 
compounded by multiple reflections and permutations of itself, so that the work may best 
be conceived as an assemblage of fractals— formal, social and psychological— where 
recursive patterns exist on levels as microscopic as diction and gesture, in domains as 
disparate as tennis academy and drug rehabilitation clinic, and through media as various 
as puppet shows, statistical calculus and political memoranda. But though conspicuously 
anatomical in the traditions of the so-called “encyclopedic novel,”2 the “Great American 
Novel,” and “novels of excess”3 the basic structure of Infinite Jest participates in the same 
kind o f orderly disorder I have described in City o f  Glass: an “infinite” system of
1 When Laura M iller asked W allace about the novel's length, W allace replied, “I know  it’s risky because 
it’s part o f  this equation o f  m aking demands on the reader— which start out financial. The other side is 
publishing houses hate it because they make less m oney. Paper is so expensive. . . The manuscript that I 
delivered w as 1700 manuscript pages, o f  w hich close to 500 were c u t . . . .  I f  it looks chaotic, good, but 
everything that’s in there is in there on purpose” (n.p.). Many reviewers have held this “m axim al” aspect 
against the book: In her review  o f  the novel, M ichiko Kakutani says, “[s]om ew here in the m ess, the reader 
suspects, are the outlines o f  a great n o v e l . . .  but it’s stuck there, h a lf excavated, unable to break com pletely  
free” (n.p.); M essud similarly opines, “Infinite Jest b illow s and sags in ungainly proportion, at least a partial 
victim o f  its own am bition” (n.p.).
2 In h is study o f  “encyclopedic narratives,” Edward M endelson writes: “Narrative is, am ong other things, 
an encyclopedia o f  narrative, incorporating, but never limited to, the conventions o f  heroic epic, quest 
romance, sym bolist poem , bildungsrom an, psychom achia, bourgeois novel, lyric interlude, drama, eclogue  
and catalogue” (19).
3 In The A rt o f  E xcess , LeClair posits three things so-called “masterful” n ovels must do: make full use o f  its 
technology (the book) and medium (language), “represent large cultural and often global w h oles” (2), and 
undercut the narcissism o f  the individual. Exam ples include (according to LeClair) Pynchon’s G ra v ity ’s 
R ainbow  (1973), Gaddis’s JR  (1975), C oover’s The Public Burning  (1977), H eller’s Som ething H appen ed  
(1971), M cElroy’s Women an d  Men  (1987), Barth’s LETTERS  (1979) and L eG uin’s A lw ays C om ing H om e  
(1985).
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Barthesian envelopes, where narrative structures recur on multiple scales and reflect the 
psychic composition of the myriad subjects and characters they contain. In interpreting 
the novel, Hayles prompts us: “Imagine a huge novel that has been run through the 
recursive feedback loops of a intelligent agent program and then strung out along the 
page” (“Illusion of Autonomy” 684). So while the recursion in City o f  Glass exists on the 
level of a single individual in a relatively localized sphere— one central psyche with 
multiple manifestations— that which pervades Infinite Jest spans multiple subjects and 
settings and, thus, enacts the rhizomatic proliferation only intimated (or apparent on a 
smaller scale) in Auster’s crystalline novella. With each reiterative system producing 
additional reverberations, the overall territory covered in Infinite Jest becomes 
exponentially greater. To use a common chaotic analogy, Auster’s book is a jagged piece 
of co ra l and Wallace's is the correspondingly jagged coastline.
In Infinite Jest, we are given a set of “character clusters” whose behaviors reflect 
the greater recursive cultural and philosophical systems depicted in the novel. The focal 
cluster is the Incandenza clan, a luminous, “radically-real” example of The American 
Family, comprised of eccentric and erratically effectual prodigies. The patriarch, Joe 
Incandenza— or, as his sons call him with appropriate closed-circuitry, “H im self’— runs 
the professional gamut of avant garde film director, nuclear researcher, and tennis school 
headmaster, generating the same destructive cycles with each successive incarnation until 
he does Himself in by way of a microwave suicide. Joe and his wife Avril, a.k.a. (with 
superheroic objectification/idealization) “the Moms,” a fabulously capable ex-professor- 
cww-neatfreak, founded and operate the Enfield Tennis Academy, “the product of 
negotiated compromises between Avril’s academic hard-assery and James’s . . . keen 
sense of athletic pragmatism” (188). Their steroidal eclecticism is reincarnated in their
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three “radically real” sons: Mario, the hideously deformed cameraman-child; Hal, the 
tennis champ-cww-lexical genius; and Orin, the disillusioned romantic, tennis-then- 
football champ. Each son, fractal-like, is a feedback loop of the obsessive and solipsistic 
neuroses that govern their parents’ dispositions. But far from being hermetic— even in 
their circuitry— dynamics within the Incandenza family and the Enfield Tennis Academy 
materialize also at the Ennet House Drug and Alcohol Recovery Facility, presided over 
by the physically enormous ex-addict Don Gately. The institutional reflection is pointed 
because, as Wallace says in his interview with Salon, “sport and the idea of dedication to 
a pursuit [are] kind of like an addiction” (5). Inhabitants of both camps are ensconced in 
drug/sport-mediated attempts to fill their assorted voids, characterized variously as 
anhedonia, unipolar dysphoria, or clinical, involutional, or psychotic depression (695).
The mutual reflectivity of the two sites is concretely, as well as thematically, manifest in 
the many controlled substances upon which both groups fixate, either through abstention 
(Ennet House) or rampant consumption (E.T.A). The inter-institutional connection is 
deepened still by romantic or professional associations, which are often invisible to those 
involved in them: Joelle van Dyne, for example, is an Ennet House inmate and member of 
U.H.I.D (Union of Hideously and Improbably Deformed) but was once Madame 
Psychosis, the namesake for Michael Pemulis’s street-drug product, DMZ; she was also 
the droning, enigmatic radio hostess who provided late-night fantasy fodder for the two 
younger adolescent Incandenza boys; she was girlfriend to the eldest son, Orin, who 
(allegedly) dodged flying acid so that it splashed and (hideously) deformed Joelle’s face 
instead; and she was an actor in several of Him self s films, including the notorious 
“Infinite Jest.” Hal and Gately too, though never connected directly during the course of 
the novel, fleetingly appear in each other’s dreams, signifying a kinship that transcends
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the physical realm and approaches the symbolic. The single identity becomes multiple, its 
behavioral and psychological systems resonating in numerous contexts despite temporal 
and spatial dislocation.
The film cartridge, “Infinite Jest,” is the crucial thread linking the inmates of 
E.T.A and Ennet House; it both epitomizes and embodies the recursion that characterizes 
the psychological and physical processes in the two institutions. The film opens with two 
figures going about a revolving door, unable to make contact with one another, but 
perpetually pushing forward in a vain attempt. This cyclical idea is then echoed by a 
figure. Death, who explains that the woman who kills you reemerges as your mother in 
the next life. The film then depicts a disconsolate “mother” figure leaning over her infant 
child, repeatedly pleading “I'm  sorry” in various ways; shot from the blurry perspective 
of the crib-bound child, this segment plays upon deep psychic operations concerning the 
(im)possibility of deviation from the oedipal structures and produces in the viewer an 
irresistible “pleasure’Vaddiction which makes it impossible to turn away from the screen. 
Ensnared in an identification with the physical and psychic recursion of “Infinite Jest,” 
the viewer, utterly consumed by what she sees, loses all compulsion to do anything but 
watch the film and consequently dies in her own excrement. The absorption of subjects 
into the film 's narrative loops threatens to affect more than the handful of viewers we see 
expire in their living rooms. The fate of the “Infinite Jest” master cartridge is, as 
explained in clandestine dialogues between O.N.A.N. (Organization of North American 
Nations) agent David Steeply and A.F.R. (Les Assassins des Fauteuils Rollents) radical 
Remy Marathe, of global importance: Quebecois militants plan to release the cartridge 
upon Americans to avenge the Great Concavity/Convexity dumpsite on Canadian soil 
into which the U.S. deposits its waste via giant catapult. The lethal loops of “Infinite Jest”
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correspond to cycles of effluence and its reprisals that operate on individual (biological 
and psychic) and social (waste and international relations) levels. Its properties are at 
once generative and “natural,” insofar as recursion is “necessary" in nature1, but is also a 
potent means of destruction, particularly in contexts where its basic “givenness” is 
challenged by alternative, flexible systems.
The Enfield Tennis Academy supplies the context for the filial and developmental 
neuroses of the Incandenzas and is, at the same time, a focal metaphor for the novel's 
principle concern with systematized flux. Just as DeLillo in Underw'orld employs 
baseball as a metaphor for social mechanics in post-industrial life and, in End Zone, uses 
football to convey a nuclear-military fanaticism, Wallace's tennis embodies the tension 
between rigidity and fluxion that defined natural, social and psychological dynamics. In 
Infinite Jest, tennis becomes the central metaphor for what Serres (in “Dream.” as cited in 
the epigraph to this chapter) calls the “interpenetration” of order and disorder. Supplying 
a conspicuous dialectic between the fixed boundary lines and the infinitely-variable 
trajectory, speed and rotation of the ball, tennis is depicted in a language of chaotic 
aesthetics:
Were he now still among the living, Dr. Incandenza would now describe 
tennis in the paradoxical terms of whaf s now called Extra-Linear Dynamics. 
And Schtitt, whose formal knowledge of math is probably equivalent to that 
of a Taiwanese kindergartener nevertheless seemed to know . . . that locating 
beauty and art and magic and improvement and keys to excellence and 
victory in the prolix flux of play is not a fractal matter of reducing chaos to 
pattern. Seemed to intuitively sense that it was not a matter o f reduction at all,
1 In her article, ‘T h e  Illusion o f  Autonom y and the Fact o f  R ecursivity,” H ayles argues that destruction  
results when “necessary recursivity” is disrupted.
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but -  perversely -  of expansion, the aleatory flutter of uncontrolled, 
metastatic growth. (82)
Tennis, as E.T.A. coach Schtitt paradoxically contends, is about '‘not-order, limit, the 
places where things [break] down, fragmented into beauty" (82). Like the incalculable 
trajectories of the narrative and its myriad occupants, tennis is "‘no more reducible to 
delimited factors or probability curves than chess or boxing;" it is at once 
“mathematically uncontrolled but humanly contained' (82). Confronting the infinite 
variability of his media, a player works to effect an artistic “containment" and thereby 
enlarges both the aesthetic potential of the game and his own creative agency. The 
competitor works alone, mimicking the directions and gestures of an adversary, 
effectively doing battle with his own reflection or twin. Thus the dichotomous rigidity 
and erraticism of tennis exists not only on the tangible “canvas” of the court but also 
within the psychic operations of its players— specifically Hal, heightening his 
“Existential individuality, frequently referred to in the West. Solipsism” (113). Hal's 
disposition— simultaneously contemplative and escapist, assiduous and flippant— fuses 
the game’s dialectic of order and flux. The psychological resonances of tennis and its 
tropes resound in Hal’s recurrent dream, where he is “standing at the baseline o f a 
gargantuan tennis court”:
The lines that bound and define play are on this court as complex and 
convolved as a sculpture of string. There are lines going every which way, 
and they run oblique or meet and form relationships and boxes and rivers and 
tributaries and systems inside systems: lines, corners, alleys, and angles 
deliquesce into a blur at the horizon of the distant net. (67)
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In Hal’s dream, the lines that ought to “bind and define" play assume the “metastatic” 
convolution that would normally be characteristic of the movements of ball and players. 
What should be fixed is in Hal’s unconscious distorted and conditioned by traits of the 
game’s flexible elements, exemplifying the psychic “expansion" occasioned by the sport. 
Further, the adversarial aspect o f tennis is changed from one involving two opposing 
players (Hal muses, “Even the ‘we’ is theory: I never get quite to see the distant 
opponent, for all the apparatus of the game”) to a pitting of child against parent— or more 
specifically, child against parental scrutiny. Hal spies “In the stands stage-left the white 
sun-umbrella of the Moms; her height raises the white umbrella above her neighbours” 
(68). Like the court lines, which are meant to delineate the limits of play but whose 
“mess” renders it impossible to know “where to direct service,” the Moms' presence is 
highlighted by a white umbrella’s radiance but she herself is obscured by its “circle of 
shadow” (68). Her presence is signified synechdocUajl^by her umbrella, as she herself is 
submerged beneath its shade, as if in the unconscious itself.
The physical “expansiveness” of tennis is linked to an analogous psychological 
magnification on the part of the player. Unlike DeLillo’s Dodgers and Giants— whose 
movements within the gaming context invigorate the world within and beyond the 
stadium, as the teams metaphorically enact social and industrial processes— the tennis 
player of Infinite Jest functions in a context o f heightened solitude and self-reflexivity. 
The absence of a discernable opponent, the mother’s looming figure, and the perpetual 
jettisoning and return of the tennis ball practically force to mind the psychoanalytic trope, 
fort-da2 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Freud uses the phrase to describe a 
child’s playful attempt at vicarious mastery over the displeasing and recurring
1 In B eyond the P leasure P rincip le , Freud describes the play o f  an eighteen-m onth old as fo r t  (“gone”) da  
(“there”).
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disappearance of the mother (when she enters and exits the nursery); “beyond" this 
pleasure-based motivation, Freud holds that the fort-da game ultimately dramatizes the 
death drive. To apply this Freudian idea to the tennis game1 is to view a player/son 
sending the ball away in order symbolically control (or rehearse and thus mitigate) the 
departure of the desired object (in Freud’s estimation, the mother2); the returning ball 
requires him to send it away once again, so that the (psychological, developmental) 
process remains suspended in the attempted mastery of the disappearing parent. In 
Freud’s conception, “by repeating it, as unpleasurable though it was as a game, he took 
on an active part” (15). Only when the ball fails to return (i.e. Hal scores a point) has fort- 
da achieved its purpose (a successful break from the mother) and the player/son 
psychologically develops, or “moves up the ranks.”
While Freud holds that the repetitive projection stages loss and death, Lacan reads 
the process differently, focusing on the wait for return, the “anticipating provocation,” 
which takes form “in the symbolic dyad of two elementary exclamations” (103-4). 
Though he emphasizes a different phase of the process, Lacan, like Freud, draws out a 
prescriptive meaning from fort-da, which he reads as “a point o f insertion of a symbolic 
order that pre-exists the infantile subject and in accordance with which he will have to 
structure him self’ (104). The schizoanalyst, while she does consider fort-da  a 
phenomenon unto itself, does not subscribe to the formulaic or essentialist models 
outlined above. Guattari explains in Chaosmosis:
1 F ort-da  after all, in Guattari’s estim ation, happens in many places: “ it can be expressed in relation to the 
effective absence o f  the mother or in a child’s gam e with its ow n im age in the mirror that it makes appear 
and disappear” ( C haosm osis 75).
2 In the Incandenza fam ily, both parents “depart” in one way or another: Joe is im possible to talk to, and 
then dies; Avril “disappears” into her obsessive com pulsions.
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Unlike Freud, schizoanalysis doesn't make the Fort-Da refrain depend on a 
feeling of frustration with regard to the mother and on universal principles of 
life and death; nor like Lacan on a transcendent signifying order. It considers 
it as a desiring machine, working towards the assemblage o f the verbal self— 
in symbiosis with the other assemblages of the emergent self, the nuclear self 
and the subjective self—and thereby inaugurating a new mastery of the 
object, of touch, of a spatiality from Winnicot’s transitional space. (74-5) 
Aligning the schizoanalytic interpretation with Winnicot’s ‘‘transitional” findings,1 
Guattari emphasizes the physical, spatial nature of the fort-da  game and, with deceptive 
simplicity, imagines its significance based on this. The infant is becoming a “self,” and 
one of the things a self must do is negotiate the physical environment, including the 
spatiality of “other assemblages.” While it appears that Freud and Lacan would find the 
subject simple and the act complex, Guattari views the act as simple, and the subject 
complex— “[i]n fact, a matter of a rich, multivalent, heterogenetic machine that can 
neither be legitimately fixed to a maternal-oral stasis, nor to a language stasis, although 
they incontestably participate in it. It is all these things at the same time and many others 
besides!” (75). While conceding that Freudian (“maternal-oral”) and Lacanian (“language 
stasis”) interpretations may be involved, Guattari identifies in the peculiar 
jettisoning/retrieval game a more flexible, complex dynamic, where what’s being 
rehearsed is the negotiation of order and disorder— in all of their forms.
Fort is a chaosmic submersion; Da the mastery of a differentiated complexion 
. . . The submersion in chaosmic imminence is always ready to exploit the 
slightest weakness. Its presence haunts, with more or less intensity, unstable
1 These are expounded in Donald W innicot’s P laying  an d  R eality  (1971) .
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situations—intolerable absence, bereavement, jealousy, organic fragilisation, 
cosmic vertigo . . . The rituals of exorcism brought to bear on it can become 
refrains of fixation, reification, tenacious fidelity to pain or unhappiness.
The “chaotic submersion''— a “haunted" state of “instability" and “intolerables"— must 
be encountered so as to be known, distinguished from areas o f experience over which the 
“emergent self' may exert some form of control or “mastery.” The fort-da game thus 
becomes a means of measuring subjective limitations— but, Guattari warns, at some point 
the measuring becomes an end unto itself, relegating a “stultified [rather than emergent] 
self' to behavioral cycles of fixation and unhappy fidelity.
Thus, the “paradox" of tennis, which, ”[w]ere he now still among the living," 
James Incandenza would describe as “Extra-Linear Dynamics" (82): the player exists in 
the tension between order (the lines of the court, the score, his “masterly" aim) and 
disorder (his own compulsion to plunge into the “chaotic submersion" of ontological and 
physical indeterminacy). In keeping with the fractal composition of the novel, the tension 
between order and disorder, the participation in, and the subversion of, a system 
materializes again in the drug-culture at the academy. Under certain conditions, drugs 
operate as poisons, wreaking havoc on psychological and neurochemical processes. 
Cocaine, as endnote 232 explains, is broken down by a process of “hydrolysis . . . [which 
is] essentially toxic and can yield unpleasant neurosomatic fallout in certain systems" 
(1037).1 In the academy, however, drugs function as alternately recreational and 
“medicinal” supplements for aspiring professional athletes— accoutrements o f a capitalist
1 The note goes on to enumerate the litany o f  ailments plaguing sp ecific  coke users: i.e. Ken Erredy’s 
“unstoppable rhinorrhagia,” Bruce Green’s “binocular nystagm us and w alloping depression ,” and Randy 
Lenz’s “vascular constriction, diuresis extremus, phosphenism , com pulsive tooth-grinding, m egalom ania, 
phobophobia, euphoric recall, delusions o f  persecution and/or hom icidal envy, sociosis , [and] postnatal drip 
(1036).
159
culture that requires that its subjects adhere to pre-ordained and inflexible systems of 
performance, and thereby be “successful'’ (and consequently rewarded) propagators of 
cultural norms. “Bob Hope'’ (a suggestive yoking of celebrity qua success and “dope'’) 
helps Hal sleep though his dream disturbances, which were “beginning to grind [him] 
down and to cause some slight deterioration in performance and rank'’ (67). The drug 
gives him “Hope,” “substance” to fill the void, while the “absence of substance is what 
allows the root to take hold'’ (Raizman 21). Drugs—both as remedies and poisons— are 
the media through which a character's experience and self-definition take shape. For the 
students of E.T.A., identity is closely linked to sporting rank, and, by extension, the 
socioeconomic superstructure wherein sporting rank is only one of many success-based 
hierarchies—thus neurochemical alteration is legitimized and even necessitated. But, just 
as the returning tennis ball signifies a perpetual developmental deferral, so too are 
patterns of drug use predominantly cyclical:
[E.T.A. students take] dexedrine or low-volt methedrine before matches and 
benzodiazapenes to come back down after matches, with Mudslides of Blue 
Flames in some discrete Academy corner at night to short-circuit the up-and- 
down cycle, mushrooms or X or something from the Mild designer class -  or 
maybe occasionally a little Black Star . . .  to basically short out the whole 
motherboard and blow out all the circuits and slowly recover and be almost 
neurologically reborn and start the gradual cycle all over again . . . (53)
Thus the social and medical implications of drug use, which are suspended in irresolvable 
dialectical relations (toxin/medicine, sanctioned/illicit) sustain further recursion by way 
of the perpetual cycle of substance use: intoxication, burn-out, and subsequent re- 
toxification.
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The reiterative, drug-mediated system participates in patterns o f expulsion and 
resurgence that permeate the novel at large. As Hayles states. Infinite Jest records the 
‘‘underground seepages and labyrinthine pathways through which the abject always 
returns in recursive cycles of interconnection that inexorably tie together the sanctified 
with the polluted” (‘‘Illusion of Autonomy” 687). A central metaphor for this recursive 
destruction and generation is annulation, a process of nuclear fusion that works by 
“bombarding highly toxic radioactive particles with massive amounts o f stuff even more 
toxic than the radioactive particles;” essentially, it is “a fusion that feeds on poisons” 
(572). In the recursive process of annulation, toxicity and waste become synonymous 
with fertility and replenishment. When deployed in the Great Concavity, annulation 
“turns out so greedily efficient that i( sucks every last toxin and poison out of the 
surrounding ecosystem, all inhibitors to organic growth for hundreds o f radial clicks in 
every direction” (573); w7aste land is transformed, through the fact o f its own toxicity, 
into supremely fertile and luscious terrain. Though both U ndei^orld  and Infinite Jest are 
preoccupied with the ecological and philosophical implications of waste, Wallace's 
interpretation of dump sites is the more problematic: DeLillo's garbage heaps, for 
example, prompt Brian Glassic to sublime reverie and contemplation o f human 
commonality, but Wallace's dump testifies to the pesky resilience of that which we wish 
to discard. Even its descriptive, “Concavity/Convexity,” is a site o f irresolvable 
contestation. And not only is the waste site a point of contention between nation states, it 
spawns havoc in the genetic codes of th e  creatures (some human) that “inhabit” its 
grounds. Unsuccessfully rehabilitated Ennet inmate, Randy Lenz pontificates at length to 
whoever will listen:
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Whole NNE cults and stelliform subcults Lenz reports as existing around 
belief systems about the metaphysics o f the Concavity and annular fusion and 
B.S.-1950s-B-cartridge-type-radiation-affected fauna and overfertilization 
and verdant forests with periodic oases of purportaged desert and whatever 
east of the former Montpelier VT area of where the annulated Sawshine River 
feeds the Charles and tints it the exact same tone of blue as the blue on boxes 
of Hefty SteelSaks and the ideas of the ravacious herds o f feral domesticated 
housepets and oversized insects not only taking over the abandoned homes of 
relocated Americans but actually setting up house and keeping them in model 
repair and impressive equity, allegedly, and the idea o f infants the size of 
prehistoric beasts roaming the overfertilized east Concavity quadrants, 
leaving enormous scat-piles and keening for the abortive parents who'd left or 
lost them in the general geopolitical shuffle of mass migration (561-2)
As Marathe succinctly puts it, “What goes around, it comes back around . . . [that's] the 
nature of filth" (233). So the feral infants o f the Concavity/Convexity, as described in 
James A.L. Struck Jr.’s term paper for his History of Canadian Unpleasantness class,
“feed on the abundance of annularly available edibles the overgrowth periods in the 
region represent, do deposit titanically outsized scat, and presumably do crawl 
thunderously about, occasionally sallying south of murated retention lines and into the 
populated areas of New New England;" though the report later qualifies the point, stating 
that the massive infants, “formed by toxicity and sustained by annulation" are essentially 
“passive icons of the Experialist gestalt." (1056). The infants represent the greater 
processes that produced them, the group responsible for the Great Concavity/Convexity 
waste "disposal" system itself, O.N.A.N., evoking onanism—the futile (and, Biblically,
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sinful) ejaculation o f one’s seed onto the ground. The organization’s name, with its self- 
defeating implications, indicates that catapulting noxious material away is, 
simultaneously but insidiously, a pollution of one’s own soil.
Hi. Narrative reverberation
There is no topology more beautiful than Mobius' to 
designate the contiguity of the close and the distant, or 
interior and exterior, of object and subject in the same 
spiral where the screen of our computers and the 
mental screen of our brain become intertwined with 
each other as well.
- Baudrillard, Xerox and Infinity, 56
“A Radically Condensed History of Postindustrial Life,'’ the first piece in W allace's B rief 
Interviews With Hideous Men, consists of two short paragraphs which describe people 
desperately trying to connect with each other:
When they were introduced, he made a witticism, hoping to be liked. 
She laughed extremely hard, hoping to be liked. Each drove home alone, 
staring straight ahead, with the very same twist to the faces.
The man who’d introduced them didn’t much like either o f them, 
though he acted as if he did, anxious as he was to preserve good relations at 
all times. One never knew, after all, now did one now did one now did one.
(0)
This tale would simply be a pithy depiction of everyday loneliness in an alienating world, 
if not for the syntactical glitch of the final line. The thrice-repeated phrase, “now did 
one,” is conspicuously at odds with the piece’s professed “radical condensation'’ of
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postmodern experience. Indeed, the repeated words add neither action nor detail to a text 
whittled down to an almost imagistic minimum. But it is the Steinian repetition itself that 
embodies a defining property of “postindustrial life''— the glitch in the would-be 
continuous system, the fallacy of resolution or completion. In the looping logic of the 
short piece, information accrues not via teleological advancement or “progress” but, 
rather, on the level of perpetual recursion. The phrase “now did one’' also sounds like a 
repeated question, leaving the possibility of communication between people open for 
deliberation even after the work itself has come to an end.
This minute instance of narrative looping, what one Wallace commentator calls 
“Infinitesimal Jest,”1 epitomizes a general trait of Wallace’s literary corpus: the diffusion 
of supposedly closed, finite systems and linear narrative formats. W allace's work mines 
the “porousness of certain borders,” to borrow from the recurring short story title in 
Hideous Men. by focusing on the anomalous elements of apparently continuous and 
coherent systems, and by amplifying these anomalies to the point where idiosyncrasy 
becomes the rule rather than the exception. Infinite Jest conveys the porousness of myriad 
borders, from physical “borders” like the “spangled mess'’ of tennis court lines in H al's 
dream to national borders permeated by waste of the Great Concavity/Convexity. While 
these distortions may superficially appear to be sites of psychological and political 
disaster, the chaotic properties they present also provide a means o f generating orders that 
are more stable or complex than preceding ones. The novel is riddled with cyclical 
operations of this kind, where instability and destruction is balanced against an emergent 
productivity and order: annular fusion, for example, is an exercise in rampant toxicity, but 
it “can produce waste that’s fuel for a process whose waste is fuel for the fusion" (572);
1 The com m ent can be found at http://w w w .sm allbytes.net/~bobkat/jesterlist.htm l.
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the drug DMZ is “synthesized from a derivative of fatviavi, an obscure mold that grows 
only on other molds" (170); ONAN doctors “[treat] cancer by giving cancer cells 
themselves cancer" (572); Marathe is “a kind of triple agent or duplicitous double agent" 
who is “pretending to pretend to betray” (995). In addition to the infolding aspect of 
specific items, identities and processes, characters move in a cyclical fashion; in an 
attempt to break his pot habit, for example, Hal visits Ennet House and finds most of the 
residents clutching teddy bears. The narrator describes the Incandenza's marital 
relationship as “the evolved product of concordance and compromise'’ (183), a phrase 
exactly repeated two pages later by Joelle (Madam Psychosis) in her radio broadcast.
Also compelling is the moeb<As strip shape of the infinity symbol,1 an icon that Orin 
traces on the bodies of his female conquests and that is also represented by the ubiquity of 
the number eight in the text (super-8 mm, some movies last 88 minutes). No thing is 
autonomous but reverberates, rather, throughout the family and community, as well as the 
symbolic and structural constitution of the narrative at large. These self-emulating, 
cannibalistic phenomena generate energy and new information, illustrating that while 
systems might be odious in themselves, their “pores” may be sites o f creativity.
Chaotic indeterminacy and orderly-disorder thus inform the narrative structure of 
Infinite Jest and the cyclical and irresolvable social formulations it contains: characters, 
items, thoughts and symbols circulate perpetually throughout the narrative domain at 
large, their patterns and behaviors not leading toward any ultimate, quantifiable result or 
objective “solution” but, rather, conveying meaning in their very unwieldy reverberations.
1 For instances o f  infinity in the novel, I am indebted to Toon T heuw is’s “The Q uest for Infinite Jest: An 
Enquiry into the Encyclopedic and Postmodernist Nature o f  David Foster W allace’s Infinite J e s t f  
http://w w w .geocities.com /Q thens/A cropois/8175/toon.htm l. Theuwis m aintains that the recurrence o f  the 
sym bol infinity “does not seem  to add up to anything. It m akes the reader feel rather paranoid” (10). I 
suggest, how ever, that the recurrence o f  infinite cycles and iconography attest to the indeterminate structure 
o f  the work as a w hole.
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These “methods produce . . .  a prodigious density,'’ LeClair explains, “because parts do 
not disappear into conventional and easily processed wholes" and “disrupt the 
tranquilizing flow of conventional fiction” (“Prodigious Fiction” 35). This 
configuration— a “disruption of tranquility” achieved through a process of reiterative 
folding— counteracts the “anesthesia of form” (McCaffery 138) that Wallace associates 
with traditional, “big-R” realist fiction and its valuation of linear causality and stable 
subjectivity. These self-emulating and recursive phenomena operate like Chinese boxes, 
“closed systems” that create energy instead of entropy. But, like Underworld, a 
rudimentary but profound recursion is also achieved through the disruption of 
chronological sequences. This kind of narrative arrangement— what Ursula Heise terms 
“chronoschism”— demonstrates a “dividing, bifurcating and branching off continuously 
into multiple possibilities and alternatives” (55). The first episode of Infinite Jest is 
chronologically the last: during a college interview, Hal erupts into “sw^animalistic” (44) 
noises and convulsions. Not until much later in the novel are possible “causes” o f the 
outburst supplied, and even then explanations are myriad and only hypotheses: Hal may, 
the text implies, have become deranged through ingesting DMZ, with which, we are to 
suspect, he accidentally brushes his teeth; or his violent incoherence could be a 
consequence o f marijuana withdrawal; or he may have accidentally watched all or part of 
the “Infinite Jest” cartridge; or Hal may be expressing a delayed hysteria connected to 
discovering his father’s corpse.1 Hal’s introduction at a point chronologically later than 
the rest of the material in the novel not only compels the reader to look beyond temporal 
sequences and linear causality, but also establishes the novel’s central mystery, for which
1 These and other explanations for H af s disorder are proposed by readers o f  Infinite J es t and appear in 
“Infinite Jest N otes and Speculations” at the DFW  w ebsite, 
w ysiw yg://92 /http://w w w .geocities.com /A thens/ A cro p o lis /8 175/notes2.htm .
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(although it asymptotK3^approaches resolution) the narrative never quite provides an 
explanation.
While my interest in the schizoanalytic meanings of recent fiction compels me to 
interpret the narrative matrix of Infinite Jest in terms of chaos theory, it is worth 
remarking upon other “science-inflected'’ analyses of the text— particularly because 
several of these analyses employ physical or mathematical models that, like nonlinear 
dynamics, countenance systematic indeterminacy and reiteration. Toon Theuwis, for 
example, suggests that by engaging with Wallace's narrative, “one ends up in a closed 
helix. As a reader we move around as if in a spiral, continuously moving around central 
point and the great moment of truth, the end, the epiphany, the moment of insight never 
seems to arrive” (16). Chris Hager compares the novel’s structure to a parabola, which 
(like the chaotic cycling I present here) undermines the notion of causal explanations of 
events, relying instead on slightly-skewed symmetry between events on the “descending'’ 
arc of the narrative and those on the “ascending” arc.1 And, as in Pynchon’s G ravity’s 
Rainbow, “only the peak we're allowed to see” (726). Hager claims that the parabola’s 
vertex on page 489, where the non-French speaker, Lucien Antitoi dies, is the “purest 
reflection on Hal’s unspoken transformation'’ (11). The parabolic structure encourages us 
to infer rather than be given connections; “the circumscription,” Hager argues,
“ultimately elucidates the essence of Hal’s transformation more clearly than a literal 
transcription of that transformation could have: that Lucien’s drastic increase of 
communicative function comes at the vertex of the novel begs a reconsideration of Hal’s
1 Hager claims that “the entrances and re-entrances o f  characters mark the vectors that mark the sym metry  
o f  these two slopes” (34); for exam ple, around page 300, “Poor Tony Krause has a seizure on the T ,” then, 
about 300 pages from the n ove l’s end, “Poor Tony Krause aw oke in the am bulance.” The same 
correspondent positioning Hager observes in Hal and Don G ately’s respective dreams o f  each other.
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ambiguous fate— as a renewed ability to communicate, if  at the cost of conventional 
appearances of communication” (12).
Whether all or some or none of the geometrical models that critics have found in 
Infinite Jest— Pynchonian parabola, Borgesian library of octagonal rooms, Mandelbrosian 
fractals, or Her* ingwayesque iceberg—were “intentionally” built into the narrative is 
immaterial. Indeed, even so-called intentional devices will always have effects that are 
unforeseen by the author. The extensive endnotes punctuating Infinite Jest exemplify well 
the imperfect functions of intentionality. Wallace is not, of course, the first author to 
employ such paratextual structures in fictional work—Lawrence Sterne uses footnotes in 
Tristram Shandy (1767), as does Flann O'Brien in The Third Policeman (1940) and 
Vladimir Nabokov in Pale Fire. More recently, the footnote has become part of the 
postmodernist arsenal of metaflctional devices, featuring prominently in Danielewski’s 
House o f  Leaves and David Eggers’ A Heartbreaking Work o f  Staggering Genius (2001). 
But, in proportion with the “maximal” tenor of his enterprise, W allace’s use of paratext is 
by all accounts excessive: the author himself admits, “it got kind of addictive” (Miller 
n.p.). There are 388 notes in Infinite Jest, contributing to about ten percent of the work’s 
length. In an interview with Charlie Rose, Wallace describes the purpose and intended 
effects o f the endnotes:
[I]t seems to me that reality’s fractured right now, at least the reality that I 
live in. And the difficulty about writing . . . about reality is that text is very 
linear and it’s very unified. . . I, anyway, am constantly on the look out for 
ways to fracture the text that aren't totally disoriented. (10)
These comments might be read alongside the notes to Deleuze and Guattari’s “partial 
objects”— “bricks that have been shattered into bits, and leftovers”— which the authors
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value because “[w]e no longer believe in a primordial totality that once existed, or in a 
final totality that awaits us at some future date” {Anti-Oedipus 42) Critics have tended to 
read Wallace's “fracturing” device in various ways: Frank Cioffi claims that the “constant 
flipping between text and notes . . .  [is a] near aerobic activity” and as such forces the 
reader into a “performance of disturbance” (169); Timothy Jacobs conceives the endnotes 
as a way of making the reader “engaged with his work— as opposed to the ‘passive 
spectation’ that television prescribes,” generating a “participatory aesthetic” where 
“readers adopt the narrative and physically reconstitute it as their own” (225-6); in “The 
Panic of Influence,” A.O. Scott calls the endnotes an expression of “quasi-Oedipal 
hostility” which attests to the author’s anxiety over “the obstacles of writing” (39).
Keeping in mind Wallace’s “double nationality” in literature and mathematics, the 
notes may also be seen to perform particular quantitative operations with regard to the 
text from which they are sprung. Inasmuch as they might have philosophical (or 
psychological, obsessive, fetishistic) implications, endnotes as such are fundamentally a 
technical contrivance, a way to transmit information that relates to a main idea but does 
not quite constitute a main idea itself. Like Raymond Queneau’s “One Hundred Thousand 
Billion Poems,”1 Wallace’s exploitation of the literary (and essayistic) device is a means 
of generating sheer textual mass, both actually (the novel’s word count) and potentially (a 
reader’s distraction from the main narrative). The endnote is a type o f “strange loop”2 
because it entails a departure from the numerical signal in the text proper to the
1 Ten sonnets, wherein each line o f  one poem may be replaced by its hom ologous line in the other poem s, 
creating a “potential” 1014 poems; Francois LeLionnais explains: “Thanks to this technical superiority, the 
work you are holding in your hands represents, itse lf alone, a quantity o f  text far greater than everything  
man has written since the invention o f  writing, including popular novels, business letters, diplom atic  
correspondence, private mail, rough drafts thrown into the w astebasket and graffiti” (M otte 291).
2 A “strange loop” occurs when “ [b]y m oving upwards (or dow nwards) through the levels o f  som e  
hierarchical system , w e unexpectedly find ourselves back w here w e  started” (10), dev ises Douglas 
Hofstadter in G odel, Escher, Bach: An E ternal G olden  B ra id  (1979).
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corresponding number in a separate bolt of text and, although one returns to the 
abandoned spot in the text proper, new information (or. frequently, mystification) has 
been added through the divergence. And unlike the footnote which can be perceived in a 
simple vertical glance, the endnote requires a physical negotiation with a (hefty and 
cumbersome) book and the temporary abandonment of place in the narrative proper, so 
that the reader becomes embroiled in a recursive performance. A reader’s detour to the 
note may also necessitate further journeying, as some notes have their own attendant 
notes and many notes contain medical, mathematical and linguistic jargon or 
complex/archaic diction that then require a consultation of the OED or some other 
dictionary.1 The coercive loops force the reader into a position of suspended 
“intermediariness,” herself confirming through action the porous borders o f the text she is 
experiencing.
Variously confounding and enlightening, the notes introduce points of rupture and 
turbulence to the (already convoluted) narrative proper. Their content ranges from 
pharmaceutical catalogues and mathematical formulae, to interview transcripts and 
historical elaborations. The endnotes—offering elaboration, clarification, sometimes 
crucial information, sometimes completely redundant asides, and, sometimes, entire 
scenes several pages long— supply yet another dimension to the indeterminacy and 
recursion functioning in the novel at large. Often, the endnotes are fractals o f patterns 
found in the main text— for example, the particular dynamics o f the Incandenza family. 
Note 24, an eight page filmography for James Incandenza, includes this one-line 
summary of his short film, As o f  Yore: “A middle-aged tennis instructor, preparing to 
instruct his son in tennis, becomes intoxicated in the family’s garage and subjects his son
1 W allace recently joined  w ith several other writers!including Zadie Smith and Stephin Merrill) to put 
together The A m erican W rite r’s Thesaurus (2006).
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to a rambling monologue while his son weeps and perspires*' (991). In addition to the 
obvious parallels between the synopsis and “real life" in the novel (tennis coaching and a 
father-son conversation/contestation), note 24 affirms through recapitulation the link 
between sporting obsession and drug addiction, which I explored in the previous section 
of this chapter. In other cases, the endnotes operate on a more conceptual level, where 
content subverts the ostensible function of the note itself. Note 216, referring to what Dr. 
Rusk at Enfield calls the ‘Coatlicue Complex’ (516), states simply, “no clue" (1036), 
while note 110C, a note upon another note which is a letter sent from Avril to Orin, 
addressed “Dear Filbert” (1006)—which, in turn, sprung out of almost nowhere amidst 
Hal's thoughts on Canadian separatist politics— this note 100° states, “don't ask” (1021). 
The lack of explanation undermines the raison d'efre of the endnote technique itself, 
evincing the “porousness” of the paratextual system. All but disclaiming its purported 
function to clarify and qualify a greater text, these paratextual arrangements work to 
subvert the primary material. “Octet,'’ a short piece from B rief Interview's With Hideous 
Men, takes this undermining a step further in its attrition of the ontological significance of 
the author himself. Assuming the general character of a “pop quiz,” “Octet'’ presents a 
number of hypothetical situations intended to prompt the reader into pseudo-ethical 
reflection. But the scenario, in classic metafictional style, gradually mutates, ultimately 
foregrounding the pseudo-ethical problematic of literary production itself: “You are, 
unfortunately,'’ the ninth “Pop Quiz” hypothesizes, “a fiction writer . . . [who is] 
attempting a cycle of very short belletristic pieces” (145). The pop quizzes increasingly 
become displaced by their attendant footnotes until the quizzes themselves get sucked 
into the auxiliary text, evoking an organism's propensity to propagate itself. The author-
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qua-originator pleads inefficacy and, finally, pretends to stand by and watches while his 
“literary device” takes on a life of its own.
The notes implode as much as they explode systematic borders upon themselves. 
Originality and flexibility— indeed, “free defraction”—can only be attained in a context 
where limits are present as forces against which freedom exerts: so writes Sartre of the 
necessity for strictures, or facticite, which “allows us to say that the For-itself [i.e. 
autonomous and free agent in the world] is or exists. The fact id le  o f freedom is that fact 
without which freedom is not able to be free” (631). Timothy Jacobs connects Wallace’s 
adherence to rules to Gerald Manley Hopkins’s license within strictness, which held that 
“literature produced without boundaries results in chaotic and solipsistic expression” 
(223). In keeping with this, Jacobs asserts, “Wallace . . . imposes on himself a mandate of 
aesthetic restraint in Infinite Jest that diminishes his presence as author and concomitantly 
'speaks’ to the reader's consciousness” (221).The application of a formal stricture, and 
the subsequent turn back upon itself, marks the convergence of structure and play that 
informs Georges Perec’s comments: “The system of constraint— and this is important— 
must be destroyed. It must not be rigid; there must be some play in it; it must ‘creak’ a 
bit: it must not be completely coherent” (Motte 70-71 ) f  Wallace’s invocation for a 
coalescence o f “free play” and “ordered systems” is indeed reminiscent o f the OuLiPo2 
mandate, which holds that the introduction of a constraint to the writing process gives rise 
to work that neither expresses a universal ordering principle nor the intended expression
1 Originally in “Entretien: Perec/Ew a Panlikowski.” L itteratures. 7. 1983.
2 Ouvroir de Litterature Potentielle (W orkshop o f  Potential Literature), a predom inantly French literary 
m ovem ent o f  the 1970s and 80s that included G eorges Perec, Raym ond Queneau, Italo Calvino and Harry 
Mathews.
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of a controlling artist; the emergent pattern will relate to the initial conditions set by the 
author, yes, but ultimately— autopoetically— it is sprung from the work itself.1
iv. Psychochaotics II
A membranous porosity subsists, muted, on other 
levels, and always threatens to break through.
Subjectification is the constitution, through 
interlocking passive and active syntheses on every 
stratum, of infoldings of various porosity.
- Brian Massumi, A Reader’s Guide to 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 80
The structural recursion at play in Wallace’s writing is a means o f expressing his 
characters’ psychic disposition and development, through enacting states o f cognitive 
distortion, acceleration, and entropy. The correlations between structural and 
behavioral/mental process are mutually reflective: a narrative pattern may be wrought 
according to the psychological mechanics it describes, or a character's thoughts can 
correspond to the systems and conditions wherein they exist or took shape. This psycho- 
structural dynamic implies less a simple determinism than a reiteration of patterns which 
permeate ontological domains of character, text, and world alike—reiteration, with its 
provisions for similarity and flux, and not direct repetition.
The apotheosis of structural and psychological intercalation in Wallace’s oeuvre 
is, perhaps, “The Depressed Person.” I have discussed how the endnotes in Infinite Jest 
influence the narrative mechanics of the novel as a whole, but in “The Depressed Person'’
1 An exem plary work is G eorges Perec’s La Vie, m ode de I'em plo i (1978 ), w herein an artist regulates his 
life around an (arbitrary, m athem atically-delineated) regim ent o f  production w hich is, in turn, reflected in 
the structure o f  Perec’s encom passing novel; also, Perec’s lipogram , La D isparition  (1969), 300 pages 
without the letter E.; and, for an American follow er, see W alter A bish, A lph abetica l A frica  (1974).
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similar structures are used to reflect chiefly psychological processes. In this short story, 
footnotes encroach upon the text proper like an exponentially growing colony of bacteria, 
or a thriving parasite, to the point where several pages of the story consist of more than 
eighty-percent footnotes. The incrementally increasing footnotes enact the depressed 
person’s insatiable and escalating dependency on others, her “neediness.” One cursory 
reading conveys the (somewhat nauseating) cognitive and emotional spirals that 
characterize the experiences of a particular “depressed person” who is ensconced in an 
endless spiral of advancement and regression in dealing with her melancholic ailment. 
Evidently, the prolonged irresolution is not only hers to endure: her friends, therapist and, 
indeed, we readers become implicated in its cycles to the point where the continuation 
and enlargement of the patient/subject's depression is the only certainty offered by the 
text. Even the therapist, whose death means (among other things) extrication from the 
depressed person’s plight, is ultimately co-opted by the reigning grief as her former 
patient fixates on her own misfortune of the therapist’s death. The footnotes are textual 
expressions of the depressed person’s dependence upon the reception of others 
(contingent, like paratext itself). No thing is independent, but rather all becomes 
embroiled in the depressed person’s lamentable (and lamenting) cognitive system. It is, 
furthermore, distinctly a feedback system, which I discussed in my introduction with 
reference to Goertzl, who reminds us that the “complex dynamics” o f the psyche is “an 
autopoietic, self-organizing system” (311): “The symptoms maintain and produce the 
underlying problem, and the underlying problem maintains and produces the symptoms.” 
The narrative’s repetitive drone is intensified by the footnoted material, which extends the 
woman’s depression beyond the confines o f the text-gwa-story proper into attendant 
domains both textual and ontological. This narrative configuration or “seepage” attests to
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the “porousness*’ of the depressed person’s psychological “borders"— in effect, it is a 
textual staging of psychochaotic recursion.
Depression and psychotherapy (and its attendant psychotropic medications) are
recurring motifs in Wallace’s fiction1. Near the beginning of Infinite Jest, a nameless
figure describes despair:
I am coming to see that the sensation of the worst nightmares, a sensation that
can be felt asleep or awake, is identical to those worst dreams’ form itself: the
sudden intra-dream realization that the nightmares’ very essence and center 
•allhas been with you^along, even when awake: it’s just been overlooked. (61) 
This deep and insidious pain is present in so many characters in the novel that, at one 
point or another, attempt to articulate or act upon the distress they experience. Kate 
Gompert tells her attending physician, “it’s more like horror than sadness . . . Lurid is the 
word. . . everything sounds harsh, spiny and harsh-sounding like every sound you hear all 
of a sudden has teeth” (73); James Incandenza cannot face the “psychic pain” (695) and 
fashions a microwave within which he can “nuke” his head; the “moribund” Marathe 
(read: Marat) feels “chained in a cage of the self, from the pain” (777); Ken Erdedy 
“understood on an intuitive level why people kill themselves” (651) and feels “total 
psychic horror: death, decay, dissolution, cold, empty black malevolent lonely space” 
(650); Orin wakes from dreams “soaked, fetally curled, entombed in that kind of psychic 
darkness where you're dreading whatever you think o f ’ (42). Counterpointing the chorus
1 A few  out o f  many possib le exam ples: “Good Old N eon” in O blivion  is narrated from the perspective o f  a 
suicidal “yuppie w ho cannot love” w ho undergoes psychotherapy in hopes o f  becom ing less “fraudulent” a 
human being; in “My A ppearance” in G irl With Curious H a ir , a celebrity named Edilyn pops Xanax to 
alleviate the psychic stress associated with her appearance on David Letterman; “O ctet,” in B rie f  Interview s 
With H ideous M en , includes a three-page footnote detailing the developm ent o f  “a post-Prozac” 
antidepressant which “com pletely w ipes out every last trace o f  dysphoria/anhedonia/agoraphobia/O C D/ 
existential despair” (148); and the sam e collection includes “ Suicide as a Sort o f  Present” (the title speaks 
for itself).
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of despairing, alienated figures are the ineffectual would-be therapists: the doctor who 
cannot understand Kate's depression, Enfield's overly-academicized Dr. Rusk, the grief 
counselor whom Hal tricks into “therapeutic approval" by using the accepted language of 
the industry, and the (marginally more successful) cultish brainwash doctrinaires of 
Alcoholics Anonymous. In her essay on the carnivalesque and Infinite Jest, Catherine 
Nichols holds that “By depicting the ubiquity of depression. Wallace creates a context for 
viewing social reality rather than an individual mental state as the source of despair" (8). 
Patients, therapists and, indeed, drug providers (both illicit and pharmaceutical) constitute 
a psychic economy where, because pain is addressed on a case-by-case basis, the 
fundamentally social character of depression is evaded and “overlooked."
Psychic unrest in its various forms, as represented in W allace's writing, often 
emerges from particular recursive patterns within families and between generations. Such 
patterns may well be, as Nichols maintains, the “requisite pain of existence” (8). Indeed, 
the fixations and dysphoria experienced by many characters in W allace's fiction are 
related in some fashion to a specific traumatic incident or behavioral trait involving a 
parent. As previous chapters have detailed, filial relations and their psychic repercussions 
remain of critical interest to many, usually male, writers in the postmodern period: 
Auster’s Moon Palace and The Invention o f  Solitude (1982) deal with the concealment 
and emergence of paternal history, while Mr. Vertigo (1994) and Timbuktu (1999) center 
upon an orphan child and an orphan dog, respectively; in DeLillo's Undeiworld, the 
target icon of the Lucky Strikes packet, for which Nick’s father ostensibly went when 
abandoning his family, surfaces in the “target” George Manza, the man Nick ultimately
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shoots and kills.1 Wallace's father-son formulations carry a similar psychoanalytical 
resonance, but they are even more explicit and directly acknowledged by both characters 
and narrators, as paternal behavior is reflected or negated, fractal-like, in the 
psychological composition of the son. In several stories, Wallace details at length the 
unraveling o f such traumas and traits, usually as they are played out by a father and a son. 
“On His Deathbed, Holding Your Hand, The Acclaimed Off-Broadway Playwright Begs 
a Boon” is a thirty-page diatribe by “THE FATHER” who (in a kind of deathbed 
confessional) bewails the sheer fact of his son’s existence: “I despised him. There is no 
other word. Often I was forced to avert my eyes from him, look away. Hide. I discovered 
why fathers hold the evening papers as they do’’ (261). In “Signifying Nothing”
(pointedly invoking Hamlet's filial disillusionment), a son recalls the long-repressed 
memory of his father exposing his genitals, as if “the dick was a fist and he was putting it 
in my face and daring me to say anything” (76); now a decade since the incident (which 
the father will not acknowledge) and after a year of voluntary estrangement, the son 
makes a comment at the dinner table regarding his dislike for chicken and the father 
“drew one o f his fists back jokingly, and said, “Get the fuck out of here” (81). The act of 
aggression is seen as an allusion to the primal scene in which the genital/fist was exposed. 
In “The Girl With the Curious Hair,” a father’s sinister mode of punishment (he burns his 
son’s penis) is played out down the line in the son’s sociopathic proclivity for burning 
those who fellate him. Known as Sick Puppy to his punk rock comrades, the speaker tells 
of his father, “one of the highest ranking individuals of the Unite States Marine Corps” 
(61) and brother, a Marine Lieutenant, who “has the honor of serving as the carrier of the 
Black Box of nuclear codes for the President of the United States.'’
1 See also, for exam ple, Donald BarthelM e-’s The D e a d  F ather (1975), Curtis W hite’s M em ories o f  M y 
Father W atching TV  (1998) and Richard Ford‘s Independence D ay  (1995).
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While characters in Wallace’s short fiction— his “Hideous Men’' and anhedonic 
women— reveal their traumatic kernels unconsciously through Browningesque 
monologues, characters in Infinite Jest are all-too-aware of the recursive systems they 
inhabit. In Mario’s Tennis and the Feral Prodigy, an “instructional” cartridge he 
produced three years after his father's death, Hal, the narrator, recommends:
Have a father whose own father lost what [talent] was there. Have a father 
who lived up to his own promise and then found thing after thing to meet and 
surpass the expectations of his promise in, and didn’t seem just a whole hell 
of a lot happier and tighter wrapped than his failed father, leaving you 
yourself in a kind of feral and flux-ridden state with respect to talent. (173) 
Amidst the litany of athletic and technical advice (“This is how to hold the stick”; “This 
type of stress prevents the groin-pull”), appears the above reference to varieties of 
“talent” in a prodigy’s paternal history. The seemingly unusable piece of didacticism 
indicates that, for the Incandenza brothers, a father’s psychology and behavior is as 
systematic a structure as any other kind of knowledge or determinism. It is analogously 
“given,” part of (to reiterate Nichols) “the requisite pain of existence” (8). And, 
completing the loop, just as soon as paternal conditions are directly expressed, they are 
directly and consciously repressed: “Here is how to avoid thinking about any of this by 
practicing and playing until everything runs on autopilot'’ (173).
The perennial cycle of paternal “idiosyncrasy” and its impact upon offspring is 
pithily parodied in a specific episode: A pre-teen Hal visits a “conversationalist,” saying 
“All I know is my dad said to come here” (27). Once the alleged conversationalist's 
moustache begins to sag and his argyle sweater is recognized, Hal sees that he is in fact 
conversing with his father, “Himself,” in disguise. Ignoring Hal’s swift protests, James
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laments how his father’s newspaper was like a “room's fifth wall," and how he “after all 
this light and noise now has apparently spawned the same silence” (31). The next thing 
James knows, Hal has disappeared and the father is left repeatedly calling “Son?'’ to yet 
another in the line of silent Incandenzas. The scene recalls a snake eating its tail. The 
father tricks his son into a conversation, begins to converse about the dearth of 
conversation, and the son promptly desists conversing.
Hal’s extremely polarized linguistic abilities become chronologically jumbled in 
the narrative. A “lexical prodigy” (29), the pre-teen Hal reads and can recite from 
memory whole sections of the OED. At the age of ten, when called in to see the 
“conversationalist,” Hal deploys language precisely but sparingly. When placed in 
therapy after his father’s suicide, Hal resorts to learning the grief counsellor's lingo in 
order to perform the speech acts required to get him out of therapy . He actually goes to 
the library and sifts through grief-counselling manuals and text books in order to learn the 
industry vocabulary and, subsequently, proceeds to strategically apply these words during 
his sessions with the therapist: “I went in there and presented with anger at the grief 
therapist ... I was subtly inserting loaded professional-grief-therapy terms like validate, 
process as a transitive verb, and toxic guilt. These were library derived” (255). But 
mimicking, and thereby circumventing the language system, does not mean that the 
communicative problem is resolved. Rather, emulation o f another’s “language game” is 
merely another step toward the utter non-viability of expression. The opening section of 
the novel, however, depicts a Hal with an entirely different expressive mode. He is 
eighteen, applying for college entrance, and undergoing interrogation regarding his 
suspiciously sophisticated application essays. Silent, Hal mentally evaluates the 
committee members’ diction: “I presume it’s probably facilitate that the tennis coach took
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for accentuate, though accelerate, while clunkier than facilitate, is from a phonetic 
perspective more sensible, as a mistake" (6). In another version o f therapeutic language 
games. Hal, the 'lexical prodigy,” when placed in therapy after his father’s suicide, 
resorts to learning the grief counselor's lingo in order to perform the speech acts required 
to get him out of therapy.1 He actually goes to the library and sifts through grief 
counseling manuals and text books in order to leam the industry vocabulary and, 
subsequently, proceeds to apply these words during his sessions with the therapist: “I 
went in there and presented with anger at the grief therapist. . .  I was subtly inserting 
loaded professional-grief-therapy terms like validate, process as a transitive verb, and 
toxic guilt. These were library derived'’ (255). But mimicking, and thereby circumventing 
the language system does not mean that the communicative problem as been resolved. 
Rather, imitating another person’s language game in order to hasten the end o f a 
conversation is merely another form of de-validating language. Hal may read the OED 
and spend prolonged periods in libraries, but ultimately the thoughts and sentiments can 
be neither translated nor transmitted to other people. This predicament culminates in the 
final catastrophe (the first scene narrated), which I discussed earlier, where H al's 
“speech” comes across to those present as a “strangled series of bleats” (14). When it 
becomes imperative that he speak, however, Hal’s “utterances'’ come across as 
“sw&animalistic noises and sounds” (14). While, in his own mind, he is “speaking slowly 
and distinctly” (10), the committee members tackle and restrain him as if  he were having 
a seizure or a psychotic break. They compare his behavior to a “time-lapse, a flutter of
1 The phenomenon o f  the manipulative patient recurs in “G ood Old N eo n ,” though in this case the patient’s 
fraud in analysis— “fencing and general show ing o f f ’ (116 )— is m otivated by a desire to “make sure [the 
therapist think o f  him] as smart and aware” (108). The assum ptions o f  analysis are further com prom ised  
when the patient, convinced o f  his analytic superiority, speculates that the doctor’s continual touching o f  his 
mustache sign ifies that he is a “deeply repressed hom osexual or androgyne” (13 0 ) and that his colon cancer 
sym bolically infers “that the open acknow ledgem ent o f  it w ould  equal d isease and lethality” (124).
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some awful . . . growth’’ and “A goat, drowning in something viscous’’ (14). Hal tries to 
communicate, “slowly to the floor, T m  in here.... I am not what you see and hear’” (13). 
I cannot make myself understood. “I am not just a jock”, I say slowly. 
Distinctly . . . .  “My application's not bought", I am telling them, calling into 
the darkness of the red cave that opens before closed eyes. “I am not just a 
boy who plays tennis. I have an intricate history. Experiences and feelings. 
I’m complex. . . .  I’m not a machine. I feel and believe and have opinions. 
Some of them are interesting. . . .  I could interface you right under the table”. 
( 10- 11)
Hal’s assertions— as he “distinctly” remembers them to be— are, for the others present, 
a “strangled series of bleats” (14), no more comprehensible, one would surmise, than the 
“clack clack bedrack” of Auster’s Peter Stillman, Jr.; “‘What in God’s name are those . . . 
one Dean cries shrilly . . . those soundsT '\\2). Cognitively, Hal’s linguistic abilities are 
intact—they are, perhaps, too lucid, as he calmly wonders “why U.S. restrooms always 
appear to us as infirmaries for public distress,” while he is “being rolled over supine on 
the geometric tile” (13). But that which is “seen and heard” bears no relation to Hal’s 
inner experience and is met with “eyebrows high on trembling foreheads” (12) and, 
finally, prompts physical intervention as he is dragged off and pinned to the bathroom 
floor.
The “time-lapse . . . growth” comment may well be accurate, though, if not on the 
level of physical resemblance then as a means of understanding the recursive nature of 
Hal’s behavior. As his fit begins to take hold, he says (or thinks he says) to the 
committee, “[cjall it something I ate” (12). Suddenly, time lapses and the narrative cuts to 
a recollection when, as an infant, Hal terrified his mother by eating some moss. Hal’s
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reference to “something [he] ate" suggests a kinship between his “marginally 
mammalian” attack and the panic that had then overwhelmed his mother. But further, the 
memory is an instance when Hal's father was absent at a moment of danger. At the 
college interview, chaperoned by his uncle, Hal is again devoid o f a father— James, once 
more unavailable after having put his head in the microwave, a place, ironically, usually 
reserved for something one eats. Hal's cognitive agility-then-incapacity is a kind of 
skewed mirror, or an emergent fractal, of his parent’s extremely adept expressiveness 
(film and linguistics being the professional domains of James and Avril respectively) but 
fundamental inability to communicate. Joelle calls James “a brilliant optician and 
technician who was an amateur at any kind of real communication” (742), while Orin 
finds James “[so blank] andiVretrievably hidden that [he]y come to see him as like 
autistic, almost catatonic” (737). Indeed, James’s own communicative glitches seem to 
stem from his own filial circumstances. This connection is supported by James’s essay, 
“Awakening my Interest in Annular Systems,” which, in the first twelve pages, describes 
how his father would vex over James’s parent’s squeaky Simmons Beauty Rest mattress 
before the essay approached anything close to the point: its final two paragraphs recall 
how, when sw^an-diving onto his own bed, the young James dislodges a doorknob and, as 
it rolls on the floor, notices “the cycloid’s standard parametric equations were no longer 
apposite, those equation's trigonometric expressions here becoming themselves first- 
order differential equations” (502). Before he can rationalize any mention of his original 
scientific discovery, James is compelled to provide pages and pages of his father's 
commentary surrounding the maintenance of a bed.
Avril is comparably adroit in the technical practice o f language, but her 
mobilization of these linguistic talents thwarts rather than encourages communication.
182
She is, according to her sons, an “insane” (1038) “agoraphobic workaholic and obsessive 
compulsive” (42); in his interview with Moment, Orin enumerates Avril’s “accredited 
reports and structuring both quadrivium and trivium three years ahead of time at the start 
of every year,” her “prescriptive linguistics books that come out every thirty-six months 
so you could set your watch by them,” her grammatical conferences and conventions 
where she appears “videophonically,” and her obsessive involvement with the Militant 
Grammarians of Massachusetts who spend their time getting “Ten Items or Less” signs at 
express check-outs changed to “fewer” (1039). When Mario comes to her with concerns 
about “someone who is sad” (presumably his brother Hal), Avril responds by writing the 
words disassociation, engulfment, suppression and “not-equal-to repression’' on a Post-It 
note and “making herself not look at her watch” (767). Avril is, like her coffee mug 
advertises, “A WOMAN OUTSTANDING IN HER FIELD,” but she is also as solipsistic 
as the cup’s image of a solitary woman standing in an empty field. She seems to support 
her children unconditionally, but they are ever aware that her experience o f them is 
merely a narcissistic reflection of her own ambition to be outstanding in the field of 
motherhood as well. Orin, who no longer has any contact with Avril, laments the 
insidious way in which she controls his brothers:
She’s got to keep Hal’s skull lashed tight to hers without being so overt about 
it that Hallie has any idea about what’s going on. To keep him from trying to 
pull his skull away. The kid's still obsessed with her approval. He lives for 
applause from exactly two hands. . . . Plus the Moms has to obsess about 
Mario . . . and worship Mario and think Mario’s some kind o f secular martyr 
to the mess she’s made of her adult life. (1040)
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But rather than instilling in her children a sense of security, Avril's overzealous but 
essentially performative maternal devotion makes them feel all-the-more alienated. Hal 
knows that “his Moms Avril hears her own echoes inside him and thinks what she hears 
is him, and this make Hal feel the one thing he feels to the limit these days: he is lonely" 
(694).
Orin's disownment of Avril may provide a practical evasion o f her “smothering" 
ways, but it does not prevent her obsessive and narcissistic proclivities from conditioning 
his thoughts and behaviors. Orin catches himself stuck in one of Avril’s preoccupations: 
“Jesus I’m thinking usage again” (1038). And inasmuch as Orin sees Hal’s “skull lashed 
tight to hers,” he himself—albeit unconsciously—feels similarly trapped by the Moms. In 
a dream of a competitive tennis situation, where he closes his eyes to the bright sunlight, 
[Orin] struggles up from this kind of visual suffocation to find his mother’s 
head, Mrs. Avril M. T. Incandenza, the Mom’s disconnected head attached 
face-to-face with his own fine head, strapped tight to his face somehow by a 
wrap-around system of VS HiPro top-shelf lamb-gut string from his Academy 
racquet’s own face. So that no matter how frantically Orin tries to move his 
head or shake it side to side or twist or roll his eyes he’s still staring at, into, 
and somehow through his mother’s face. As if the M om's face were some sort 
of overtight helmet Orin can’t wrestle his way out of. (46)
Orin wakes to find a note from the woman he just slept with, indicating that during the 
night he had “clutched her head in both hands and tried to sort of stiff-arm her” (47).
Thus beyond this deep-seeded psychic “suffocation,” the compulsion to extricate himself 
from a smothering female is enacted in Orin’s relations with women, or, as he calls his 
romantic partners “Subjects” (566). Orin’s “intimacies'’ are entirely devoid of intimacy,
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constructed to remove any trace of subjectivity from his mate, so that he is “both offense 
and defense, she neither” (566).
v. Mediated fractals
Just as the ringing telephone in City o f Glass regulates behavior and, as a catalyst for 
narrative and ontological bifurcation, ignites a series of recursions, technological devices 
in Wallace’s text give rise to fractals and loops that assume momentum on psychological, 
social and physical levels. Rather than the one element o f Auster’s austere allegory, 
Wallace presents a veritable catalogue of such devices that at once “please” and control 
the subject—mediating technologies that function together in the Bakhtinian tradition of 
heteroglo, ssia and polyphony: newspaper clippings, puppet show scripts, bibliographic 
references, mathematical formulae, political meeting minutes, letters, emails, dialogue, 
television transcripts, film, and memories combine and play off one another to create a 
chaotic web of information. For instance, a microwave (the quintessential time-saving 
device) becomes James Incandenza’s deathtrap of choice and as such sets in motion Hal’s 
deterioration to “marginally mammalian” bleating. Video-recordings of repetitive tennis 
plays may help students learn and develop their skills— “it’s easier to fix something if 
you can see it” (55)— but the repeated screening of “Infinite Jest”— itself a repetitive 
assault by a sinister, apologetic mother—has a viewer expire in his/her own excrement. 
Time itself becomes another site where control and commodity are conflated; “subsidized 
time” (391) means that years are sponsored by and assume the names of commercial 
technologies like the Whisper-Quiet Maytag Dishwasher, the Tucks Medicated Pad, and
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the Depend Adult Undergarment. Like the many other devices and concoctions in Infinite 
Jest, they become recursive facilitators, mechanisms through which the expelled returns.
The lethally pleasurable video cartridge is a version o f Auster’s irresistible 
telephone developed to an extreme— it is entertainment so “perfectly tailored to the 
subject's psychology that no one can escape its fatal ecstasy'’ (Hayles “Illusion of 
Autonomy” 684). Whereas Quinn's telephone serves as the inaugural instrument for his 
chaotic fracturing, the cartridge “Infinite Jest" is a “virtual environment'’ and a “predatory 
practice” that binds together “‘enraptured consumers’ with recursive cycles to create a 
complex system that is spinning out o f control toward a socio-ecological catastrophe of 
unprecedented scope” (Hayles 684). The first reference to the heinous cartridge, 
appropriately, describes the observer rigging the tape to play in a “recursive loop” (87), 
ensuring that, with each successive repetition, the death toll o f unsuspecting viewers will 
proportionally rise. The irresistible loops of “Infinite Jest” make explicit an inherently 
regimented televisual culture in general, which conceives itself as “free” because it can 
surf channels at seeming whimsy, but is actually confined to the fixed parameters of 
television (or, in the novel, InterLace TelEntertainment’s Big Four)— the medium, the 
program and the advertisement. Thus the “Infinite jest” viewing experience enacts the 
“detrimental effects of technology-based media reconfigurations on a televisual culture 
when those reconfigurations are undertaken solely to satisfy market dictates” (Kaufman 
1), implicitly condemning corporate media outlets for producing a subject who becomes 
progressively more uncritical in its responses to an increasingly sophisticated corporate- 
controlled televisual culture.
Mediating devices, though, inasmuch as they may generate turbulence, may also 
be actively (but perhaps not consciously) mobilized by subjects within recursive systems
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toward the ordering of mysterious and chaotic phenomena. For Quinn, a single pen and 
notebook facilitate the pictographic representations that provide some means of 
understanding old Stillman’s peculiar routes through Manhattan; for Mario, the camera 
and the visual image of film offer a similar means of comprehending his perplexing father 
and a complex political regime, each of which are characterized by the expulsion of toxic 
material. Mario’s first “halfway-coherent film cartridge . . . consists o f a film of a puppet 
show’' (380) and depicts politicians bandying about phrases like, “I happen to have my 
Term-In-Office-At-A-Glance book right here” (386) and “You have gorgeous souls” 
(384). The distinctly artificial and arcane quality of puppets, in addition to the heightened 
manner in which President Gentle and his group relate to each other, suggests the 
essentially parodic aspect of Mario’s film. Further, as Quinn's method of record is 
influenced by Stillman Sr.’s spatio-linguistic preoccupations, so too do M ario’s films 
share the allegorical veneer of those of his father; Mario’s is an “openly jejune version of 
his late father’s take on the rise of O.N.A.N and U.S. Experialism” (385). The similarities 
are formal as well, as Mario uses “his late father’s parodic device o f mixing real and fake 
news-summary cartridges, magazine articles, and historical headers from the last few 
great daily papers'’ (391).
Film becomes the chosen method of “emplotment” for the Incandenza family. 
James Incandenza’s films, which are periodically described in detail, are fractals, 
microcosmic reiterations, as well as representations, of larger themes in both the 
filmmaker’s life and Infinite Jest at large: The Joke, “the most hated Incandenza film,” is 
a feedback loop where the audience sees “row after row of itself staring back at it with 
less and less expectant and more and more blank and then puzzled and then eventually 
pissed-off facial expressions'’ (398); Medusa v. Odalisque depicts a staged battle between
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the two mythical (hologram) figures and spectators who, by the film’s “end;’ have all 
been transformed to either stone or gem, depending upon which combatant they gaze 
upon first. The interlocking cycles that inform the two films evoke the symbiosis and 
contagion that exists among the members of the Incandenza clan, with Himself supplying 
the generative “source.” Blood Sister: One Tough Nun (described in footnote 24,
“JAMES O. INCANDENZA: A FILMOGRAPHY,” as a “parody of revenge/recidivism 
action genre, a formerly delinquent nun's failure to reform a juvenile delinquent leads to a 
rampage of recidivist revenge”) conveys the fallacy o f supposed “salvation” from the ills 
of drug addiction and a sordid lifestyle. Rumbles and drug deals on church turf are proof 
positive that certain “saved” nuns remain corrupt. The film, footnote 289 states, is “a 
veiled allegory of sponsorship and James’s own miserable distaste for the vacant grins 
and reductive platitudes of Boston AA that M.D.s and counselors kept referring him to” 
(1053).1 Blood Sister points to the inevitability o f one’s own nature—to the belief that 
behavior is ingrained, hard-wired, and that no amount of creed-elocution and affable 
shoulder-punching is going to change a person’s fundamental character. Hal, “the only 
person in the room who isn't 100% absorbed” (704), finds the deterministic vein of Blood 
Sister simple testimony of his father’s resistance to change.
However, James Incandenza’s Wave Bye-Bye to the Bureaucrat, (in the same 
footnoted “FILMOGRAPHY,” described as a “Possible parody/homage to B.S. public- 
service-announcement cycle of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, a harried commuter is 
mistaken for Christ by a child he knocks over”) depicts a man replaci ^ frenzied 
preoccupation with philanthropy. Compared to the irreversible trends of Blood Sister,
1 This may be read in light o f  Christian M etz's formulation o f  film  as analogous to daydream— “It is a rich, 
and disparate, analogy between film  and dream, film  and fantasy, film  and docum ent— and one that makes 
its call on psychoanalysis as a very modern form o f  dream interpretation, a therapy w hich is going to put 
fantasy at the heart o f  being and reality” (Lebeau 4).
Bureaucrat offers a less pessimistic view of personality— one in which there is room for 
development and change. In the film, a random power failure jeopardizes the bureaucrat's 
last chance to get to work on time. The man speeds, smacks into a child at the train 
station, and misses his crucial train. Though highly mechanistic in its delineation of the 
acts and happenings that lead up to the ultimate disaster o f the missed train, the final 
moment contains a morally sentimental gesture: the bureaucrat “watches the train pull out 
. . . [and] straightens the kid's bow-tie, kneeling down the way adults do when they're 
ministering to a child, and tells him he's sorry about the impact" (688-9). As plot, 
Bureaucrat illustrates James’s (read: Himself s) self-absorption, but with a fantastical, 
altruistic addition: the bureaucrat sacrifices his “ontological security" and chooses child 
over job. As if recognizing the gravity of this sacrifice, the kid asks the bureaucrat, “Are 
you Jesus?” (689). The film is the favourite of both Hal and Mario, “possibly because of 
its unhip earnestness" (689). Hal likes to “project himself imaginatively into the ex­
bureaucrat’s character on the leisurely drive home toward ontological erasure" (689)— the 
“h im self here serving doubly as a reference to Himself, the aloof father who, by all 
accounts, would have lunged forth onto the ontologically-affirming train.
The recursive patterns perpetuated by visual media are further played out in the 
linguistic domain. As much as language in the novel exhibits a Bakhtirfclialogism, it also 
presents the problems that occur when disparate communicative modes converge. Bakhtin 
posits that in a narrative “each character’s speech forms his own belief system" 
(“Discourse in the Novel” 315), but as Derrida would have it, while these “belief 
systems" may (under optimal conditions) be delineated through language, their 
interpretations seldom align. As it is with interpretations o f language, so is it with 
interpretations o f other individuals and the self. In Infinite Jest, characters cannot
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understand each other, because each one has his or her own lexicon and employs 
language in a different way; many kinds of paroles— Quebecois, English, Ebonics, ESL 
(coach Schtitt), silence, animal noises, erudition, street and technological jargon, internal 
language— and their varying contexts make for a heterogeneous conglomeration of 
individual speech and multiple narratives, rather than a coherent communicative space. 
Further confusion is caused by the fact that words don't necessarily correspond to what 
they mean; Hal's verbal breakdown, for example, denies any Saussurean relationship 
between the signified and the signifier. In Infinite Jest meaning is conferred less through 
language than through context, the ways and places in which words are actually used.
Call Michael Pemulis and ask “Is Bob Hope in town?'’ and you are asking to buy drugs. 
When Joelle refers to herself as “hideously deformed,” she is saying that she is 
impossibly beautiful. Language, like tennis, is a game and its rules fluctuate depending on 
where and when the game is played. The final complication (a problem that concludes 
Tractatus Logico-Philosopfncv$)is that there are things outside language that exist but 
cannot be named—metaphysical concepts connected to ethics and values— which do not 
correspond to anything in the corporeal world. “What we cannot speak about,” 
Wittgenstein determines in the Tractatus, “we must pass over in silence” (74). Thus, the 
remarkable indeterminacies (textual, linguistic, ontological) o f Infinite Jest: formal 
coherence in the novel not only goes against Wallace's attempt to represent “the real,” but 
it also constitutes a philosophical impossibility.
Language as a medium, then, is represented as the most turbulent and chaotic of 
communication technologies because, as Marshall McLuhan maintains, in the “spoken 
rather than the written arena of experience . . . audience participation is created. The 
spoken word involves all senses dramatically” (84). “Participation” entails
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misunderstanding. James's films—themselves unfathomable artifacts— often play out 
such misunderstandings: in his Cage II, “[s]adistic penal authorities place a blind convict 
(Watt) and a deaf-mute (Leith) together in ‘solitary confinement,' and the two men 
attempt to communicate with one another” (987). Communicative fissures are all-too-real 
for Kate Gompert, who endures a conspicuously disconnected interview with an attending 
emergency physician. After listing the pills that Kate had taken in her suicide attempt, the 
doctor says: “You must really have wanted to hurt yourself' (70). Kate, after much 
circumlocution and some attempts at dark irony responds,
I wasn't trying to hurt myself. I was trying to kill myself. There's a 
difference. . . . [It's like] every cell and every atom and every brain-cell or 
whatever was so nauseous it wanted to throw up, but it couldn't and you felt 
that way all the time. . . . Part o f the feeling is being like willing to do 
anything to make it go away. Understand that. Anything. Do you understand? 
It’s not wanting to hurt myself, it's wanting not to hurt (70-78)
At one point during Kate's description of her mental state, the doctor writes down 
“something much too brief to correspond directly to what she'd said” (74); the doctor, 
perhaps, condenses her description into medical shorthand, the name o f a syndrome or 
condition which, broadly speaking, might encompass the symptoms with which she 
presents. His thoughts about Kate's remarks are chillingly at odds with her manner of 
expression:
He couldn't keep himself from trying to determine whether the ambient blank 
insincerity the patient seemed to project during what appeared, clinically, to 
bejsignificant gamble and move toward trust and self-revealing was in fact 
projected by the patient or was somehow counter-transferred or projected
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over the critical therapeutic possibilities her revelation of concern over drug 
use might represent. (78)
The doctor metabolizes his patient’s description through a set of psychoanalytic 
principles in order to put her condition into a linguistic and conceptual format he can 
recognize. But this reformulation of her speech distorts its meaning, rendering it as 
neutral as a crossword puzzle. Where Kate puts as plainly as possible the reason for her 
suicide attempt (“not to hurt”), the doctor thinks in terms of “ambient blank insincerity” 
and counter-transference.” Such disparities highlight the discontinuity between scientific, 
technical training and lived experience. Doctor and patient use the same “language” 
(English) but their respective milieus and subject-positions make dialogue impossible. 
Finally, realizing that the discussion is going nowhere, Kate begs for shock therapy, the 
only thing she can hope might relieve her depression.
Though linguistic division between individuals and the resultant turbulence are, 
scenes I have mentioned make explicit, inherent properties o f the medium, certain 
communicative contexts are designed toward the “ordering” o f language and, 
concomitantly, ideation. The linguistic tenets of Alcoholics Anonymous are used to 
streamline diversity of thought among drug users, “teaching them fairly deep things 
through these seemingly simplistic sayings” (Miller n.p.). After venting his or her often 
horrific personal history (and, often, rationalizations for addiction) in confessional 
monologues, the alcoholic is armed with a set of phrases and expressions to replace the 
blameful and dis-empowering logic that, according to AA subscribers, merely perpetuates 
addiction. Residents of Ennet House learn that “Denial ain’t just a river in Egypt;” they 
are told to repeat “I didn’t know that I didn’t know;” and they are advised, “One day at a 
time,” and “Ask for Help” (678). Similar kinds o f mantras echo throughout Enfield
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Tennis Academy: “Don't Think Just See Don't Know Just Flow" (110). Brooks 
Daverman sees the AA slogans (and, one might add, the sayings at E.T.A.) as “master 
narratives that make fragmented subjects coherent" (3) “These shared narrative 
conventions," Daverman continues, “also eliminate conceptual and stylistic differences 
between members that might block communication.” Geoffrey Day, one of the 
“rehabilitated" in Infinite Jest explains how the simplicity works:
I used sometimes to think. I used to think in long compound sentences with 
subordinate clauses and even the odd polysyllable. Now I find I needn't. Now 
I live by the dictates of macrame samples ordered from the back-page ad of 
an old Reader's Digest or Saturday Evening Post. Easy does it. Remember to 
remember. But for the grace of capital-g God. . . .  I walk around with my 
arms stretched out in front of me and recite these cliches. (271)
Just as the tennis players “disappear into the loop” (110) of their internal, institutionally- 
sanctioned chants, so does the alcoholic, zombified, become subsumed by the drone of 
AA dogma.
Infinite Jest the novel is, of course, the outermost layer o f mediation, its 
techniques functioning inAsame manner as the diverse media it describes. The 
discontinuities of cinema and television are reproduced in the novel’s multi-textured 
composition, wherein perspectival, temporal and spatial changes are as erratic as cross­
cutting and commercial breaks. Wallace employs the “technology" o f intertext; most 
obvious are the allusions to Hamlet, which supplies the novel’s title [“Alas, poor Yorick.
I knew him Horatio— a fellow of infinite jest, of most excellent fancy (5.1.71)] and
archetypes for several of Wallace’s characters: the implication of incest between Avril 
and Tavis and Tavis’ usurpation of the late James’s role at the academy are analogous to
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the union of Gertrude and Claudius; Hal's solipsism and verbal preoccupations hearken 
back to Hamlet’s obsession with “words, words, words;” Gately's dream in which he 
picks up Himself s head corresponds to Hamlet’s handling of Yorick's skull; and Hal's 
essay, “The Emergence of Heroic Stasis in Broadcast Entertainment" (7) discusses a 
Hamletesque hero of inaction. References to Hamlet make sense because, in addition to 
confronting the limitations of linguistic acts, Shakespeare's play dramatizes the snares of 
psychological recursion and cognitive feedback that become, to quote Guattari, “refrains 
of fixation, reification, tenacious fidelity to pain or unhappiness” (Chaosmosis 75).1
Infinite Jest manages to achieve all this and still be extremely funny, providing the 
“euphoria” of the so-called pleasureful text. The humour, however, is predominantly 
ironic: for example, in James Incandenza’s film. The Joke, is a “parody of Hollis 
Frampton’s ‘audience-specific events’, where two EC-35 video cameras in theater record 
the film’s audience and project the resultant raster onto screen— the theater audience 
watching itself watch itself get the ‘joke’ and become increasingly self-conscious and 
uncomfortable and hostile” (991). Like the audience of The Joke, readers of Infinite Jest 
soon recognize that the filial, social and political circumstances in the novel are actually 
lightly-veiled expressions of our own. We participate in its “infinite” cycles while 
fumbling between text and endnotes; we laugh at its many “jests”— the funniest parts are 
those which “manque de souplesse” (Bergeson 66). Thus, the ironic humour is also 
darkly sober, recalling Barthes’ “text of bliss,'’ “the text that imposes a state of loss, the 
text that discomforts (perhaps to the point of a certain boredom), unsettles the reader's
1 D eleuze and Guattari quote Henry Miller: “ [A]re w e born Ham lets? W ere you born  Hamlet? O r d id  you  
not ra ther create a  type o f  H am let in you rself!  Whether this be so or not, w hat seem s infinitely more 
important is— w hy rever t to the m yth? . .  . This ideational rubbish out o f  w hich our world has constructed its 
cultural ed ifice is now , by a critical irony, being given its poetic im m olation, its m ythos, through a  kind o f  
w riting  w hich , because it is o f  the disease and therefore beyond, clears the ground for fresh 
superstructures.” (A nti-O edipus  298)
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historical, cultural psychological assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, values, 
memories, brings to a crisis his relationship with language'’ (“Style and its Image*’ 14). 
Skeptical of simply negating “sanctioned themes,” Wallace’s work ridicules its way 
towards diagnosis and redemption.
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Chapter 4
Psychological Orders and Disorders 
in Mark Z. Danielewski’s House o f  Leaves
“ . . . Whenever I'm  in stress, the dream 
comes.”
“That's terrible.”
“No, it’s not,” he said. “Not very, anyway. We 
all have our bad dreams.” He gestured with a thumb at 
the silent, sleeping houses they were passing on 
Jointner Avenue. “Sometimes I wonder that the very 
boards of those houses don’t cry out with the awful 
things that happen in dreams.”
- Stephen King, Salem ’s Lot. 411
I say Mother. And my thoughts are of you, oh, House. 
House of the lovely dark summer of my childhood
- Czeslaw Milosz, “Melancholy,” 1913
Danielewski’s novel begins with an ominous anti-dedication: “This is not for you.” 
Immediately, we are dropped into a world of uncertainty, where neither the source nor the 
function of the novel— let alone the best means of apprehending it— can be simply 
ascertained. A monstrous, typographically diverse text, House o f  Leaves masquerades as 
an academic-cww-biographical report about a physically impossible “house,” whose 
shifting and seemingly infinite interior becomes a point of obsession for documentary 
filmmaker Will Navidson. The work, in part, consists o f the quasi-scholarly accounts of 
an old blind Los Angeleno man, Zampano, who spends decades cobbling together 
mountains of eclectic material related to Navidson and company’s incredible and tragic
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expeditions into the architectural depths. What compels Zampand to accumulate this 
material is not made precisely clear, but obsessive compulsive disorder, script-fetishism, 
existential vacancy, and the hovering sword of imminent mortality are all possible 
motivations for his unchecked accrual of data. These scraps and jottings are in turn 
elaborated upon by Johnny Truant, a down-and-out Gen-Xer and tattoo-parlor employee, 
who takes it upon himself to make sense of the late Zampand’s impressively disorganized 
and mysterious manuscript. A final narrative layer is supplied by Truant’s mother, 
Pelafina, who, incarcerated in a psychiatric institution, sends her son wildly inconsistent 
and/or encrypted letters lamenting their tragic family history and the horrors of her life at 
the hospital. The three narratives are clunkily integrated and appendicized by the book’s 
“Editors,” who advance the odd clarification or disclaimer via footnotes or subsidiary 
documents. House o f  Leaves, like the house it describes (where “leaves” are pages and 
“house” is book), is thus without narrative center or contextual foundation. As a result, 
the novel produces a kind of vertigo in its readers, who are at once enthralled by dramas 
attached to the unfathomable house, the Navidson family dynamics, and Truant’s difficult 
life, but are, at the same time, unsettled by the pervasive ambiguity between truth and 
invention and the apparent (possibly causal) link between the house’s physical 
indeterminacy and its inhabitants’ psychological troubles. In what follows, I identify 
some of the many pressures involved in Danielewski’s narrative chaotics, with particular 
emphasis on the psychological implications of this style o f storytelling. What emerges 
from the novel is a battle between an impulse to assign structure to otherwise unwieldy 
psychological processes— both within and between individuals— and concede to a 
psychic space that is inevitably overdetermined and amorphous. Chaos, with its intrinsic 
tension between order and disorder, provides the conceptual model for the expression of
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this psychological dynamic. Ever-vacillating between destructive and constructive drives 
and, indeed, giving rise to corresponding vacillation in its reader's experience, House o f 
Leaves exemplifies the “in-the-middle-ness” that Deleuze attributes to the most 
compelling and vital of literary machines. “Affective, intensive [and] anarchic” forces, 
writes Deleuze in Essays Clinical and Critical, belong to objects— aesthetic, textual, 
organic—which consist “solely of poles, zones, thresholds, and gradients” (131). House 
o f Leaves, with its variable textual and psychic architecture, may be considered one such 
object.
i. Composition and the absence o f  origin
The goal of literary work (of literature as work) is to 
make the reader not the consumer but the producer of 
text.
- Roland Barthes, S/Z, 4
In House o f  Leaves, that which is being constructed is simultaneously or periodically 
being destroyed. Textual production, as it is depicted in the novel, is perhaps the most 
pronounced and multifaceted site of this dialectical, often paradoxical, process. Self- 
reflexively undermining the solidity of the work itself, Danielewski presents a number of 
scenarios where writing— and, by extension, any meanings which an author would 
attempt to convey— exists indefinitely between form and formlessness, presence and 
absence. Text at once aspires to structure and flees from it, corroded by the ephemerality 
of its medium or the falsities, assumptions and incongruities in its substance.
As emanations from a subject or collection o f subjects, texts trace out processes 
both conscious and unconscious. In an interview with Sophie Cottrell, Danielewski likens
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the writing process to a dramatic event, where the text enacts and reveals the internal 
lives of the people (authors, narrators, characters) who produce them:
I like to look at House o f  Leaves as a three-character play: a blind old man, a 
young man, and a very special, extraordinarily gifted woman. The three of 
them are telling each other stories . . . and it's  easy not to see them. You get 
swept up in their narratives, in their images. But then . . . there are moments 
when you become aware of the actual person and realize all these things 
they're describing, the dialogue, the events, along with the gestures, even the 
hesitations, everything involved in all you're hearing— the errors, the 
repetitions, the energy—is in fact an intimate portrait o f themselves. (6) 
Storytelling thus becomes a barometer for operations in the mind— and it is writing's 
capacity to measure, chart and explore these operations that Danielewski exploits in his 
variegated novel. Using an array of rhetorical, generic and typographical strategies in 
order to create an environment that is overtly ‘'constructed,” Danielewski implies that not 
only is identity linguistically and semiotically constructed, but it is also variable and 
polysemic. His collage makes explicit Barthes’ view that “a text is not a line of words 
releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ of the Author-God) but a multi­
dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none o f them original, blend and clash” 
(146). This principle is hardly new: language is always a code. But in House o f  Leaves 
this code is itself encoded so that much of the text can be understood as a kind o f para- 
language, aiming to express what cannot be directly verbalized (whether for intellectual 
or emotional reasons). In one of the few critical articles written about House o f  Leaves, 
Hayles posits that “ [t]he relevant frame [in the novel] is no longer consciousness alone 
but consciousnesses fused with technologies of inscription” (785). Indeed, the various
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accounts are advanced in as many representational formats. There are Zampano’s 
incoherent fragments and pseudo-academic citations; there are shot-by-shot descriptions 
of Navidson’s documentary footage; there are poems, letters, distorted/inverted phrases, 
footnotes, drawings and medical reports. There are three fonts: Courier, Times, and 
Bookman.1 In one edition of the novel, the word house is printed in blue ink, minotaur in 
red, and some crossed out text in purple.2 Another edition contains Braille— which makes 
sense in view of Zampano’s lack of sight, but functions as yet another form of encryption 
for those of us not proficient in this particular font. Hayles is correct in connecting print 
technologies with discrete modes of perception (consciousnesses, minds, wills), but what 
must be considered are the effects of this blend (pace the Deleuzian imperative: How 
does the text work?).3 Most significantly, in terms of the present consideration of 
narrative and psychological indeterminacy, one finds that the novel renders normative 
epistemological strategies fruitless. On one hand, the structural and semiotic perversions 
and elliptical coding mean that plausible interpretations o f House o f  Leaves approach 
inexhaustibility. On the other hand, the conspicuous absence of author and origin stymies 
interpretation altogether.
In trying to understand the implications of epistemological ambiguity in House o f  
Leaves, it is useful to look at its generic relatives within the narrative tradition. While 
Danielewski’s is perhaps the most dense and ornate novel o f its kind, a textual resistance
1 The “m eanings” o f  such forms o f  coding in the text can be m ore or less oblique; as D anielew ski g losses, 
“Johnny Truant’s typeface is called Courier . . . because he is a courier o f  sorts” (W itterm aus n.p.).
2 The colouring o f  certain words is an allusion to cinem atography: “W hile D anielew sk i w ould not reveal his 
m otives for using blue for ‘hou se,’ he w as kind enough to offer that it has som ething to do with how  blue is 
used in film. K now ing this, it’s not much o f  a stretch to say that N a v id so n ’s h ouse acts as a psychological 
‘blue screen,’ m eaning those w ho enter the maze effectively  com e into an em pty structure on their own, 
with their psyches providing the background im ages and sound.” (W itterm aus n.p.)
3 “Reading,” D eleu ze  says, “ is never a scholarly exercise in search o f  w hat is signified , still less a highly  
textual exercise in search o f  a signifier. Rather, it is a productive use o f  the literary m achine . . . that 
extracts from the texts its revolutionary force” [E ssays C r itic a l a n d  C lin ica l (1993) 106].
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to typographical, formal and narratological coherence and order is not new. Importantly 
(in terms of the novel's general positioning within the genre o f horror),1 the use of 
multiple viewpoints and disparate sources of information is a prominent device in 
nineteenth-century gothic fiction, where, as Lyn Pykett says in her essay “Sensation and 
the Fantastic in the Victorian Novel,” “narrative complicatedness, manifested in the 
widespread use of layered, framed, and embedded narratives including journal extracts 
and other ostensible documentary records, [works to] create an illusion o f verisimilitude, 
disperse narrative authority and to disrupt narrative causality and problematize origins” 
(3). While the twice/thrice-removed narrative viewpoints in Wuthering Heights (1847) 
and Frankenstein (1818), for instance, encourage a degree o f skepticism and permit the 
reader “safe distance” from articulated threats, their manipulation o f pseudoscientific, 
historical and testimonial discourses imbues them with a chilling sense o f truth. House o f  
Leaves achieves a similar, dual tension through its several (less than mentally sound) 
narrators and multiple framing devices. But this perspectivism, as Deleuze says o f Henry 
James's novels, “is not a variation of truth according to the subject, but the condition in 
which the truth o f  variation appears to the subject” (The Fold  20; my emphasis). “Truth” 
may be variable depending on whose perspective is singled out, but truth also varies 
within each perspective and in the context of that which is being perceived. Every point 
of view is thus a point of view in flux. Zampand’s many “scholarly references” fluctuate 
in this way, turning out to be alternately fake, factual, facetious, internally contradictory, 
or some amalgam of the above. As with the narrator-^w^-parasite in Nabokov's Pale Fire,
1 Although, heightening the indeterminacy effected through textual and linguistic opacity, the novel is a 
generic mongrel; this elision  o f  categories is but one strategy in its general interrogation o f  normative 
perception. In this respect the novel, D anielew ski says, is “much like its subject, T h eN avidson  Record 
[which] is also uneasily contained— whether by category or lection. If finally catalogued as a gothic tale, 
contemporary urban folkmyth, or merely a ghost story, as som e have called it, the documentary w ill, sooner 
or later, slip the limits o f  any one o f  those genres” (Cottrell n.p.).
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Zampano blends fantasy and veracity to achieve the critical perspective that serves him 
best (though, unlike Nabokov's hero, whose analyses are means o f injecting himself into 
his textual object, Zampano's make obvious the inherent biases of scholarship and not 
narcissism as such). In the footnotes, authentic material is interspersed within (and is 
sometimes indecipherable from) invented material. Zampano cites, for example, cultural, 
literary and psychological critics like Susan Sontag, Jacques Derrida and Erica Jong 
(among scores of others) but these citations are often misquoted, anachronistic, or 
completely fabricated. One impressive page-long footnote catalogue of photographers 
whose work, Zampano contends, would illuminate Navidson’s artistry was constructed 
entirely at random: we are told that Zampano and his reader/assistant “just picked the 
names out of some books he had lying around” (67). In discussing The Navidson Record, 
Zampano cites Ken Bums, but Truant provides the dispelling footnote: “As you probably 
guessed, not only has Ken Burns never made any such comment, he 's also never heard of 
The Navidson Record, let alone Zampano” (206). Zampano’s “research” and
critical commentary thus at once evoke and undermine the very concept of authenticity 
and authority. And, as if infected by the ambiguity he finds in Zampano’s parent text, 
Truant’s own “studied” contributions become increasingly inconsistent and impossible: 
for example, he asserts that Volume 28 of Hubert Howe Bancroft’s collected works 
doesn’t exist, while page 658, in the Contrary Evidence Appendix, shows a picture of its 
title-page. It would seem that, in view of the horrendous paradox of the shifting house, 
neither Truant nor Zampano can be relied upon. And so the uncertainties of House o f  
Leaves pile into each other, concentrically, like Russian dolls: the house, without 
Navidson’s substantiating film, would not exist; Navidson’s film, even in the imagined 
“real” of Danielewski’s novel, does not exist; and the two figures for whom the house and
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film are their (narrative and otherwise) raisons d ’etre— Truant and Zampano—are 
rendered indifferent to the discrepancies that riddle their own investigations. Truant 
admits, “the irony is it makes no difference that the documentary at the heart of this book 
is fiction” (480). Zampano adamantly revels in the fallacy o f his whole enterprise: “They 
say that truth stands the test of time. I can think of no greater comfort than knowing this 
document failed such a test” (480).
Confusion generated through textual and generic diversity and undetermined 
authority/origin is intensified by a pervasive disjuncture between the various investigative 
techniques and belief systems practised by characters in the novel. The “confrontation 
between opposing models of reality,” as Todorov contends in his analysis of the literary 
fantastic, “is the essence of terror” (25), and House o f  Leaves is riddled with such 
confrontations. The comforting “solutions” of science, in particular, are put into question 
as physical and mathematical laws fail to account for the behavior o f the house on Ash 
Tree Lane: even when repeatedly measured by world experts in geophysics using the 
most sophisticated instruments, the interior dimensions o f the house are shown to exceed 
those of its exterior by 1/4”—a discrepancy which, Navidson hopes upon its discovery, 
had “better be a case of bad math” (31). But the impossible data persist as Navidson and 
his brother Tom fret over their empirical results:
No matter how many legal pads, napkins, or newspaper margins they fill with 
notes or equations, they cannot account for that fraction. One incontrovertible 
fact stands in their way: the exterior measurement must equal the internal 
measurement. Physics depends on a universe infinitely centered on an equals 
sign. . . . The problem must lie with their measuring techniques or some
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unseen mitigating factor: air temperature, mis-calibrated instruments, warped 
floors, something, anything. (32)
Even our prosthetic senses cannot be trusted to concur with the “laws” of physics, which, 
Navidson and Tom are made to suspect, have not been discovered but rather imposed 
upon an indifferent universe. The house is terrifying because it undermines a scientific 
promise of objectivity and truth. Such disrupted certainties produce a gothic malignance 
because, as Richard Davenport-Hines asserts, they “provide constant reminders that 
power is ephemeral, that controls fail and hierarchies totter” (116). Indeed, not only are 
scientific paradigms compromised by the impossible house, but also established methods 
of representation and interpretation like cartography and critical analysis illuminate 
nothing about the house's history: Truant can neither locate Ash Tree Lane on maps of 
the region nor can he find any reference to Navidson’s documentary in film or cultural 
studies literature. And, at once inviting and resisting a theological understanding of the 
house, samples taken from its walls indicate that the structure is both larger and older 
than planet Earth.
Rather than simply depicting a mystifying puzzle, House o f  Leaves is itself a 
mystifying puzzle. Initially published on the internet, House o f  Leaves shares the 
enigmatic provenance of the house it describes. The absent architect of the ever-morphing 
house on Ash Lane is matched by the absent author o f the ontologically unstable House 
o f Leaves. The demiurgic elusiveness exemplifies, however self-consciously, Bakhtin’s 
assertion that “[t]he author (as creator of the novelistic whole) cannot be found at any one 
of the novel’s language levels: he is to be found at the center o f organization where all 
levels intersect” (111)—but where, precisely, is this intersection? While the print form of 
the novel fluctuates from one “truth” to another by way o f typographical semiotics, the
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internet version, suspended in the insubstantial and fluid space of cybertext— and now, in 
fact, having vanished from the web altogether—jeopardized conventional assumptions 
that, once published, novels are forever unalterable things-in-the-world. The untraceable 
dissemination o f House o f Leaves via the web, too, renders its readership largely 
unlocatable, itself becoming part of the novel's extra-textual mythology. The many voices 
and scripts (and, indeed, shifts and fissures within each distinct psyche or passage) work 
not only to disorient readers— immersing them in a domain as unpredictable and 
inconsistent as the one in which Navidson and company find themselves— but also to 
prevent them from arriving at any conclusions about the meaning and origin o f the novel 
in hand. That reading the book is both an act of devouring and of being devoured is 
performed in Navidson’s perishing moments, when he floats in space within the bowels 
of the house; he reads House o f  Leaves and burns its pages, producing a flame that will 
last only as long as there is printed matter to fuel it.
Still, the metatextuality of House o f  Leaves— its allusions, references, puns, 
acronyms, acrostics— compels the reader (as Truant was compelled by Zampano's 
efforts) to dissect the book, in the spirit o f interpretation. Its polysemic density invites as 
much decoding. But symbolic, allegorical, and otherwise interpretive readings do not 
provide answers. We try, for example, to decode Pelafina’s letters using the system she 
has devised: she instructs her son to use the first letter of each word to spell new words, 
which will be her “real” message, hidden from the medical censors she suspects are 
reading her mail. If we apply the same acrostics to a letter dated 5 April, 1986 (not one 
she specifically says should be decoded in the manner), we come up with the question, 
“My dear Zampano who did you lose?” (615). How does Truant’s mother know about 
Zampano? Does this indicate that she is the actual author o f The Navidson Record or, for
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that matter, the text we have been attributing to Truant? As in Infinite Jest and City o f  
Glass, moves to decode simply produce further mysteries. And these mysteries, in turn, 
destabilize the reader, who, in effect, becomes yet another site of narrative uncertainty. A 
“drama of terror” is achieved, which, the nineteenth-century author of Melmoth the 
Wanderer (1820), Charles Maturin suggests, has “the irresistible power of converting the 
audience into its victims” (98). Truant’s exposure to The Navidson Record, and the way 
in which it alters his experience of the world from one o f relative solidity to disquiet and, 
eventually, to anguished paranoia, exemplifies the capacity o f a “work” to alter and 
redefine the nature of one who apprehends it; as he gets deeper into his efforts to compile, 
decode and organize Zampano’s notes. Truant's identity and sense of himself begin to 
assume properties of the text itself. Plumbing passages about Heidegger’s “uncanny,” for 
example, produces in Truant a remarkable sense o f existential dis-ease:
The point is, when I copied down the German a week ago, I was fine. The last 
night I found the translation and this morning, when I went to work, I didn’t 
feel at all myself. It’s probably just a coincidence— I mean, that there’s some 
kind of connection between my state o f mind and The Navidson Record or 
even a few arcane sentences from a former Nazi tweaking on who knows 
what. More than likely, it’s something entirely else, the real root lying in my 
strange mood fluctuations, though I guess those are pretty recent too, rocking 
back and forth between wishful thinking and some private agony until the bar 
breaks. I’ve no fucking clue. (25)
This terror is felt, too, by Navidson and his brother when their science fails to account for 
the dimensions of the house; our interpretive tools, when applied to House o f  Leaves, fail
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to produce the explanations we need or expect. Resisting the very interpretation it invites, 
the novel finally demands the kind of reading Bruce Baugh calls “experimental’':
It’s clear that an experimental reading doesn't search for a single meaning 
(what the author really meant): such a reading subordinates the reader’s 
objectives to that of the author (or perhaps the text), when ‘intended meaning’ 
can only be a matter of conjecture in any case. By restricting the goal of 
reading to the imaginative attempt to identify and duplicate a prior intention, 
interpretation rules out questions of use and efficacy in favour of meaning- 
exegesis . . . [Kjnowing the meaning o f something (a symbol, word, image) 
gives us no clue as to what it does or what is done with it, its operative use or 
positional functioning within a functional assemblage. (37)
Decoding symbols, at best, scratches the surface of a text, producing outcomes on a par 
with ones we might find in deciphering the hidden principle in a number series. On a 
broader, political level, the subordination o f the reader’s objectives to those of the author 
is a means of propagating the “imperial-despotic-system” by “assigning an identifiable 
meaning or set of meanings that correspond to a signifier, thereby excluding others” 
(Baugh 37). In Essays Critical and Clinical, Deleuze regards this approach to literature as 
a “‘flattening out’ . . . [of] the polyvocal nature of the real” (76). The “use and efficacy” 
of fictional writing and, by extension, its potential as an instrument and catalyst for 
revolutionary thought and action, Deleuze contends, can only be grasped by evaluating 
writing in terms of how it works and what effects it achieves:
We will never ask what a book means, as signified or signifier; we will not 
look for anything to understand in it. We will ask what it functions with, in 
connection with what other things it does and does not transmit intensities, in
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which other multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed, and with 
what bodies without organs it makes its own converge. A book exists only 
through the outside and on the outside. A book is itself a little machine; what 
is the relation (also measurable) of this literary machine to a war machine, 
love machine, revolutionary machine, etc.— and an abstract machine that 
sweeps them all along? (4)
ii. Media and the extensions o f  the unconscious
Literature ceases to be defined by its “signs o f 
literariness” but rather by its intransitivity, its refusal 
of all rhetorical and generic markers, [emphasizing 




In The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, Deleuze develops an aesthetic theory based upon 
the concept of continuous folding and unfolding, which he finds exemplified first in 
baroque art and architecture and, later, in what he calls “technological objects” (19). This 
type of object, Deleuze says,
refers neither to the beginnings of the industrial era nor the idea o f the 
standard that still upheld a semblance of essence and imposed law of 
constancy, but to our current state of things, where fluctuation of the norm 
replaces the permanence of a law; where the object assumes a place in a 
continuum by variation; where industrial automation or serial machineries
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replace stamped forms. . . The object here is manneristic, not essentializing: it 
becomes an event. (19)
Whether or not we agree that “fluctuation of the norm" is exclusive to this age, there is 
much to be gleaned from Deleuze's convergence of technology, variation and “an event.” 
What causes more consternation and excitement than an occurrence (real or cinematic) 
where change or catastrophe is brought about through some technological innovation or 
mishap? Deleuze looks to those cultural objects (bodies, machines, artifacts, texts) that 
effect and are effected by other objects (they, in other words, w o rk ) because they possess 
a technological flexibility that makes them conduits (rather than sponges) of disparate 
forms of energy and information. Deleuze's writing is notoriously (and defiantly) obscure 
and poetic,1 but, at root, he argues politically for an aesthetic o f multiplicity and fluidity, 
and insists that we explore objects and processes that never occupy a definite state but are
i fv x iw d
always “in the middle.” Bearing in^the designation “technological object,” it is not a 
stretch to identify forms o f media and, in particular, media composites, as fertile objects 
for a Deleuzian consideration. Always “in the middle,'’ mechanistic and changeable, 
media-objects become both nexus and disseminator o f “multitudes and energies.” Hayles 
extends this notion beyond individual objects to the cultural environment generally when 
she claims that there is “no reality independent of mediation” (779). Indeed, now that 
information can be delivered in a multitude of ways (or, to use Deleuze’s term, media are 
“manneristic”) and cyborgs and artificial intelligences are the new faculty recruits, the 
“technological object'’ must increase its valences exponentially in order to maintain its 
affective purchase. McCaffery sees this heightening and expansion of the technological
1 He insists that the philosopher, like the poet, should invent the rhetorical tools and methods he requires, 
that she be encouraged to create the terms and parameters o f  discourse in her conceptual deliberations 
(Essays C ritica l and  C lin ica l 108).
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object as an “avant-pop”1 preoccupation and connects it to what he terms the second 
wave of capitalism— “hyperconsumption”— in which our imaginings are extensions of 
the extensions of man:
With so much already stored away and available to anyone with enough 
computer memory and the right software, there is naturally something 
fascinating about things that as yet evade our efforts to download them.
Hence the recurrence in [avant-pop] o f the invention of the machine capable 
of capturing experiences not presently “capturable”: a “special camera” 
capable of photographing the spirits of the dead . . .  a “psychopraxiscope,” 
which records human thoughts. . . . Such fabulous inventions are, of course, 
extensions of our own actual fabulous inventions . . . which have utterly 
changed the borders of reality, human perception and memory . . . The 
ultimate goal, o f course, is to be able one day to record— thus capturing it, 
making it susceptible to human reason and control— everything, (xxiv -  xxv) 
Because of this goal, he argues, we find fantastic apparatuses like Wim Wenders’ dream- 
recording devices in Until the End o f  the World (2001) and William Gibson’s memory 
implants in Johnny Mnemonic (1981) so affecting; they draw together the biological and 
the synthetic, translating the formless (dreams/memories) into digital arrangements that 
can be variably consumed and/or altered from without.
1 Avant pop, M cCaffery explains, expresses a fascination w ith techn ology  and next-generation or 
imaginary media: “Avant-pop has invented a w hole range o f  innovative formal strategies and narrative 
approaches on more kinetic, dynam ic, nonliterary forms o f  art: . . . hypertext’s reliance on branching 
narrative paths; . . . the w indow s-w ith in-w indow s structures o f  com puter software and video gam es, with 
their dizzying sense o f  infinite regress; rap m usic’s sam pling techniques, with an endless recycling o f  
‘bites’ feeding the hand that rearranges them into new aesthetic contexts; and principles o f  collage and 
other forms o f  spatial, visual, and temporal arrangements borrow ed from video and cinem a” [A fter  
Y esterday’s C rash  (1995 ) xx ii-xx iii].
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The affective capabilities of the technological object are intensified through the 
processes of remediation— and this, as Hayles explains in her interpretation of House o f  
Leaves, is what makes Danielewski's novel so dynamically resonant. “Remediation,” 
Hayles explains, is “the re-presentation of material that has already been presented in 
another medium . . . [and] has been greatly expanded by the advent of digital 
technologies” (781). Inventing a remediating machine in its own right, Danielewski (via 
Zampano, via Truant, via Pelafina, via The Editors) imports “pre-existing” (in the context 
of the fiction) material and arranges it in a new way toward new effects. This 
construction, Danielewski argues, works for the contemporary reader because it reflects 
the hypermediated context from which the novel has emerged:
Whether it’s dealing with magazines, newspapers, radio, TV, and of course 
the Internet, most people living in the 90s have no trouble multi-processing 
huge sums of information. Older generations— despite the fact they're multi­
processing their morning breakfast, a train wreck in India and thoughts of an 
ailing friend—will find House o f  Leaves difficult because they’re prejudiced . 
. . [Formal invention] can intensify informational content and experience. 
Multiple stories can lie side by side on the page. Search engines— in the case 
of House o f  Leaves a word index— will allow for easy cross-referencing. 
Passages may be found, studied, revisited, or even skimmed . . . Words can 
also be colored and those colors can have meaning. (Cottrell n.p.)
House o f  Leaves is an “affective” technological object in the Deleuzian sense because its 
formal qualities— its concurrent storylines, snippets, indices and collages— have been 
made familiar to us by the modalities of television, film, the internet, etc, and supply 
numerous pores through which the object might connect with its perceiver. The novel
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works, in other words, because we know how to use it. In Writing Machines (2002), 
Hayles coins the term technotext to describe literary works like House o f  Leaves which 
foreground their materiality in order to draw attention to the technologies of inscription 
that compose them. What emerges upon our engagement with a technotext is necessarily 
informed by the creative faculties o f a particular reader responding, through 
interpretation, to the “catalytic interaction and intertwining o f media from different 
historical moments” (Tabby and Wutz 10).
It would be difficult to determine whether the complex textuality, the 
intermediality, that is House o f  Leaves were informed by conditions intrinsic to its 
original hypertextual format (appearing, as it initially did, on the web) or whether 
Danielewski selected the internet as an appropriate home to narrative strategies he had 
already imagined; the relative cheapness o f a web-based publication was, the author 
maintains, part of the reason for his original choice.1 The degree to which we would read 
hypertext theory into House o f  Leaves further depends upon what we take the term to 
mean. Drawing her conception from a general consensus among theorists (such as 
Douglas and Bolter2) that hypertext is a “rhetorical form having multiple reading paths, 
chunked texts, and a linking mechanism connecting the chunks” (“Remediation” 795), 
Hayles concludes that House o f  Leaves is a hypertext; she supports her assertion by 
referring to the novel's parallel commentaries, which cohere through linking mechanisms 
such as footnotes, intratextual allusions, and typographic cues. But, as George Landow 
reminds us, as with print technologies, hypertextuality accounts for a diversity of forms: 
“hypertext can take the form of stand-alone or networked systems [which] in turn can
1 D anielew ski m axed-out five personal credit cards to fund the novel.
2 R espectively, Jane Y e llow lees D ou glas’s The E nd o f  B ooks— or B ooks Without End: R eading Interactive  
N arratives  (2001 ) and D avid B olter’s W riting Space: The Com puter, H ypertext, an d  the H istory o f  W riting  
(1991).
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take the form of read-only, or broadcast, systems, or those that permit readers to create 
links and brief annotations, or of those that grant the reader full access as a writer” (30-1). 
Obviously, a print book is not adaptable in the way that an e-book might be; online 
novels like Michael Joyce's Afternoon: A Stoiy  (1987), Shelley Jackson’s Patchwork Girl 
(1995) and Carolyn Guyer’s Quibbling (1992) shift narrative course in relation to what 
paths the reader “chooses” to pursue, so that each reader encounters a different text (up to 
a point: the number of lexias, or possible installments, is finite) and will probably not 
encounter all available text. While one would not necessarily navigate House o f  Leaves in 
a purely linear progression (the novel is conducive to the cursory flip-through, inviting its 
reader to dart haphazardly between its many images and typefaces), all elements of the 
narrative are present and not buried as they might be within a hypertextual construct. In 
his essay, “Wittgenstein, Genette, and the Reader’s Narrative in Hypertext,” Gunnar 
Liestol shrewdly uses Gerard Genette’s narratological categories of order, duration and 
frequency as a basis for ascertaining what distinguishes the hypertextual work from its 
print cousins. Liestol notices “that one of the defining characteristics o f hypertexts, from 
the reader’s point o f view, is to engage in selection and combination of different modes 
and techniques of narrative construction and composition. With hypertext fiction, the 
reader is invited to take interactive part in the operations o f what we might call the 
narrative machinery” (98). In some works, this interactive role is extended beyond 
machinery to include narrative content— as is the case in the well-known collaborative 
hypertext, Robert Coover’s online project, The Hypertext Hotel. Polyvocalism in 
Danielewski’s novel— in addition to being a product of multiple arrangements and 
editings rather than a “co-operative” enterprise per se— is at base a simulation, or
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fictionalization, of collaboration— and, furthermore, one that is documentary or 
conspiratorial rather than literary in nature.
Although House o f  Leaves may fall short o f some interactive possibilities afforded 
by hypertext, many of the novel's stylistic features and philosophical concerns resemble 
those of online writing. Collage, which has come to dominate online aesthetics, is perhaps 
the most salient hypertextual import in this regard. Not simply the inventive juxtaposition 
of items drawn from diverse media (e.g., photographs, paintings, music, charts, etc.), 
collage—particularly in online applications— means merging the creative with the 
discursive. Gregory Ulmer has dubbed this generic yoking mystorical, where personal, 
public and mythic history are brought together so as to expand the epistemological terrain 
of the work. Ulmer argues that this generic polymorph, facilitated especially through 
networked technologies like hypertext, opens up structural and rhetorical strategies for a 
new kind of critical theory, which he calls teletheory; he argues that “one purpose of 
teletheory is to make personal images accessible, receivable, by integrating the private 
and public dimensions of knowledge— invention and justification” (39). A teletheoretical 
arrangement, furthermore, is a means o f circumventing the strictures of linguistic flow, 
which Wittgenstein and other philosophers have taken to be detrimental to continuous 
thought; in the fragmentary and multidirectional text o f Philosophical Investigations 
(1953) “Wittgenstein claimed a looser textual organization and arrangement that 
obviously parallel the acclaimed liberalization and decenteredness of hypertextual 
structures” (Leistol 89). Large sections of House o f  Leaves are teletheoretical: Truant's 
personal accounts sit alongside Zampano’s “scholarship,” which sits alongside The 
Navidson Record, which is itself a kind of narrative/documentary hybrid. The strategy is 
perhaps most memorably prefigured in Pale Fire— and, interestingly, both Nabokov’s
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and Danielewski *s fusion of the critical with the literary are less illuminating 
epistemologically then they are psychologically. Placing a responsive text beside its 
object— a move that, as Ulmer would have it, might clarify or expand epistemological 
concerns— may be more revealing of the interpretive values (or neurotic complexes) of 
the commentator. Isn't this, you might wonder, essentially the status o f all criticism, 
then— a parasitical means to communicate one's own biases? Herein lie the cautionary 
and parodic functions of Pale Fire, House o f  Leaves and, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, Infinite Jest. These works capture the richness and complexity afforded by the 
pluralism of teletheory and, at the same time, by foregrounding the risks of deception and 
fallacy, contest teletheoretical claims on epistemological expansion.
In addition to exploiting the psychographical potential o f collage, Danielewski*s 
flirtation with hypertext accentuates the more general issues o f authorial ambiguity in the 
novel. Anonymity is known to be (for better or for worse) easily achievable on the 
internet; this is perhaps one of the reasons why resolutely intertextual and a-teleological 
literary work— such as Stuart Moulthrop's Victory Garden (2001) and The Unknown (on­
going) respectively— find accommodation on the web. In M oulthrop’s piece, a re-writing 
of Borges’ short story, “The Garden o f Forking Paths,” the original text is divided into 
discrete lexias and then supplemented with further lexias o f his (i.e., Moulthrop’s) own; a 
mystery intensified by questions of origin like the ones which saturate Borges’s writing, 
Victory Garden, like House o f  Leaves, cannot be attributed to any particular author. In 
The Unknown, pockets o f local organization in the form of vignettes, lists, short essays, 
etc, are linked upon multiple axes, creating an ever-threading docu-narrative which never 
comes to a determinable or fixed end. Counterpointing critical claims that closure is 
essential to narrative poetics— claims advanced, for example, by Frank Kermode, Peter
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Brooks and Walter Benjamin1—works like The Unknown force the reader to decide when 
a reading experience has achieved fruition and, indeed, what conditions need to be 
satisfied before we can consider a narrative “closed'’ or complete. Is a story finished when 
a conflict is resolved (but what about life after the documented conflict?), when the 
protagonist dies (but what about his evil twin?), or when (as is the case with House o f  
Leaves) we simply run out of text to read? The three other novels central to my thesis, in 
one way or another, resist narrative closure: the case is never cracked {City o f  Glass), the 
fate of a central character is left unresolved (Hal in Infinite Jest), and all elements fuse 
into the amorphous metaphor of the perennially present World Wide Web (Underworld)’, 
but the openendedness achieved in House o f  Leaves is interesting because it stems not 
only from questions and characters left dangling but also from inferences signaled by its 
hypertextual constitution. House o f  Leaves would thus be better understood as a print text 
that alludes to—rather than participates in or aspires toward— hypertext. By referring to, 
borrowing from, and problematizing elements o f an inscriptive form (one which, 
moreover, has been associated with the impending “obsolescence'’ o f the tangible artifact, 
the book), Danielewski is able to exploit the epistemological and ontological resonances 
o f the new medium without wholly assigning it supremacy.
O f all media invoked in House o f  Leaves, either imitatively or substantially, film 
proves to be the dominant one. Of course, in terms of narrative content, film is significant 
as the chosen means of documenting the house and its exploration. Where other systems 
of record and measurement have proven incapable of representing the building’s fluid 
interior and unpredictable behavior, a filmic record “prevails” precisely because seeing,
1 Their positions are sum m arized by J. Y ellow lees D ouglas thus: “Endings . . . either confirm or invalidate 
the predictions w e have m ade about resolutions to conflicts and probable outcom es as w e read stories, 
watch film s, or speculate about the lives o f  others” (161 ).
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proverbially, is believing. Then again, maybe not: the typical reaction to Navidson's film, 
after all, is distrust. “The Navidson Record does not first appear as it does today,” the 
critical literature informs us; “Nearly seven years ago, what surfaced was “The 5 Minute 
Hallway"— a 5 minute optical illusion barely exceeding the abilities of any NYU film- 
school graduate. The problem, of course, was the accompanying statement that claimed 
all o f it was true” (28). The image becomes an object o f suspicion (it must be a hoax of 
special-effects, its instrumentation must be faulty or tampered with) because it posits an 
incredible scene:
In one continuous shot, Navidson, whom we never actually see, momentarily 
focuses on a doorway on the north wall of his living room before climbing 
outside of the house through a window . . . crawling back inside the house 
through a second window . . . finally returning us to the starting point, thus 
completely circling the doorway and so proving . . . that insulation or siding is 
the only possible thing this doorway could lead to, which is when . . . 
Navidson’s hand appears in frame and pulls open the door, revealing a narrow 
black hallway at least ten feet long . . . threatening this time to actually enter 
it [at which point] Karen snaps, “Don’t you dare go in there again, Navy. (4-
5)
The (in)capacity of the image to convey truth is made explicit in Zampano's opening 
commentary when he states that ‘“[authenticity” still remains the word most likely to stir 
debate. In fact, this leading obsession—to validate or invalidate the reels [read: 
real/reality] and tapes— invariably brings up a collateral and more general concern: 
whether or not, with the advent of digital-technology, image has forsaken its once 
unimpeachable hold on the truth” (3).
217
Danielewski's application of film may be in part inspired by his father, who was a 
filmmaker and who made film screenings and criticism part o f his children's upbringing. 
In an interview, Danielewski tells Michael Sims that the “look" o f House o f  Leaves was 
influenced to a degree by the formal engineering of e.e. cummings and John Cage, but 
that film informed most decisions regarding textual layout; while working to achieve 
certain fluctuations in pace, he “began to realize that cinema has an enormous foundation 
o f theories on how to control the viewer's perception of a film" (12). Elsewhere, 
Danielewski explained that he wanted his text to produce in his reader the “visceral" 
experience of a cinema-goer:
Most of the typographical setting is influenced by film. That had been the 
design from the very beginning: to use the image of text itself in a way that 
had been studied very carefully for a hundred years by exquisite film-makers 
and to increase the reader's experience as they progress through the book . . . 
Before an action sequence, a director tends to present the audience with long 
shots and static views so the eye is fixed on a certain focal point on the screen 
and doesn't move. When the action sequence actually comes in, a lot of short 
cuts are used and it intensifies the viewers’ experience by shifting the focal 
point all over the screen. The eye is moving all around and there's an actual 
visceral response to that. (G2 5)
House o f  Leaves moves all over the place, using layouts designed for, among other 
things, jockeying the reader along at a rate that keeps pace with the action in the novel. 
Pages 424 to 441 provide a good example of how typographical arrangements work to 
instill in the reader a sense o f movement, speed and space (see Appendix iv for images of 
the original formatting):
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• As soon as Navidson begins his solo venture into the house, the paragraphs 
on pages 424 and 425 are centre-aligned, denoting a straight course.
• Summarizing the first five days, the type is squeezed into a rectangle, also 
centre-aligned (425).
• An entire page dwarfs the single sentence, “nor does this endless corridor he 
travels remain the same size'” (426).
• The clause “sometimes the ceiling drops in on him” appears, alone, at the 
bottom of a page (427).
• The ceiling’s subsequent rise is denoted by the diagonal graduation of words 
. . . (429).
. . .  and the corridor's widening to “an enormous plateau'’ is indicated by 
sending alternate words to opposite sides of the page (431).
• A sense of speed is conveyed by turning pages 425 through 435 rapidly.
• A sense of difficulty is likewise conveyed by having to tilt the book to read 
certain pages (436 -  441)
• There is also a claustrophobic compression of text between pages 443 and 
458.
This passage illustrates how textual size, positioning and formatting can bring the reader 
deeper into the experience of a novel; in some instances, a gesture that a reader is made to 
perform corresponds to a motion described in the text (e.g., on page 427, the reader’s eyes 
drop to the bottom to of page to read the line, “sometimes the ceiling drops in on him”); 
in other instances, format emulates spatial qualities, so that the reader’s navigation of the 
text enacts Navidson’s exploration of the house (phrases suspended on an otherwise blank 
page as on page 426, convey desolation; we physically struggle with the book to read
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pages 436 to 441). In addition to these experiential effects, though, Danielewski points 
out that he wanted to increase the pleasure of the reader, and providing moments of speed 
was one means of doing this: “I've never talked to anyone who didn't feel a sense of 
elation when they’d read, say, 80 pages in an hour, because something was moving 
quickly— or expressed some sort of frustration because it took them an hour to read ten 
pages'’ (Sims n.p.).
But while Danielewski’s borrowing from film and its strategies does indeed 
propel the reader into the drama of the narrative and, at times, allows for a respite of 
swiftness in reading this largely grueling text, it also has important connections to the 
novel’s more general themes concerning the orders and disorders of psychological 
operations. If  we accept Louis Andreas-Salome]statement that “ [o]nly the technique of 
film permits the rapid sequence of pictures which approximates our own imaginative 
faculties” (101)— then we might argue Danielewski’s application of film technique also 
brings about a textual resonance with the workings of the mind. Much theoretical ink has 
been spilt on the relationship between the cinematic screen and the Lacanian mirror; the 
analogy breaks down, however, because it is not a reflection of herself that the viewer 
sees on the screen, but, rather, a fictive world devised by an auteur-subject. Whether the 
viewer recognizes or projects herself within the narrative she observes depends upon the 
constituent elements of the particular film. In other respects, though, film and psyche are 
mutually reflective— for example, in both cases the perceptual object is simultaneously 
present and absent, both shown and hidden. “ [W]hat unfolds there [on the screen],” says 
film theorist Christian Metz, “may be more or less fictional, but the unfolding itself is 
fictive (43); Joan Copjec, in her psychoanalytic study of cinema, echoes this distinction, 
pointing out that when we watch a film, “[b]ehind the visual field there is, in fact, nothing
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at all'’ (450). Just as the film spectator will look and never find its object (but still feel as 
though she has encountered something), the psychoanalyst will probe but find nothing 
visible or tangible in the mind of her patient (although she will draw meaning from 
whatever intangible systems she does identify— she will find something there). As 
“hallucination that is also a fact'’ (Andre Bazin 16), the cinematic image provides an 
analogue to the hallucinated realities which riddle House o f  Leaves: an impossible house 
exists, The Navidson Record is analyzed but does not exist, Pelafina's delusions are 
insights, and Navidson reads House o f  Leaves whilst located within the same novel.
Deleuze admires film because, while it aspires to the fictional expression o f 
subjectivity, it is an intrinsically flexible medium, capable of breaking apart regimental 
temporal sequence in order to explore the “in-the-middle-ness” of experience— processes 
of becoming rather than finite instances of being. In Cinema 2: Time Image (1989), 
Deleuze writes that in film, “ [t]he elements are constantly changing with the relations o f 
time into which they enter, and the terms with their connections. Narration is constantly 
being modified in each of its episodes, not according to subjective variations, but as a 
consequence of disconnected spaces and dechronologized moments” (133). But bearing 
in mind Deleuze's adamantly effect-based method of evaluating art, he would agree with 
Jean-Louis Baudry that “[t]he key to the impression of reality has been sought in the 
structuring of image and movement, in complete ignorance o f the fact that the impression 
of reality is dependent first o f all on a subject effect that might be necessary to examine 
the position o f the subject facing the image in order to determine the raison d'etre for the 
cinematic effect” (702-3). Film works because its “disconnected spaces and 
dechronologized moments”— its “apparatus” (Baudry)— mirror our own “mental 
machinery” (Metz); in fact, as Vicky Lebeau states, “the unconscious is the condition of
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cinema, essential to the very act of watching a film” (45). In order to apprehend film, the 
conscious mind must cleave to the unconscious, the hallucinatory state that is the basis of 
dreams: “The difficulties met by the theoreticians of cinema in their attempt to account 
for the impression of reality are proportionate to the persistent resistance to really 
recognizing the unconscious" (Baudry 703).
Why, then, does Danielewski present his tale in the form of a book? More than 
simply moving toward the print form, he has resolutely moved away from the idea of 
House o f  Leaves as a film, having rejected a number of lucrative Hollywood offers for an 
adaptation. One theory worth considering is that Danielewski is resisting (and working to 
subordinate) a form that is strongly associated with his father. In her essay on House o f  
Leaves, Hayles describes an episode when, in his early twenties, Danielewski brought a 
short story to his father, who was ailing in the hospital. The story, called “Redwood,'’ was 
a thinly veiled account o f his relationship with his father; upon reading the story, 
Danielewski's father became infuriated and berated his son, saying that he should stop 
wasting his time writing and get a job at the post office. Devastated, Danielewski tore up 
the story and threw it in a dumpster. A few days later, his sister Poe handed him a manila 
folder containing the story, which she had retrieved from the dumpster and taped back 
together. “That rescued story,” Hayles reveals, “became the kernel o f House o f  Leaves” 
(794). Given this background of the novel, as well as its overt themes o f paternity, 
embodied by Truant (whose father was a dead-beat) and Zampano (who yearns for the 
“perfect son’’), Danielewski’s incorporation of—and adamant non-reversion to— his 
father’s medium becomes psychologically interesting. Rather than make a film, he would 
subjugate film to become but one of many elements in a book, an arch-form that contains 
and is not itself contained. By drawing from film and hypertext both, Danielewski
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expands the potential of the novel and extends its claims as a form that may not only 
achieve effects considered exclusive to or superior in other media, but also surpass many 
of these effects. When discussing the operational speed of computer-based writing in an 
interview, Danielewski makes his case:
But here’s the joke. Books have had this capability all along. Read Chomsky, 
Derrida, Pinker, Cummings. Look at early 16th century manuscripts. Hell, go 
open up the Talmud. We may be using a 300 Mhz G3 to finish the layout of 
my book, but to get from the first page to the last takes impossible seconds. 
Not a second but seconds. And yet you can pick up a book— even an 
encyclopedia—and get from one to a thousand in much less than that. You 
can even access several pages at the same time. And you can carry this 
magical creation with you, write in it, and never need to hunt down 
conversion software to find out what you wrote and read years ago. But 
somehow the analogue powers of these wonderful bundles o f paper have been 
forgotten. I’d like to see that perception change. (Cottrell n.p.)
iii. Psychic architecture
Welcome to my nightmare.
I think you’re gonna like it.
I think you’re gonna feel right at home.
- Alice Cooper,
“Welcome to My Nightmare,” 1975
If  each site of potential truth or meaning in House o f  Leaves (indeed, the ontological 
status o f the novel itself) turns out to be the result o f smoke and mirrors, on what level
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does substance reside— sufficient substance to render the novel meaningful or, even, 
readable? One signal is Danielewski’s conspicuously architectural focus. Built space 
becomes a means o f expressing colliding domains of the real and the imaginary, the 
conscious and the repressed. Such collisions date back to eighteenth-century literature, 
“whose favourite topos,” states Anthony Vidler in The Architectural Uncanny, “was the 
haunted house” :
A pervasive leitmotiv of architectural revival alike, its depiction in fairy tales, 
horror stories and Gothic novels gave rise to a unique genre of writing that, by 
the end of the century, stood for romanticism itself. The house provided an 
especially favored site for uncanny disturbances: its apparent domesticity, its 
residue of family history and nostalgia, its role as the last and most intimate 
shelter of private comfort sharpened by contrast the terror o f invasion by alien 
spirits. (17)
Think only of the forbidding castles of Otranto and Udolpho, the crypts and hidden vaults 
of Poe, the isolated, archaic, haunted territories, manors and dungeons o f Bronte, Shelley, 
and Stoker; consider more recent yokings of psychology and domestic space in films like 
The Others (2001), Safe (1995), and The Shining (1980) or novels such as Beloved  (1987) 
and The Body Artist (2001). In these works, in- or quasi-human agents emerge from 
hidden chambers, penetrate walls, loom menacingly over their mortal cohabitants, 
incarnating what Maggie Kilgour calls a “subconscious psychic energy [that] bursts from 
the restraints o f the conscious ego” (3). Cabin pressure, so to speak, escalates with 
unexpressed guilt, repressed traumatic memory, and all else unnamable. In the case of 
Morrison’s and DeLillo’s novels, an entity comes to reside in the house o f the bereaved, 
as a projected wish-fulfillment and catalyst for the acceptance of loss; in gothic texts and
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sophisticated works o f horror, a supernatural presence surfaces as the psychic residue of 
proscribed deeds committed, social or moral transgressions, or an anguished passage 
through adolescence or illness; in Todd Haynes' 1995 film Safe, the home becomes a 
toxic environment— or, at least, from the point of view o f its inhabitant, an unsatisfied but 
numb woman who develops an incapacitating allergy to the chemicals and pathogens 
which permeate her home (read: mind). The solidity of the domicile— of reality, history, 
family and self—is thus compromised by an unfathomable entity who/which, one must 
suspect, has always been as elemental as any corridor or window pane, but has been 
hitherto now undetected. Its appearance breeds further paranoia, begs further questions: 
“What else lurks unseen in this house? Why is it unseen, and when will it, too, surface?” 
Of course, the correlation between psychic and domestic architecture is a 
Leitmotif throughout foundational psychoanalytic discourse: Jung recounts a dream, 
which he shared with Freud, about being in the house o f his youth; as he descended the 
various levels of the house, the decor became increasingly antiquated until, in the 
basement, Jung locates “yet another flight of narrow steps leading down to a sort o f cave 
which was obviously a prehistoric tomb” [Man and His Symbols (1964) 213]. Jung reads 
this dream as “a short summary of [his] life—the life of [his] mind” (213), as part of 
(what was then his emerging) his professional conviction about the personal specificity of 
dreams. More and more, Jung would resist Freud’s dominantly death- and/or sex- 
inflected analyses, viewing the recurrence of certain images and scenarios not as 
indicative of a definitive dream-semiotics but, rather, evidence of a collective 
unconscious, “a psychic propensity to a regular functioning, independent of time and 
race” (515). The cross-cultural recurrence of dreams and myths featuring labyrinths 
(versions of built space, ranging from domiciles to mazes) is one phenomenon that Jung
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posits in support of his theory^universal symbolism. In The Poetics o f  Space (1969), 
Gaston Bachelard identifies the aesthetic importance o f Jung’s collective conception, 
stating that “an immense cosmic House is a potential of every dream of houses. Winds 
radiate from its center and gulls fly from its windows. A House that is as dynamic as this 
allows the poet to inhabit the universe. Or, to put it differently, the universe comes to 
inhabit his House” (51). Freud, for his part, sees the house and its component parts as 
expressions of both psychic and somatic structures. “I know patients,” claims Freud in 
The Interpretation o f  Dreams, “who have retained an architectural symbolism of the body 
and the genitals. . . . For these patients pillars and columns represent the legs (as they do 
in The Song o f  Solomon), every gateway stands for the bodily orifices (a ‘hole’), every 
water pipe is a reminder of the urinary apparatus, and so on” (346); drawing from 
Schemer’s early attempts at dream analysis, via Volkner, Freud notes that “the human 
body as whole is pictured by the dream-imagination as a house and separate organs of the 
body by portions of a house” (225).1 Later, Freud asserts with great conviction that 
“Steps, ladders or staircases, or, as the case may be, walking up or down them, are 
representations of the sexual act” (355).
Whether we subscribe to Jung’s personal and collective interpretations or Freud’s 
psychic equations (or neither), the house stands as an apt literary metaphor by way of 
which a subject’s anxieties and fears can be represented. In investigating the
1 Shirley Jackson's The H aunting o f  H ill H ouse (1984) provides a potently anthropom orphic rendering o f  a 
house: “N o  human eye  can isolate the unhappy coincidence o f  line and place w hich  suggests evil in the face 
o f  a house, and yet som ehow  a maniac juxtaposition, a badly turned angle, som e chance o f  m eeting o f  roof  
and sky, turned Hill H ouse into a place o f  despair, more frightening because the face o f  H ill H ouse seem ed  
awake, with a w atchfulness from the blank w indow s and a touch o f  g lee  in the eyebrow  o f  a cornice.
A lm ost any house, caught unexpectedly or at an odd angle, can turn a deep ly  hum orous look on a watching  
person; even a m isch ievous little chim ney, or a dormer like a dim ple, can catch a beholder with a sense o f  
fellow ship; but a house arrogant and hating, never off-guard, can only be ev il. T his house . . . reared its 
great head back against the sky w ithout concession  to humanity. It w as a house w ithout kindness, never 
meant to be lived in, not a fit p lace for people or for love or for hope. E xorcism  cannot alter the 
countenance o f  a house; H ill H ouse w ould stay as it was until it w as destroyed.” (248)
226
psychological implications of the house, and imagining why it appears in dreams (and in 
art, where its symbolic application is deliberate), we may look first at what this space in 
and of itself suggests. Freud's thoughts on this are instructive. Emblematic of what we 
would find comforting—familiarity, the known, the domestic, the mother— the house, 
when compromised, invaded, or distorted in dreams or in art, comes to signify its 
opposite: the obscure, the unacknowledged and the wild. Attacks upon the house thus 
cathect perturbations in the psyche, or what Freud polysemically terms das 
Unheimliche— polysemic because das Heimlich means “homey and intimate” as well as 
“hidden or obscure,” so that its opposite, das Unheimliche, conveys both a “not-at-home- 
ness” and an “uncovering.” Freud uses the term in his essay, “The Uncanny,” to describe 
“that class o f the frightening which leads back to what is known to us alUong” (233). 
Thus is characterized the particular kind of eeriness that descends upon us when we 
recognize “something familiar and old-established in the mind which has become 
alienated only through the process of repression,” when something “which ought to have 
remained hidden . . . has come to light” (234). The return of the repressed— in stories and 
dreams, allegorized by the emergence of a formerly-concealed, dreadful figure—  
generates in the subject a sense of das Unheimliche, where what should be familiar (i.e. 
the home) becomes strange, uncanny. Thus, as Vidler explains, “not-at-home-ness” is not 
simply a sense o f not belonging, but rather, “the fundamental propensity o f the familiar to 
turn on its owners, suddenly to become defamiliarized, derealized, as if in a dream” (7).
This notion of derealization, of the merging of (and blurring o f the boundary 
between) the house and dream, regularly surfaces in House o f  Leaves. In the beginning of 
the second chapter, for example, we are alerted to “the impending nightmare [that 
Navidson] and his entire family are about to face” (8). Though this might initially be
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taken as a figure o f speech (“nightmare” as a terrible ordeal endured while awake), the 
frequent comparisons between the house and a dream that is at once lived and 
“unconscious” provoke a more literal understanding of the relationship. For example, 
when confronted with the anomaly of the dark hallway and the sheer endless staircase, 
Wax, the young assistant in the expedition, remarks, “It's so deep, man, it's like it's 
almost dream like” (85). At the end of the novel, Karen describes the dissolution of the 
house as both a dream and death:
Q: How did you get him out of the house?
Karen: It just dissolved.
Q: Dissolved? What do you mean?
Karen: Like a bad dream. We were in pitch blackness and then I saw, no . . . 
actually my eyes were closed. I felt this warm, sweet air on my face, and then 
I opened my eyes and I could see trees and grass. I thought to myself, ‘W e’ve 
died. W e’ve died and this is where you go after you die.’ But it turned out to 
be just our front yard.
Q: You’re saying the house dissolved?
Karen: [No response]
Q: How’s that possible? It’s still there, isn’t it? (532-533)
Dream and reality are here in Karen’s description melded, where the “front yard” is 
conflated with the place “where you go after you die.” Familiar territory and structures— 
home, property, the canny, what is “known”— become synonymous with the unfamiliar, 
unknowable regions of dream and death.
Further encouraging a psychological interpretation of the house and its inhabitants 
are the direct references to das Unheimliche and its theoreticians that occur on several
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occasions in House o f  Leaves. As with much of the meta-analysis in the novel, these 
references function as interpretive cues, prompting the reader to think about figures and 
events in particular ways. “[V]iable works of literature,” Peter Brooks points out, “tell us 
something about how they are to be read, guide us toward the conditions of their 
interpretations’’ (XII)— and House o f Leaves is such a work of literature. Near the 
beginning of the book, Zampano remarks about the internal expansion and contortion of 
the house, which began after the Navidsons returned home after a short trip:
What took place amounts to a strange spatial violation which has already been 
described in a number of ways -  namely surprising, unsettling, disturbing but 
most of all uncanny. In German the word for ‘uncanny’ is ‘unheimlich* which 
Heidegger in his book Sein und Zeit thought worthy o f some consideration. 
(24)
This is followed by a long passage from Heidegger’s BeingwfTim e  (1927), cited in the 
original German and, on the following page, provided in English (as footnoted by 
Truant—who calls the translation “a real bitch to find'*):
In anxiety one feels uncanny. Here the peculiar indefiniteness of that which 
Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to the expression: 
the “nothing and nowhere”. But here “uncanniness” also means “not-being-at- 
home” [das Nicht-zuhause-sein]. (25)
While Zampano finds these ideas conceptually relevant to Navidson’s predicament—  
u[The uncanny] is alien, exposed, and unsettling, or in other words, the perfect 
description of the house on Ash Tree Lane (28)*—Truant is dismissive, remarking only 
that Heidegger’s text “goes to prove the existence of crack back in the early twentieth 
century” (25). But, indirectly affirming the philosopher, Truant swiftly shifts focus to
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recount a recent experience in the tattoo parlor, where he felt the presence of “something 
bitter and foul, something inhuman, reeking with so much rot & years, telling me in the 
language of nausea that I am not alone” (26).
Before I turned, it felt exactly as if I had turned and at that instant caught sight 
o f some tremendous beast crouched off in the shadows, muscles a twitch from 
firing its great mass forward, ragged claws slowly extending, digging into the 
linoleum, even as its eyes are dilating, extending beyond the point of reason, 
completely obliterating the iris, and by that widening fire, the glowing furnace 
of witness, a camera lucida. with me in silhouette, like some silly Hand 
shadow twitching about upside down, is that right? Or am I getting confused? 
Either way registering at last the sign it must have been waiting for: my own 
recognition of exactly what has been awaiting me all along— except that when 
I finally do turn, jerking around like the scared-shitless shit-for-brains that I 
am, I discover only a deserted corridor, or was it merely a recently deserted 
corridor? This thing, whatever it had been, obviously beyond the grasp of my 
imagination or for that matter my emotions, having departed into alcoves of 
darkness, seeping into corners & floors, cracks & outlets, gone even to the 
walls. (27)
Truant denigrates Heidegger’s concept of the uncanny, but he then goes on to relate his 
experience o f the very thing he denigrates. In the familiar environment o f his workplace, 
a place that “pretends to afford the utmost security while opening itself to the secret 
intrusion of terror” (Vidler 11), Truant senses a terrible presence, whose pupils are 
“extending beyond the point of reason” and who, Truant suspects, has been waiting for 
Truant’s “own recognition of exactly what has been awaiting [him] all along.” The
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insidious always-already uncanny is felt in the same way that it is by the depressed person 
Infinite Jest, who finally sees that ‘‘the sensation of the worst nightmares, a sensation that 
can be felt asleep or awake, is identical to those worst dreams’ form itself: the sudden 
intra-dream realization that the nightmares’ very essence and center has been with you aA 
along, even when awake: it’s just been overlookedr” (61).
In addition to these various appearances of the uncanny in House o f  Leaves, a 
psychological interpretation of the house is indicated by the many allusions to 
Bachelard’s The Poetics o f  Space in the novel. Bachelard’s book stands as a classic 
analysis of everyday spaces— from closets to boxes to staircases— that, in one way or 
another, act upon or express psychological states and processes. An entire chapter is 
devoted to the space of the house, about which, in his signature reflective and 
impressionistic style, Bachelard muses: “It is a strange situation. The space we love is 
unwilling to remain permanently enclosed. It deploys and appears to move elsewhere 
without difficulty; into other times, and on different planes of dream and memory” (53). 
The house on Ash Tree Lane comes to physicalize Bachelard’s more abstract ideas about 
the “house” and its relation to subject formation.
[I]n point of fact, a House is first and foremost a geometric object, one which 
we are tempted to analyze rationally. Its prime reality is visible and tangible, 
made o f well hewn solids and well fitted framework. It is dominated by 
straight lines, the plumbline having marked it with its discipline and balance. 
A geometrical object of this kind ought to resist metaphors that welcome the 
human body and the human soul. But transposition to the human plane takes 
place immediately whenever a House is considered as space for cheer and
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intimacy, space that is supposed to condense and defend intimacy.
Independent o f all rationality, the dream world beckons . . . (47-48)
The lability of “loved space"— space that is intimately experienced (like the one we call 
“home”)— corresponds to the amorphous spheres of dream and memory—the space of the 
unconscious— which equally defy definition or fixity. When, during their expedition of 
the house, Navidson and Reston encounter a door with no door knob, Zampano mentions 
Bachelard’s discussion of traumatized children who draw knobs on doors as “kinesthetic 
sign[s]” {House o f  Leaves 188-89). This reference inclines us to suspect that, like 
Bachelard’s “children,” who symbolically enact an escape from (psychic, traumatic) 
imprisonment by depicting a house that one may enter and exit freely (the doors have 
knobs), Navidson and Reston’s encounter with an w«-doorknobbed door suggests an 
analogous traumatic imprisonment.
iv. Schizoanalysis and the house
A person should never represent anything they aren’t 
willing to have come true.
- Richard Powers,
Plowing the Dark, 130
Given the prevalence o f psychoanalytic cues in House o f  Leaves nudging us toward 
Freud, Vidler and Bachelard, it is not surprising that the few critics who have written 
about the novel interpret the text along orthodox psychoanalytic lines. Nell Bemong’s 
“Exploration #6: The Uncanny in Mark Z. Danielewski’s House o f  Leaves” explicitly 
addresses the psychoanalytic dimensions of the novel: she uses the conspicuous traces of 
Freud, Lacan and Heidegger in House o f  Leaves (some o f which I have discussed above)
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to argue that the novel is a “narrative repetition of Freud’s theorization as put forward in 
his essay ‘The Uncanny,’ where Jentsch’s postulation o f intellectual uncertainty is 
replaced by Freud’s concept of suppression” (n.p.). Bemong reads the labyrinthine house 
as something invented by Navidson and Karen, who “created the impenetrable and 
unfathomable labyrinth” as an expression of their “real and phantasmatic traumas.” While 
I would agree with this reading to an extent, I think it goes only as far as Freud’s psychic 
topology will permit. I would suggest that rather than signifying a manifestation or 
projection of its inhabitants’ unutterable and otherwise unrealizable psychic states, the 
house and its labyrinthine interior testify to the impossibility o f psychic interpretation 
though the Freudian model. The house is psychologically poignant, yes, but not because it 
expresses what is concealed or repressed in the minds of those who apprehend it, but 
because, in its perpetual movement between states of solidity and malleability, the house 
reveals the fundamental indeterminacy of psychic operations. Danielewski’s house on 
Ash Tree Lane thus posits neither hidden spaces to be revealed nor boundaries to be 
transgressed—because the space itself is in continual motion. It is the space itself which 
transgresses logic and physical law. Zampano explains:
It would be fantastic if  based on footage from The Navidson Record someone 
were able to construct a bauplan of the house. O f course this is an 
impossibility, not only due to the wall-shifts but also [sic] the film’s constant 
destruction of continuity, frequent jump cuts prohibiting any sort of accurate 
mapmaking. Consequently, in lieu of a schematic, the film offers instead a 
schismatic rendering of empty rooms, long hallways, and dead ends, 
perpetually promising but forever eluding the finality o f an immutable layout. 
(109)
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If viewed as a psychological analogue, then, the house postulates not “repressed*’ 
structures but the absence o f structure per se— a “schismatic” system of forms and 
spaces. And so any corresponding psychic topology, any analytic claim that links, for 
example, one closed door or a constricted hallway with a subject's internal life is 
rendered an ephemeral speculation, a projection of whomsoever claims the linkage. The 
architectural metaphor implies that there should be a blueprint, and yet Zampano writes: 
Where Navidson’s house is concerned, subjectivity seems more a matter of 
degree. The Infinite Corridor, the Anteroom, the Great Hall, and the Spiral 
Staircase, exist for all, though their respective size and even layout sometimes 
changes. Other areas of that place, however, never seem to replicate the same 
pattern twice, or so the film repeatedly demonstrates. No doubt speculation 
will continue for a long time over what force alters and orders the dimensions 
of that place. But even if the shifts turn out to be some kind of absurd 
interactive Rorschach test resulting from some peculiar and as yet 
undiscovered law of physics, Reston’s nausea still reflects how the often 
disturbing disorientation experienced within that place, whether acting 
directly upon the inner ear or the inner labyrinth o f the psyche, can have 
physiological consequences. (178-9)
The house, connected here by Zampano to “subjectivity,” is irreducible to any kind of 
blueprint, is “more a matter of degree.” If there ever was a blueprint, it is constantly being 
redrawn— or reread.1 Or reviewed: the relativity of perception and interpretation is made
1 I m ention read in g  because the novel— as an inscription or textual pictograph o f  the house— might be 
regarded a kind o f  blueprint; but, as I have discussed earlier on in this chapter, its dem arcations offer little 
in the w ay o f  structural solidity, and it is difficult to im agine reading the work in exactly the sam e way  
tw ice, the w ay a blueprint would, if  fo llow ed  exactly, generate identical structures. Rather than providing a 
repeatable, defin itive prescription, the novel (like the house and, as I argue, the psyche) in fact repels and
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plain in Zampano’s comments about labyrinths, the ability to navigate through which is 
entirely different if positioned inside or outside the maze. “[M]aze-treders, whose vision 
ahead and behind is severely constricted and fragmented, suffer confusion,” writes 
Zampano,
whereas maze-viewers who see the pattern whole, from above or in a 
diagram, are dazzled by its complex artistry. What you see depends on where 
you stand, and thus, ait one and the same time, labyrinths are single (there is 
one physical structure) and double: they simultaneously incorporate order and 
disorder, clarity and confusion, unity and multiplicity, artistry and chaos.
They may be perceived as a path (a linear but circuitous passage to a goal). . .
. Our perception of labyrinths is thus intrinsically unstable: change your 
perspective and the labyrinth seems to change. (133-4)
While the dynamic between analyst and analysand may seem to be consistent with the 
one between “maze-treder” and “maze-viewer,” this holds only when the maze is a fixed 
construct. The one viewing the totality of the space “from above” and the subject's 
position within that space, may perceive how the center or exit can be reached, but this 
constitutes the hierarchical situation that Deleuze and Guattari find problematic in the 
analyst/analysand dyad. With a change in perspective, “the labyrinth [may seem] to 
change,” but a labyrinth that itself shifts and morphs relegates both viewer/analyst and 
treder/analysand to positions of equivalent perplexity.
negates interpretation as much as it encourages and invites it. B eginn ing on page 119, for exam ple, is a 
long, sprawling list o f  things that the house does not contain; on the sam e series o f  pages are b oxes o f  text 
which are “transparent” (the “ idea” o f  transparency is achieved  by having the boxed text appear in reverse 
at the exact place on the corresponding overleaf). Footnote 146 on page 120 lists (in justified colum ns along  
the outside edge o f  each page) architectural schools and bu ild ings that cannot be applied to the house; the 
list continues until 134 and terminates in footnote 147, w hich , in “mirroring” colum ns that fo llow  a 
retrograde pagination, is an unjustified, italicized list o f  architects w h ose  w orks are d issim ila r  to the house. 
At page 130, this peculiar but consistent layout becom es progressively  distorted [see A ppendix v].
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That “subjectivity is a matter of degree” is further suggested by the way in which 
“readings” of the house are conditioned by the disciplines and ideologies of those 
advancing the readings. Long after witnessing her husband’s obsessive explorations, 
which destroyed their marriage and killed several o f his cohorts, Karen shows footage of 
the house to a number o f critics, artists and public personalities. Each one puts his or her 
own characteristic spin on the labyrinth that is captured in the film: “Camille Paglia” sees 
it as “the feminine void” (363), artist “Kiki Smith” focuses upon “the surfaces, the 
shapes, dimensions, even all that movement,” and “Jacques Derrida” pontificates: “that 
which is inside, which is to say, if I may say, that which infinitely patterns itself without 
the outside, without the other, though then where is the other?” (361).1 “Harold Bloom” 
pulls his book, The Anxiety o f  Influence, from the shelf and reads to Karen a passage in 
which he quotes Freud: “anxiety can be shown to come from something repressed which 
recurs” (359). Bloom’s response, like the other responses Karen documents, seems sadly 
inept, cookie-cut from the rhetoric of the particular discipline in which he. Bloom, 
happens to possess expertise. He “reads” the film as he would a text, as an emanation o f 
the anxiety a writer necessarily experiences under the “influence” o f a literary precursor 
(who stands for the “ultimate” precursor, the father). Bloom’s approach to the film 
conforms to the Freudian prescription for representation and the psyche, as opposed to a 
more flexible, schizoanalytic interpretation. In light of this, the “critical” take on Karen’s 
footage of the house seems insufficient, highly contingent upon the theoretical or 
practical biases of each individual critic.
1 Zampano h im self quotes Derrida: “The center is at the center o f  the totality, and yet, since, the center does 
not belong to the totality (is not part o f  the totality), the totality has its center elsew here. The center is not 
the center” (112).
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Truant's very visceral response to The Navidson Record, by comparison, seems 
more in keeping with the nature of the labyrinth— unpredictable and “organically” 
emergent, but is still conditioned by his particular psychic debris. Truant’s reaction 
(though he is responding to Zampano’s manuscript and not Karen’s film) is belated, a 
surprise even to himself: while carrying a tray of ink at the tattoo parlor, he “encounters” 
a terrible beast, which causes him to drop the tray and drench him self in ink, symbolically 
effacing himself in its blackness. Truant describes the shock in a fashion that embodies 
moment of fractured reality— or, what I referred to in my introduction, a schizoanalytic 
“breakdown”:
The rest is in pieces. A scream, a howl, a roar. A ll’s warping, or 
splintering. That makes no sense. . . .
Everything falls apart.
Stories heard but not recalled.
Letters too.
Words filling my head. Fragmenting like artillery shells, Shrapnel, 
like syllables, firing elsewhere. Terrible syllables. Sharp. Cracked. Traveling 










Without meaning— I'm  afraid not.
The shape of a shape of a shape o f a face dis(as)sembling right before 
my eyes. (71)
In the fragments, we find traces of his mother (her “letters” from the asylum, “stories 
heard but not recalled” that she would tell him about his childhood); she is present, but 
nothing in the passage guides us toward any definitive meaning o f her presence. The 
fragmentary nature of the passage is itself the meaning, the tale o f inner workings in 
Truant’s mind. His interpretation of The Navidson Record is similarly inflected by his 
own history, but the inflections don’t give rise to any definitive explanation for his 
interpretation. Excavating the crossed-out sections of the manuscript, Truant discovers 
Zampano’s description of the minotaur, the deformed son of King Midas, who, out of 
shame, sends the minotaur into the labyrinth. Truant, the son of a mentally ill mother and 
deadbeat father, imputes himself into the script, remarking, “I discovered a particularly 
disturbing coincidence. Well, what did I expect, serves me right, right? It means that’s 
what you get from wanting to turn The Minotaur into a homie” (336). What he
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“discovers,” we deduce later on, is that “the minotaur” is anagram for “O Im he Truant.” 
So has Truant (his own name suggesting absence) grafted himself onto the absent, effaced 
(crossed-out) minotaur figure, or is Truant another of Zampano’s creations? Zampano 
writes:
Perhaps in the margins of darkness, I could create a son who is not missing; 
who lives beyond even my own imagination and invention; whose lusts, 
stupidities and strengths carry him further than even he or I can anticipate. . . .  
He will fulfill a promise I made years ago but failed to keep. (543)
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We can only assume that this “promise” involves the Navidson Record; Truant points to 
this, also using the language of failure: “There's only one choice now. . . [F]inish the 
book Zampano himself failed to finish. Re-inter this thing into a binding tomb. Make it 
only a book” (327). Thus is reception revealed to be the twin force of perception; the 
viewer (or, in terms of my earlier interpretation of City o f  Glass, the “experimenter”) 
inflects what is observed with the currents of his or her own thought.
The house on Ash Tree Lane exemplifies and enacts the orderly disorder that is 
the omphalic design in the chaotics of schizoanalysis. “Absolutely nothing visible to the 
eye,” writes Zampano, “provides a reason for or even evidence o f those terrifying shifts 
which in a matter o f moments reconstitute a simple path into an extremely complicated 
one'’ (69). The house is alternately stable and unstable, constant and shifting. As much as 
the structure deteriorates, it regenerates. Locating the right passage becomes a rite o f  
passage.l If this is so, between what states, or from where to where, does Navidson's 
journey into the labyrinth signify passage! What does Navidson discover at the centre of 
the house? Not the minotaur he expects. More alarming than any monster, there is 
nothing— or rather an infinite extension of nothing. Like the man in Borges’ story “The 
Circular Ruins” who dreams a son into being only to discover that he himself is the 
product o f a dream and is immolated at the center of circular ruins, Navidson penetrates
1 In Through the Labyrin th  (2000), Herman Kern describes the labyrinth as an em bodim ent o f  initiation 
rites: “[A labyrinth is] an interior space isolated from its surroundings. An external w all surrounds and there 
is only one sm all entrance. The interior space resem bles an architectural ground plan and appears 
alarmingly com plicated at first glance. A  certain level o f  maturity is required to understand the shape of, as 
w ell as to make a decision  to venture into, a labyrinth. . . . The interior space is filled with the maximum  
number o f  tw ists and turns possible— meaning the greatest loss o f  tim e and the most physical exertion for 
the walker on the w ay to his or her goal, the center. The experience o f  repeatedly approaching the goal, 
only to be led away from it again, causes psychological strain. S ince there are no ch oices to be made on the 
path to the center, those w ho stand this strain w ill inevitably reach the center. This experience is sym bolic  
o f  the conform ity to natural laws and is not limited to subjective, arbitrary experience. Once at the center, 
the subject is all alone, encountering him - or herself, a d ivine principle, a Minotaur, or anything else for 
which “the center” m ight stand. In any case, it is meant to be the p lace w here one encounters som ething so 
basic that it dem ands a fundamental change o f  direction. . . . [TJurning around at the center does not just 
mean giving up on e’s previous existence; it also marks a new  b eginn ing” (30).
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the unreal maze to become, finally, weightless with only the lit pages of The Navidson 
Record to approximate anything outside his self—and finally the light burns out.
But “nothing'’ permits the advancement o f something. The house and the novel 
both act as psychological “blue screens,” meaning those who enter/read the maze 
effectively come into an empty structure which activates mind to provide form, content or 
meaning. This is the inevitable situation of fiction. Danielewski is explicit about this 
point, saying in an interview: “Our fictions are real enough in themselves, but, as signs 
pointing to any world outside the fiction or the dream, they have no factual status. All 
thought, being fiction, tends towards this situation. We may think about reality all we 
please, but we shall never reach it in thought” (48). The radical mutations and 
dislocations depicted within and comprising House o f  Leaves itself have, for a number of 
reviewers, indicated a deep nihilism, an effacement of any sense of stability, meaning, or 
selfhood. But this is to overlook the effects of terror as means o f identifying what is 
valued, what one defends from perceived, imagined, or actual threats. Danielewski 
explains that luring readers into his labyrinth, and the ontological subversion it generates, 
works toward affirmations both ideological and ontological. He says:
“Meaningless” and “terror” cannot exist together at the same time. At the 
heart of any terror is the fear of losing what we find meaningful. Even “terror 
of the meaningless” is the same; the fear that our lives will be rendered 
inconsequential. In a strange and perhaps ironic way— especially when 
elicited by the thought of others in peril— terror can actually be evidence of 
our ability to care and generate significance. (Cottrell n.p.)
If the house can be taken to be an architectural representation o f the psyche, then, what 
does its evasiveness to delineation, its lack of adherence to form in House o f  Leaves
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imply in terms of psychological investigation? A problematization of this (domestic, 
ontologically symbolic) space, in short, allows for a productive problematization of the 
psyche. We might wonder about the psyche in the same way that Truant wonders about 
the house on Ash Tree Lane:
Is it merely an aberration of physics? Some kind of warp in space? Or just a 
topiary labyrinth on a much grander scale? Perhaps it serves a funereal 
purpose? Conceals a secret? Protects something? Imprisons or hides some 
kind of monster? Or, for that matter, imprisons or hides an innocent? As the 
Holloway team soon discovers, answers to these questions are not exactly 
forthcoming. ( I l l )
We may adopt the same language— “physics,” “labyrinth,” “scale,” “conceals," 
“purpose”— in our interrogations of psychic processes, but we will likewise find 
answers “not exactly forthcoming.” The schizoanalytic model (which can only loosely 
be termed a “model”) would, within the conditions embodied by the house, appears to 
be the more productive and a p t; analytic strategy: While the purpose of Freudian 
psychoanalysis is to restore links which have been broken (through which neurosis 
emerges), to liberate the repressed through articulation, to, in essence, reconstruct a 
psychic and somatic order in the subject, schizoanalysis resists binaries like 
repressed/expressed and order/disorder altogether, acknowledging the coincidence and 
simultaneity o f seemingly polar processes and states. The Freudian either/or, which 
schizoanalysis deems to be superimposition rather than revelation of order, is 
supplanted by the Deleuzo-Guattarian and/and.
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The literary machine thus becomes the relay for a 
revolutionary machine-to-come, not at all for 
ideological reasons but because the literary machine 
alone is determined to fill the conditions o f collective 
enunciation that are lacking elsewhere in the milieu: 
literature is the people's concern.
- Deleuze and Guattari. Kafka: Tow ard  
a Minor Literature, 17-8
Chaotic narratives illuminate the inherent indeterminacy and instability o f cultural and 
psychological systems. They undermine masternarratives in the same way that chaos 
theory undermined the tenets of classical physics— the discreteness o f physical matter, 
the linear cause-and-effect chain o f natural processes, and the ultimate knowability of 
natural laws. Chaos theory has been called “postmodern science,” in part, because its 
development roughly coincided with a cultural shift towards heterogeneity and. in part, 
because technological innovation since the 1970s has made possible the complex 
computations involved in studying nonlinear dynamical systems. As Hayles says in her 
introduction to Chaos Bound'.
The postmodern context [specifically, Hayles is referring to the proliferation 
of the microcomputer] catalyzed the formation of the new science by 
providing a cultural and technological milieu in which the component parts 
came together and mutually reinforced each other until they were no longer 
isolated events but an emergent awareness o f the constructive roles that 
disorder, nonlinearity, and noise play in complex systems. (7)
The convergence o f chaotic science and literary practice is, in some respects, an 
inevitable one because, as Conte explains, “there has been a homologous development in 
which the two disciplines move independently but to shared convictions regarding the
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nature of chaos. Correspondences between the self-similarity of tropes in a literary form 
and in a fractal are not accidental, but the refraction o f a common observation in each 
discipline” (3). In analyzing a set of texts, I have borrowed from chaos theory and related 
fields (fractal geometry, Heisenbergian uncertainty, Maxwell’s Demon) structural and 
operational terms like bifurcation, recursion, complexity, fractal and alinearity. My goal 
has been to demonstrate how these structures work to express psychological operations 
that are unaccounted for in the deterministic semiotics o f Freud. The anti-psychiatry of 
Deleuze and Guattari, I have argued, provides a suitable theoretical framework within 
which we may discern the psychological significance o f chaotics narratives. Where Freud 
and his disciples posit the oedipal myth (with its substructures: the pleasure principle, the 
death drive, the castration complex, and arch-signifier— the phallus) as the governing 
force of the unconscious, Deleuze and Guattari propose an altogether more flexible and, 
for the individual, a more empowering psychic arrangement. The significations and 
representations o f classical psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari contend in Anti- 
Oedipus, are a means of instilling a social homogeneity; as such, Oedipus becomes “part 
of those things we must dismantle through the united assault o f analytical and political 
forces” (x). Thus, in works like Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, the philosopher- 
analyst duo argue for a mode of psychic apprehension that not only tolerates but 
encourages in the subject erratic, contradictory and indeterminate kinds of transformation. 
Their polemic, “designed as a matrix of independent but cross-referential discourses 
which the reader is invited to enter more or less at random” (Moulthrop 300), embodies 
the very tenets o f their argument, rendering “causality”— both theoretically and 
textually— multitudinous to the point of being unformulizable, overdetermined. Deleuze
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and Guattari provide a vivid account of multiplicity— a psychosocial rhizome—that 
includes the family (indeed, creates the family) but is not reduced to it:
The father, the mother, and the self are at grips with, and directly coupled to, 
the elements of the political and historical situation— the soldier, the cop, the 
occupier, the collaborator, the radical, the register, the boss, the boss's wife— 
who constantly break all triangulations, and who prevent the entire situation 
from falling back on the familial complex and becoming internalized in it. In 
a word, the family is never a microcosm in the sense o f an autonomous figure, 
even when inscribed in a larger circle that it is said to mediate and express. 
The family is by nature eccentric, decentered. We are told of fusional, 
divisive tubular, and foreclosing families. But what produces the hiatuses and 
their distribution that indeed keep the family from being an “interior”? There 
is always an uncle from America; a brother who went bad; an aunt who took 
off with a military man; a cousin out of work, bankrupt, or a victim of the 
Crash; an anarchist grandfather; a grandmother in the hospital, crazy or 
senile. The family does not engender its own ruptures. Families are filled with 
gaps and transected by breaks that are not familial: the Commune, the 
Dreyfus Affair, the Vietnam way, May 68— all these things form complexes 
o f the unconscious, more effective than everlasting Oedipus. {Anti-Oedipus 
97)
The Deleuzo-Guattarian self is part of a matrix of information and impulses that 
transcends the Freudian trinity (“mommy-daddy-me”) and exists, rather, in an interactive 
dynamic with social, political, technological, environmental, and all other phenomena.
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The self is both organic and mechanical— machinic— and develops along multiple axes of 
effectivity.
But what does the schizoanalytic model look like and, more importantly, how 
does it work? This, I have argued, is where narrative becomes important and, in 
particular, chaotic narratives, as the space of schizoanalytic expression and effectuation. 
Deleuze and Guattari locate in Beckett’s Unnamable (1959), for example, “a succession 
of irregular loops, now sharp and short as in the waltz, now of a parabolic sweep" (20) 
that exemplify schizoid subjectivity, which is never fixed to a central point (as it is, for 
example, in the Oedipal narrative) but is forever oscillating between states of order and 
disorder. The oscillation is a chaotic one, as each transformation is perpetually processed 
back into the system, so that the psyche incorporates new information as it develops. This 
feedbacking is expressed in the various quests or searches that are staged in City o f  Glass 
(the Stillman mystery), Undenx’orld (the baseball genealogy), Infinite Jest (the 
whereabouts of the deadly cartridge) and House o f  Leaves (the nature o f the house on Ash 
Tree Lane)— where new information or “clues” remove the searcher (and, by extension, 
the reader) ever further from a resolution. Similarly, the accrual o f information about a 
character’s experience—through memory, flashback, photograph, or allegorical 
intertext— repels us further from any deterministic system that might account for his or 
her psychic development. A chaotic narrative perplexes and invigorates the reader’s 
critical capacity by defamiliarizing cultural and psychological patterns we take to be 
orderly, predictable and finite. Thus, as Deleuze writes in Essays Critical and Clinical, 
the writer becomes “a physician, the physician of himself and of the world” (3).
Theory itself can become an oppressive regime in its effort to create a totalizing 
logic: “the more powerful the logical system, the more powerless the reader comes to
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feel” (Jameson 5). The theorist’s objective, the creation of an impenetrable arrangement 
of ideas and explications, is ultimately his impediment because the reader’s capacity for 
revolution is paralyzed by the very inflexibility of the theorist's argument. We see the 
trap of such inflexibility in Brooks’ Reading fo r  the Plot (which I have discussed at some 
length in my introduction). It is true that, towards the end of his exegesis, Brooks remarks 
upon the recent trend in narrative to deviate from the so-called “masterplof ’ of Freudian 
psychoanalysis; he refers to narratives that express a “pervasive suspicion that plot 
falsifies more subtle kinds of interconnectedness” as “bad conscience plots” (113).
If the novels of Joyce and Woolf and Proust and Gide, and then Faulkner and 
Robbe-Grillet, cannot ultimately do without plotting insofar as they remain 
narrative structures that signify, they plot with irony and bad conscience, 
intent (in thewery different ways) to expose the artifices of formal structure 
and human design. Whereas it was part of the triumph o f the nineteenth- 
century novel in its golden age to plot with a good conscience, in confidence 
that the elaboration of plot corresponded to, and illuminated, human 
complexities. (113-14)
But is it really the case that the so-called “bad conscience” plots of writers like Joyce, 
Proust and Faulkner— simply because they do not align with principles established by 
Newton, Darwin, or Freud—portray the “artifice” of “human design”? Do they portray 
“artifice” at all? Or (and I would consider this more to the point) do these rogue plots 
testify to a human design that cannot—given the cultural conditions of the twentieth- 
century— be confined to previously unquestioned masternarratives? Johnston’s 
commentary on DeLillo’s work is instructive on this point:
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[If fiction explores] new ways of thinking in and about the postmodern world, 
especially as conceived and represented in the generally unfamiliar terms of 
physics, mathematics, technology and systems theory, it is because this world 
presents itself specifically as a multiplicity o f forces and relations that can no 
longer be mastered by a centered subject nor even represented by 
conventional novelistic forms. {Information Multiplicity 180)
Thus, what Brooks takes to be the “triumph” of the nineteenth-century novel is, rather, a 
reflection of the philosophical principles of the period and not a sign a masterful 
illumination of “human complexities.” This is not to diminish the particular achievements 
o f Flaubert, Hardy and others, but to dismantle the “good” and “bad conscience” binary 
that, for Brooks, depends upon a narrative's relative congruence with psychosocial 
models that dominated nineteenth- and early-twentieth century philosophy in the West.
As I argued in my introductory comments, the “truths” and universals o f Newton and 
Kant have been revealed to be mere approximations: Einstein showed us that time, an 
apparently “constant” physical unit of measurement, fluctuates depending on speed; 
Heisenberg discovered that the assessment of a particle's behavior is contingent upon the 
way in which it is observed. If, as Zola says in Le roman experiment ale, the novelist must 
be like a scientist, then “chaotic narrators” like Auster, DeLillo, Wallace and Danielewski 
are certainly novelists in the way that Zola recommends. Their fictions— structurally 
complex, culturally perspicacious and psychologically dynamic— reveal the rhizomatic 
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